Rym Momtaz, Rosa Balfour, and Stefan Lehne debate whether it is still worth it for Europeans to try and placate Donald Trump.
Since U.S. President Donald Trump has returned to the White House, several crises have affected the transatlantic relationship.
Rym Momtaz, Rosa Balfour, and Stefan Lehne reflect on whether Europeans should stop considering the United States as the partner it once was.
[00:00:00] Intro, [00:00:57] Was it Worth it for Europe to Appease Trump?, [00:13:22] EU Dependence on the U.S. in Different Domains, [00:24:56] Is the U.S. Still a Reliable Partner for Europe?
Rym Momtaz, ed., May 7, 2026, “Taking the Pulse: Is it Worth it for Europeans to Placate Trump?,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Rym Momtaz, May 5, 2026, “Europeans Are Quiet Quitting the United States,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Rym Momtaz, ed., April 9, 2026, “Taking the Pulse: Can NATO Survive the Iran War?,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Stefan Lehne, March 24, 2026, “Time to Merge the Commission and EEAS,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Stefan Lehne, February 12, 2026, “What Can the EU Do About Trump 2.0?,” Carnegie Europe.
Rosa Balfour, February 8, 2026, “Dependence on the United States Is Deeply Rooted in the European Mindset,” Le Monde.
Rosa Balfour, January 24, 2026, “The EU Finally Used an Economic Threat Against Trump. But the Markets Forces his Climbdown,” The Guardian.
Rosa Balfour, January 6, 2026, “The Cost of Europe’s Weak Venezuela Response,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Stefan Lehne, November 4, 2025, “Can the EU Meet the Trump Moment?,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Rosa Balfour, Stefan Lehne, and Elena Ventura, September 22, 2025, “The European Radical Right in the Age of Trump 2.0,” Carnegie Europe.
Rym Momtaz
Hello and welcome to a new episode of Europe Inside Out. I'm your host, Rym Momtaz, and I'm the editor in chief of Carnegie Europe’s Strategic Europe, where twice a week we publish punchy short analysis on all things strategic in Europe. Today we're delving into what is probably the core of strategic affairs in Europe. It could be summarized by one question. Is it still worth it for Europeans to placate U.S. President Donald Trump? There's obviously a lot to unpack with that question. And to do just that, I'm delighted to be joined by Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe, also my boss. Hi, Rosa.
Rosa Balfour
Hi.
Rym Momtaz
And Stefan Lehne, senior fellow at Carnegie Europe. Hi, Stefan.
Stefan Lehne
Hi Rym.
Rym Momtaz
So, as I said, lots to unpack. Just to give our listeners a bit of context. We are in May 2026, a lot has happened over the past year and a half since President Trump has come back to the White House. There was a first phase where after an initial very tough meeting in the White House by the president of Ukraine with U.S. President, European leaders decided, in a way, to do whatever it took to keep President Trump on side. And that included a whole lot of what I like to call genuflection. And then the Greenland crisis occurred where suddenly there was a serious threat of possible military move, not to say invasion by the U.S. Against Greenland. And then we got this war that the U.S. And Israel launched against Iran without any consultation between the U.S. And European partners and allies, even though the U.S. clearly needs the U.S. bases in Europe in order to be able to launch and prosecute this war. And then it became a series of attacks by the U.S. President against the Europeans for not doing more in a war in which they were not consulted, but for which they are paying some of the highest price. And finally when the German chancellor, perhaps not very wisely, said to a group of students that there was no strategy in the current war, the U.S. president wasn't happy and seems to have announced a withdrawal of U.S. soldiers from Germany in a way that wasn't necessarily concerted, that hadn't gone through the usual process. So, it led me to think, you know, was the year of genuflection for nothing. Is it still worth it to try to placate him? And I'm going to go to you, Rosa, first, you've been working on this for a very long time. I can't think of a better person. What do you think?
