Rosa Balfour, Sylvie Goulard, and Gerald Knaus debate the security benefits and political challenges of further EU enlargement.
The EU and its member states are weighing the costs and benefits of offering Ukraine a fast-track accession process, while also considering how to manage relations with other candidate countries.
Rosa Balfour, Sylvie Goulard, and Gerald Knaus examine how further enlargement could shape the EU’s cohesion, decisionmaking capacity, and ability to act effectively on the global stage.
[00:00:00] Intro, [00:01:02] Could a Smaller EU Be Stronger than an Enlarged Bloc?, [00:32:37] The Future of EU Enlargement.
Rosa Balfour, March 25, 2025, “The Case for Europe,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Rosa Balfour, October 3, 2024, “EU Should Enlarge, Even Out of Despair,” Visegrad Insight.
Dimitar Bechev, Iliriana Gjoni, October 28, 2025, “How the Western Balkans Can Contribute to European Defense,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Stefan Lehne, Zoran Nechev, Richard Grieveson, August 27, 2025, “Access Before Accession: Rethinking the EU’s Gradual Integration,” Carnegie Europe.
Rym Momtaz, February 10, 2026, “To Survive, the EU Must Split,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Rosa Balfour
Hello and welcome to our second debate in our Europe Head-to-Head series. Today we're going to be talking about European Union enlargement. And I have two excellent panelists to discuss this important topic. Sylvie Goulard is currently professor of practice at SDA Bocconi. formerly she's had several, ministerial positions in French government. Also as, deputy Governor of the Bank of France and also as a former member of the European Parliament. And Sylvie is joined by Gerald Knaus, who is the founding chairman of the European Stability Initiative and a prolific writer and not least, his bestseller book, “What Borders Do We Need?”
Rosa Balfour
Without further ado, I would like to ask our panelists, starting with Sylvie, to directly address the question, could a small EU be stronger than an enlarged bloc? Sylvie, the floor is yours.
Sylvie Goulard
Thank you so much, Rosa. So I will try to tackle three points, to answer your question. The first one is, when we say stronger, what are we talking about? Is it just the number of states and the number of citizens living in the EU? What is the nature of the European Union? But I know that Gerald is also a Monnet fan. But if you remember, the purpose of the European integration it was to unite people. It is not an alliance of states. So this is for me the most important point. It is about sharing sovereignty. It is about being together in something with a sense of belonging. It is not just about diplomacy, because even if you want to be strong in diplomatic or geopolitical terms, you need to make sure that you have your people behind. So the first thing is the nature of the union. And here I have some doubts with what the European Union is doing right now. The second point is that we of course want all enlargement to be a success. I mean, we perfectly know that all the people knocking at the door are fully Europeans, the Ukrainians, they are living something, a tragedy. So it's not that we don't want them. We want the whole process to be a success. We want to make sure that at the end, we have not just created false expectations. And here, to be honest, the position of the European Commission is very, very poor. the decision was taken by the European Council in December 2023, so more than two years ago. And we still don't have any peaceSo how can we decide and not be blocked by veto? We see the games of Mr. Orban these days. We see how he tries to block the decision making process. It is obvious it's not something against the newcomers. It is really a problem we already face with 27. What about the policies I could develop, but I don't want to be too long. No one dares to say in our countries that we should revise the policies that if you are serious about geopolitics, you don't put a quarter of your budget in agriculture. Above all with a country like Ukraine having a huge agriculture. So these are questions that are not discussed. And the very last point is the budget. All countries joining are much poorer than the current member states, which is one of the goals of enlargement, by the way, to make sure that these people get richer and that we spread prosperity. And it worked in the past, but now there is such a diversity and such a reluctance to pay for Europe. it's not that we have so many enthusiastic governments that I'm a little bit, worried on, so institutions, policies and budget. And my third point is something that has to do with the language. And I looked again for these podcasts, the last enlargement package published by the Commission in November. And what is coming from the government is not very different or everything we do is merit based for the others, okay, the others, the candidates, they should show that they make the reforms, that they are moving ahead, etc. But there is nothing on ourselves, nothing it's not buried, based for the governments inside the EU for example, I take two or three very concrete examples. We discussed a lot the Draghi report and the future of the single market and the competition. There is nothing on enlargement in the Draghi report that is not even on the screen when he talks about pragmatic federalism outside the report, but in all the presentation he makes when he said we need to federate further. It's more difficult to federate if you are more numerous or at least is the question a little bit tackled with the future member states? Not at all. And my last point is we had lots of problems with the rule of law and it could happen in our countries as well. I mean it's not to put the blame on anyone, but it's very serious. If we want the EU to remain, not just a market, but something more, we need to make sure that we have the right procedures in place for defending, the rule of law. So in a nutshell, and I conclude as the Commission said, it is a whole of society project, and I don't see, and I'm sad when I'm Saying that this, I don't see the blueprint that helps citizens to realize what it is about. And the Eurobarometers show that only a third of the Europeans know a little bit what is at stake and 67% of them ignore, what is going on. And with all the risks we are facing, with Russia, with the war, with the uncertainties due to the American national security, it is clear that we cannot just stick to something that is weak and then pretend that we are strong. So I stop here. once again, I insist it is not at all against the possible future member states or the candidates. I very much support the idea, but certainly not the way we are handling this. And last point, remember Turkey? 20 years ago, governments were all saying they are thinking in geopolitical terms and they will build a bridge with Islam and whatever, and we are nowhere, and it's very, very dangerous to play with our neighbors in this way. So I stop here and I'm sure that Gerald will add many other points. Thank you so much.