Rosa Balfour
Thank you very much, Rym, and thank you for inviting me to talk with you and Stefan today. So, I think, is it worth it? I think the straight answer is no. Should Europeans continue trying to placate Trump? The straight answer is no. Was it worth it? I would perhaps say that Europeans managed to buy a few months’ time because the whole goal of the appeasement policy of 2025 was to keep the U.S. in Europe, to keep Russia out of Europe, to keep Europeans together and to support Ukraine. And so there was a very, very deliberate short-term goal to support Ukraine and to keep U.S. military support running toward Ukraine. And I guess for a few months that was achieved. But I think what the tactic underestimated was the degree to which the U.S. President and his entourage are not committed to alliances, the degree to which they are not committed to rules and the antipathy they hold towards Europe as a whole and the European Union in particular. And so even before the Greenland debacle, where that became painfully clear, we had the national security strategy and we had the abduction of President Maduro from Venezuela, a sort of special military operation that, went against international law. The signs were there, that even if Europeans managed to achieve a short-term goal of keeping the U.S. still engaged in Ukraine, it did not matter in the sense that commitments are not important, commitments can be broken and even international and domestic law, in the case of Venezuela and in the case of Iran, can be broken. And so there was a very practical short-term goal of keeping the U.S. in briefly. And Rym, you and I were both at the NATO summit and we felt that the floor was split between those saying, well, Rutte calling him daddy, he's just doing his job. And those feeling, wow, that is really humiliating. But, you know, that's tactics. The point being it's tactics did not amount to a strategy and it didn't last very long. Therefore, it should not be pursued in the future.
Rym Momtaz
Rosa, are you worried that the U.S. could do, I wouldn't say abduct an EU leader, but could it violate the, let's say, laws of a European country the way it did in Venezuela?
Rosa Balfour
I think the Greenland risk is not over. From what I gather, the talks between Greenlanders, Danes, and the Americans are not going that well. It would depend a bit on where Donald Trump's attention turns to, but I think, you know, looking at what is happening in Iran, I would not exclude that the U.S. President would like to embark on another foreign policy adventure, to cover up for failed foreign policy adventures or to cover up for domestic trouble. It might not necessarily be, you know, in Europe. Cuba seems to be the next candidate for this type of adventurism. But I think the key point is that the U.S. President clearly believes that being unpredictable is a tool for U.S. power. He sees that as a clever tool. He uses it regularly. He likes to keep his allies in a situation of uncertainty. And I mean, you know, Donald Trump has just arrived in Beijing for the summit, the U.S.-China summit, which had been delayed because of Iran, and now, Taiwan and Asian allies are worried that Donald Trump is going to consult with Xi Jinping before deciding on what, arm transfers to send to Taiwan. So he's using this kind of uncertainty over what the next U.S. posture will be as a tool, presumably with the idea that this gives greater power to U.S. projection. I assume that is his goal. So I think all allies, all countries around the world need to keep that in mind when they're designing strategies to deal with the United States and designing strategies that are focused on, as you call it, genuflection or focus on appeasement may not necessarily work in the longer term because Donald Trump doesn't seem to have much respect for those types of positions, whereas he has shown to have respect for leaders who show that they are tough, who are willing to speak their minds, like Putin or Xi Jinping. He has shown admiration for this type of diplomatic posture. So, I think Europeans really need to think hard about the next steps, not just in the transatlantic relationship, but the next steps also in protecting Europe from possible future bones of contention that U.S. President might pull out of his hat of tricks.
Rym Momtaz
Stefan, Rosa is drawing a difference between the immediate short term and the longer term. And so saying in the short term, perhaps trying to appease Donald Trump was to a certain extent successful or effective, but actually in the longer term, it's not. What's your assessment?
Stefan Lehne
Well, I think the point of departure, the two points of departure is one is Trump doesn't like Europe the way it's set up at the moment. I think the national security strategy made this very clear. The visits by Vance and Rubio to Munich have rubbed the message in basically in a very provocative fashion
Rym Momtaz
At the Munich Security Conference both in 2025 and 2026.
Stefan Lehne
The second point is that obviously Trump, considers this policy of accommodation of the flattery and psycho fancy as a sign of weakness. Basically, that encourages him to come back for more concessions, discussion about trade, about technology passes out very clearly. I think by now the Europeans have understood where we are. And clearly, as Rosa has said, the Greenland episode was sort of a wake-up call, if it was still needed at this point. And of course the Iran war also had a huge impact on the European mood. I think the European public got really angry because they are paying the cost basically for the war in some significant ways and the risks of it too. and therefore the politicians had to accommodate basically this public anger. So you have a much more negative attitude, but still a huge spectrum basically between Prime Minister Sanchez of Spain, who is very forthright in his rejection of Trump policies, paying a certain price for it. I think he gets a lot of anger from Washington these days. And on the other hand there is Rutte, who is still behaving as sort of an honorary member of the court of Donald Trump. It's his job profile, basically. You can't really blame him so much. But also, if you look at Tusk and Eastern European politicians, they are still primarily preoccupied by this concern about the U.S. leaving Europe altogether. So, they are still very, very cautious. And in between that, you have people like Starmer, who is critical but tries not to be provocative, Macron in a way, a similar way, even Meloni, who's been the favorite politician of Trump, now taking certain distance when he attacks the Pope. And I think Merz, you pointed this out, is a perfect example of how not to do it. Still, in his visit to Washington, he was still on the kind of flattery, accommodating line. And then talking to students suddenly saying Iran is humiliating the U.S. That was really crazy. That's what should not be done. I find that the recent positions of the institutional leaders of Europe have been quite reasonable and good, basically. I think von der Leyen focuses on her main business that is trade in this context. And she's trying to remain an interlocutor for the administration, doing her job reasonably well. And I like best of all the President of the European Council, Costa, who says, well, the slogan should be stay calm and carry on, which was the slogan of the British government at the time of the split. And I think that captures this perfectly. There’s another old adage coming from Roosevelt, I think that is very applicable to the current situation. That is, speak softly and carry a big stick. I think the problem that Europe is facing at the moment, we have a very puny stick. I think the real conclusion from the experience of the second Trump administration that we seriously have to invest in stick, but not just in the defense area, but also when it comes to economic competitiveness, when it comes to technology. And I think if the Trump administration triggers a much more serious effort in building capacities, creating genuine autonomy, then I think we might still come out of this very painful experience in a better way.
Rym Momtaz
So it's interesting you talk about sticks because for me there are clearly two major areas where Europe and the United States need to figure out perhaps a new kind of relationship. There's obviously the security and defense basket, and then there's the economic-tech basket. And actually the sticks aren't the same on the security and defense basket, the European stick is quite weak and meek. It's being strengthened and bolstered, but it's not there yet. And then there's the economic-tech one where actually the EU has a much bigger stick than, at least I feel it has, put on the table in its negotiations with the United States. So, Stefan, I'll go to you. Why, why is it that, for example, in the EU-U.S. trade negotiations of 2025, a bigger stick wasn't used by von der Leyen and the EU team?
Stefan Lehne
I think you need to differentiate the sticks even further. There's the military thing, and everybody agrees we're still dependent on the U.S. we have to do much more with the aim of eventually becoming more autonomous in this area. When it comes to the economy, there's a big difference, I think, between trade and technology. On technology, I think Europe is an American colony. I think 90% of European data run on American servers. In terms of cloud, et cetera we have totally subserved, totally basically captured by American big business. And that will not change for quite a while. And it's a big concern because this is going to probably strategically one of the most important dimensions of global relationships. When it comes to trade, of course, the EU in theory is much stronger. We've always said here we are really a world global power, etc. I think the choice last year not to fight back against the tariffs with countermeasures, I think is due to two reasons and one has been already identified by Rosa. One is clearly the concerned that a confrontational trade war would spill over into the Ukraine management, basically that the Americans, if they are very angry in the trade war, they will pull out even more rapidly. Turned out, they're pulling out anyway. So ultimately this hasn't made so much difference. But the other reason is that Europe was divided, right? The French were about French economic interest, the Germans about the car industry. And there were a lot of processed entrenched interests that pushed against a robust European response. And I think the commission was prepared for it. They came up with this 90 billion package of countervailing tariffs. But there was not sufficient support in the EU, for going in this direction. And now in May 2026 we see the same situation essentially because the Turnberry Agreement is sort of still hold up by the European Parliament. But essentially I would think the majority of member states and the majority of economic interests that are influencing this is still going forward with accepting this unfair and unequal agreement, because they are afraid that if not an American response would create further damage. So the Americans are still stronger also on the trade relationship where Europe has prided itself on being such a fantastic power.