Rosa Balfour
Thank you very much, Sylvie. That was a really excellent start. I'd like to turn to Gerald and then we can unpack these issues a bit more carefully. So Gerald, would you say that, could a smaller EU be stronger than a larger block or vice versa?
Gerald Knaus
Well, thank, you Rosa, for this invitation, this chance to discuss this crucial issue at this moment, with Sylvie, who is the kind of person who needs to be convinced, and if she is not convinced, we are not going to make progress because it's the people who care about Europe that need to believe in enlargement. and so I actually, perhaps that's not the idea of the format, but I do agree completely that I do not see a blueprint either. But to answer your question directly, yes we need to enlarge, but the way we are doing it now will not work. But, and I think this is the Monnet-style constructive approach. What can we do then today? What, where are the pressures and interests of existing members? Because in the end, it's in our parliaments and governments that we need to make the argument that they have a benefit. Obviously Ukrainians, Moldovans, or the people in the Balkans, see their benefit. That's why they apply, that's why they work. But what is our interest? So I, I make four quick points. First, enlargement was always difficult. You know, states don't, in large usually, you know, the EU has this ability. It has done so throughout its history, but it was always difficult. And the huge big enlargement 99 came as a result of a shock when in Helsinki, it was decided to open talks with well, in the end, it was with 12 countries who then joined within a few years. This was because the fourth war in the Balkans had happened and the second war in which NATO had to intervene. There was a sense of, we must do something. All right, so this shock we should have now with Ukraine, but what do we do? Is that enough? Second, the current process will not work. I agree with Sylvie. I mean, Ukraine has applied in 2022, within days after the big invasion started, it became a candidate. Not a single chapter has been opened until today. And yes, of course, it's Hungary that blocks. We know that. But, it's not just Hungary. I, mean, I could give you quotes from the last few weeks in Germany. Leading politicians, leaders of parties in the current government that say very openly that they cannot imagine an accession in the near future. Near future, meaning the next few years of more countries. So the current process doesn't work. Not because the commission is failing. although the commission, I think, would benefit from acknowledging the problems and then proposing answers, but because member states and publics don't back it at the moment. If you would push member states, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and many others to say, can you now commit that Ukraine could be a member if it meets all the conditions in six years, I don't see how you would do that in Berlin. I would wish it would work. It won't work. Third point. it would be a disastrous mistake to continue with the current policy because we've seen, I mean, Sylvie mentioned Turkey, but we've seen it also in Serbia and other countries. The EU dramatically loses leverage. But in the case of Ukraine, where we have an allied country that is also the most effective democratic army in Europe, we really have an interest, a national interest, not just Poland and the Baltic states and the Baltic countries, but also Germany and France and everyone else. We have a massive interest that Ukraine is stable, democratic, and that Ukrainians don't give, up, that they believe that they have a future. And if you talk to Ukrainians, it's clear that future is very much linked to a credible vision of joining the Europe of democratic peace and prosperity. So if accession at the moment is excluded, the current process doesn't work. We definitely need to give something. Where do we turn? And this is my fourth point and last point. Where do we turn for inspiration? Now, it's usually a good idea in the European Union's history to look to things that have been tried before and worked. And there's a great frenchman, and it's not Monnet this time, it's Jacques Delors, who, faced with the challenge of countries wanting to join, that there wasn't a political consensus in the union of 12 at that time, said to Sweden and Finland and Austria and Norway, listen, you are European. We will not waste your time. You can join the single market, we create the European Economic Area. You will live, your businesses will operate like Europeans, but you are not in the agricultural policy and you will not have a veto. You will not sit at the table and vote. We don't exclude this. This is important. But, in any case, you first need to join a single market. And then we see this was a great success. Three of the four countries that joined the European Economic Area then, have then, when the politics changed, joined the EU. So it was not a detour. But Norway and Iceland remained in the economic area. And a proud democracy like Norway for more than three decades has been happy in this. So if we are looking for an inspiration, what we might offer this year in the council to Moldova or Ukraine, that just might pass in the parliaments in France, at the Netherlands and Germany, and that the council could promise, it would be to say, we prepare ourselves that by 2029 or 2030, we will be ready to welcome you to the single market, if you have all the reforms and the rule of law and good neighborly relations, no discount on standards, but we are preparing ourselves for this. No, this does not mean that you will not join the EU. Perhaps the mood changes, but it does mean that we don't want to waste the next three or four years. You need a concrete goal to anchor your reforms. And I think this very French idea might have a chance of working and ticking most of the boxes, of what anyone who's, who cares about the European future, needs to care about.