Rym Momtaz
But isn't that interesting because it's not just theoretical. I mean the Europeans are the biggest providers of foreign direct investment in the U.S. by far, by far. Even tech, by the way. Yes, the Europeans are fully dependent on U.S. tech, but U.S. tech giants could not continue developing their algorithms and their development without access to extremely valuable data from the European users. And that's the thing that always strikes me. It feels like Europeans are masters at always minimizing the leverage that they do have. So Rosa, you said from the beginning they tried in 2025, it worked somewhat in some way to delay perhaps what was anyways going to happen. And now we seem to be in the phase of what was anyways going to happen, which is actually since Trump came back to the White House, the U.S. has no longer given military aid to Ukraine. It has provided weapons that were bought by the Europeans for Ukraine and so on and so forth. We talked about the Turnberry agreement, which is basically the U.S.-EU trade agreement that is now being again put into question and violated by the U.S. President himself. Is there any way with their current vulnerabilities today that the Europeans can kind of liberate themselves from this stranglehold.
Rosa Balfour
A few points. And they really, you know, follow, follow on what Stefan has already said. I mean, first of all, the current debate now on the U.S.-EU trade agreement here in Brussels is to introduce some sunset clauses. So, if the U.S. does not abide by, the trade agreement, then the EU too, can A, pull out, B, retaliate, et cetera. So, I think that perhaps is this a kind of practical way forward, that can protect the EU from possible changes, on the U.S. side. The second point, I mean, it's very interesting how last July, last summer, when we were talking about the EU-U.S. Trade agreement, I was really wondering about the degree to which the trade community and the security community here in Europe had actually banged their heads together to provide a sort of analysis of the relative strength and weight of Europe vis-a-vis U.S. power. And I'm not entirely sure the balance was correct. I mean, the trade agreement was really quite flawed in favor of the United States. And you we talk about European strategic vulnerabilities and you know, our security deficiencies. But if you look at it purely from the prism of Ukraine, well, it was already in January 2024 that European military support started to exceed U.S. military support.
Rym Momtaz
Even under President Biden.
Rosa Balfour
Exactly. Financial, humanitarian, and economic support was always the burden that was mostly carried by Europeans. And come mid-2026 Ukraine is still holding in the field. The process of enlargement that is Ukraine joining the European Union might be moving forward. So, you know, it's not as if Europeans have not been able to support Ukraine. Ukraine did not capitulate and in fact, you know, in recent weeks, Russia has had to move back a little bit on the battlefront. So, sometimes I feel in all this discussion we get stuck in narratives and we don't actually see the trajectories that change. And there has been change. And you know, the next time you know, defense budgets as a percentage of GDP are pulled up in the NATO context. You know, there was the 2% goal that was decided upon in 2014 that European NATO members were mostly not meeting. Now they've agreed to a 5% goal. Well, you know, we're going to have the Ankara summit in July. Now today the defense spending of many countries has really shot up. So in my view, the challenge for Europe is less to do about the relationship with the U.S. but it's actually in getting its act together to make sure that all that additional defense spending is actually carried out in an integrated and efficient way so that Europeans can actually take a much more proactive role in their own deterrence. And to an extent that need not require the United States. The key point is that Europeans need to find their concept for deterrence, they need to find their doctrine for deterrence, and they need to make sure that their defense spending and everything that is entailed through defense spending, procurement, the industrial, um policy based etc. Is really geared towards that goal. And I think that is where if this does not happen and it has to happen now, if that does not happen, this is where we see not so much the strategic dependence on the U.S. but the cognitive dependence on the U.S. I mean are Europeans actually able to come together and to figure out how to handle one threat? Because at this stage, we're still talking about Russia and Ukraine, one specific threat. And you know, I'd be really happy if later in the conversation we also talk about, you know, the transatlantic relationship and other global issues, because I think that's something that you know, it doesn't, doesn't come into the debates enough. But that to me is the real challenge. And this is, you know, something that you know, many Europeans have been arguing, you know, for years, well before Trump, that you know, Europeans really need to get their act together in defining what the security environment is like and what they want to contribute. And I think that's going to be the real challenge is divorcing the U.S. from a cognitive and a strategic perspective beyond the material perspective because things are shifting and ditto in terms of trade. I mean Stefan's right that trade and technology are two different areas. And the EU is much more powerful when it comes to trade and hasn't been very reluctant to use those tools which honestly weren't even used in the case of Greenland, because I mean they mooted the idea of the anti-coercion instrument but they didn't implement it because you know the markets picked up on that and Trump decided to backtrack. So it's untested territory even on the trade front, but obviously on technology Europeans lack the competitiveness and the innovation, et cetera, et cetera. And we all know the Letta report, we all know the Draghi report. So, the question is why is it that Europeans, even if we've had these policy guidelines for a long time. Why they're not moving on them. And again, I don't think it's because of the U.S., I think it's because of blockages in the member states mostly. So, there's some hard questions that really need to be turned onto the Europeans, beyond what is happening in the White House, beyond guessing what Trump's next step is.
Rym Momtaz
So, you know, I think we spend a lot of time on this podcast and in our work at Carnegie Europe talking about the differences, the divergences, between EU member states. There is something that you said that touches upon, I think, a theme that we don't often talk about or don't talk about enough, which is the contradictions in the U.S. position. So first, the U.S. position is not. This is not a Trumpian issue. I think now perhaps most EU leaders have understood that the problem is not related to the personality just of President Donald Trump. Obviously, his personality, the way you described it, Rosa, his penchant for using and abusing unpredictability, his petulant nature sometimes doesn't help. But you also mentioned that even under President Biden there had been some issues with support for Ukraine, for example, we haven't talked about the Inflation Reduction act, which was complete body blow to European green tech and the green sector. That was obviously done by President Biden. AUKUS, also, a huge issue for France, for example, no talks or negotiations or coordination with the Europeans, again done by the United States under President Biden. And at the core of that is something we were discussing just now, which is the Europeans needing to build up a real defense sector and a real defense industry, and for that, needing to make sure that they apply in their purchases and procurement policies. A European first, if not a European preference, policy. And whenever you bring that up, whether it's a Democrat in the White House or a Republican in the White House, there is an immediate and very strong opposition to that. And the United States puts pressure on the European governments not to go down that line. So, Stefan, to you, how much of an issue is that as well, the American, we can call it incoherence, we can call it hypocrisy. They keep saying, you know, Barack Obama was the first one who called the Europeans free riders. People forget that. So they've been saying that for many, many years, you know, decades. And yet when the Europeans start taking real action. And obviously, admittedly, they haven't done much of that, but when they do start doing that, there's immediate U.S. pressure for them not to do it.
Stefan Lehne
I mean, obviously there's something schizophrenic about American attitudes. On the one hand, what is obvious is that their commitment to Europe is weakening. And it's not just a matter of Trump. It's something that will continue because of the pivot to Asia. The rise of Asia is a concern. So it's quite logical no one who will replace Trump will be a pro-European president in the old sense. They will all have their minds elsewhere, and their commitment to European security will not be what it was in the 80s or 90s. That is obvious. At the same time, and that's very interesting also for Trump, they don't sort of consider Europe as something that is unimportant and irrelevant. They want to shape it and they want to change it. They have not given up their kind of neocolonialized, hegemonistic attitudes towards Europe. Comes across very clearly in the national security strategy, where they say civilization in Eurasia is threatening. European countries are losing their European character because of their irresponsible migration policy and this has to be changed. And therefore the U.S. has to work with patriotic parties and support them and change the kind of way that European politics are going at the moment. This aggressive attitude has not been there previously. This is something completely new and very specific to Trump. And it's backfiring in a major way, fortunately I must say. I think that the defeat of Orban was a very important event. Vance had some days previously visited and made a fervent plea to support Orban. Obviously, this doesn't mean that the radical right is defeated in Europe. we have seen concerning developments in Bulgaria, Romania. If you look at polling in France and other places, the threat to the EU that comes from this direction is very much alive. But I think we should encourage Vice President Vance to extensively travel around Europe in the coming months. And then I think we could be much on safer grounds because obviously the kind of Trumpian policy towards Europe is creating a lot of resistance, even by voters of AfD and RF and other parties, he is deeply unpopular. And therefore this notion that MAGA can sort of reshape Europe in its own image, it's not going to work out. And that, I think, is an opportunity for Europe basically to forge its own identity again. Also becoming more autonomous in an ideological sense, as it were.
Rym Momtaz
Rosa, I want to end with you, because Stefan said the U.S., despite its schizophrenia and also its brutality toward Europe, recognizes that Europe is essential mainly for its projection of power. Let's just call it what it is. And we're seeing it with the Iran war. But if we go even a step further and look at the more macro vision here, and we look at the world. First of all, has the U.S. Become a central, maybe main, source of destabilization for Europe on the world stage? And also, is the U.S. still a real partner for Europe when it comes to global issues? Even when it comes to things like health, like climate? What's your assessment of that part of the transatlantic relationship?
Rosa Balfour
So, I mean, at the moment the U.S. is not a partner for Europe and cannot be seen in these terms. But I do think this doesn't mean that one has to give up on the United States. The transatlanticists in the U.S. have been a shrinking minority. and I think now, and I was recently in Washington, I think now there is a recognition that if, you know, if we want to think ahead to, you know, in a few years time and perhaps there's a change of government in the United States, the transatlanticists need to come together across the ponds on new terms. The relationship needs new terms and those new terms need to be defined far more by Europeans. And therefore, the discussions on where Europeans and Americans differ might be harder than they were in the past. Let's not forget that it's not as if they were always perfectly aligned. They were not. There were always issues with regardless. And you mentioned Obama and Biden, there have been long standing issues there. But I think the key point is that the transatlanticists in the United States are coming to acknowledge that if they want to have a relationship with Europe in the future, Europe needs to be stronger and Europe needs to define the terms of its own strength. The second point, I think there is a structural problem with the evolution of American politics. And this is something Europeans need to be aware of. I'm not entirely sure that it has sunken in deep enough. Because it's not just about a president with erratic goals or with MAGA goals enacting them around the world. It's also the sort of institutional and structural personalization of the executive and the fact that there seems to be no institutional gatekeeping with respect to ascertaining whether the analysis on the weakness of the alleged weakness of the Iranian regime that would collapse after a couple of bombs. No one seems to be making an assessment of whether, you know, the information that reaches Trump's there is actually correct, number one. Number two, nobody in the executive seems to have the strength to introduce some checks and balances. So if you have the superpower, the major superpower that is actually incapable of running or working according to its own rules and its own institutions, then there is a structural problem. If that remains the case, it is obvious that Europe needs to play a bigger role globally. If that were not the case, and if, if things were to head in a more, you know, in a more institutional and democratic direction in the future, well, then I think there are a number of global challenges where you need to have the U.S. and its leverage. You need to have China as well. And I think it would be in the interest of Europeans that even if they're not a major power in these areas, they play a role in shaping the way the conversation evolves in the future. And I'm thinking about artificial intelligence and what the threats to humanity, what threats to humanity artificial intelligence and its development might entail. I'm thinking about nuclear proliferation. We're seeing nuclear proliferation temptations across the globe for obvious reasons. And the climate crisis. And on these three issues, you need to have the U.S. on board, and you need to have China on board. You need to have the Europeans on board. And I think it would be in the interest of Europeans to think ahead about how they can contribute to shaping an environment in which you have talks, big power talks, not dissimilar from the talks on arms control in the 70s and 80s because, you know, these challenges are threats to humanity. They're not just threats to the United States or to China or to Europe, Africa, etc. Thinking ahead. you know, Europeans, even though at the moment they might feel belittled and under threat you know, because of Russia, because of the U.S. and also because of China's economic and climate policies. Well, maybe they need to think, to be a little bit more creative in thinking about what kind of role they can play beyond the immediate crisis that Trump or Putin might enact on the international scene.
Rym Momtaz
So, on that constructive note we always try to do that here. We are going to have to leave it there, even though we could obviously go on for another hour. Rosa, Stefan, thank you so much for joining us for this month's Europe Inside Out.
Rosa Balfour
Thank you, Rym.
Stefan Lehne
Thank you.
Thank you for joining this month's episode of Europe Inside Out. For those who are interested in learning more about how to reinvent the transatlantic relationship, I encourage you to follow the work of Carnegie Europe on X and LinkedIn.
Our producer is Mattia Bagherini.