Rosa Balfour
Thank you very much, Gerald. I just wanted to share with everyone that enlargement has been a feature of European integration from the very beginning. The debate between whether a smaller EU would be stronger than a wider one is one that has accompanied the whole history of European integration. And certainly, political imagination has certainly been the big tool that has enabled these enormous changes to the governance set up of the European Union. And this is something that we will be talking about. At the same time, there's been a huge acceleration of the urgency of the enlargement project, precisely because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. And as we speak, we're talking about, we're hearing a lot of talk here in Brussels in the corridors of the European Commission. It's, you know, part of the package that the EU can provide in a context in, you know, in case a ceasefire agreement is reached between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine. So this is one prospect which of course also raises questions for countries that want to join the European Union that have been in the waiting line for longer than Ukraine, in particular in the Western Balkans. So what I'm hearing here from the points that both of you have made is that we have a set of geopolitical considerations which I think I would like to add one which is about scale in this context of, you know, geopolitical rivalry. There is a strong argument that the bigger the European Union, the stronger is also to confront countries such as U.S. and China, which are increasingly adversarial. We have a big question about governance, decision making, institutions, policies, resources, etcetera. But we also have a big question on the ideas. So maybe we could unpack these three. And Sylvie, I turn to you. Shall we address perhaps this sort of governance question, the EU governance question, first, to see, you know, what the issues at the table are. And Gerald, I think, you are well known for producing new ideas and indeed, you mentioned the European Economic Area earlier on.
Sylvie Goulard
Yes, thank you. And thank you Gerald, for what you said. I think we are sharing the same concerns and you were right to say that it is not just about the Commission, it is also about the member states and the capitals. On this I agree with just one caveat, which is that the Commission is steering the process. The Commission has a monopoly of initiatives, so they could do more. But I agree. And to answer to you, Rosa, it's clear that the governance issue is very simple. Very simple. Do you agree to share sovereignty? Do you agree to enter into shared procedures where with 37, 36 members you cannot decide unanimously? It's the math that does not work. it's not likely to adopt a decision. You will always have someone having an election or having a strange government, etc. etc. So the first key question is, are our governments ready to share sovereignty and to accept to be represented by someone taking the floor on behalf of the others? We have a certain experience on that. Let's take the European Central Bank. We have a central bank where all countries are represented through their governors, but with a board which is also supranational. And the only person going to the press conference is the head of the ECB. Are we very different? German, French, Italian, Spanish people since we have someone representing us for monetary policy and interest rates? I don't think so. So we could relax a little bit. And I would not say that, for me, the things that matters more much is, is to be able to take rapid decision in a context of whatever crisis. It could be a financial one, it could be a geopolitical one, etc. And here, if I may, Gerald, my little problem is that there is a contradiction in what we are getting and offering to these countries. For example, it is clear that Ukraine is right now playing a role for which we should all be grateful, which is to defend the European continent. They are dying for us. So it is clear that it is in the, in the field of diplomacy and defense that we should draw the lessons from what is happening in Ukraine. And last year in Munich, Zelensky summed it up with one sentence. He said, be careful, for you it's either Brussels or Moscow. So are we ready to take decisions collectively or not? If we are, then the question you ask on scale is certainly true. I mean, the bigger the better. We take the whole family together. We have the scale, we have the state from an economic point of view, because these countries would develop. And we also have this scale, to take decisions in diplomatic terms and defense. But the problem is that right now, right now you don't even have an agreement, fundamental agreement between Germany and France. You don't even have an agreement on the Board of Peace, these scandalous institutions where you have to pay a fee to be a member of, and that is in competition with the un, the United Nations settings. So here again, how could we say, because we are bigger, more numerous, it will be easier if on such a fundamental question as the Board of Peace and the way you organize the international life, we are not able to have a joint position. So we should work on this. I'm not saying it's not feasible, but right now we are not where we should be.
Rosa Balfour
Just adding in a couple of additional points. The fact that Europeans, you know, if we enlarge, then that makes our decision-making process more cumbersome and it'll be harder to take rapid decisions. The current divisions are actually between the founding members of the European Union. So it's not as if enlargement diluted the ability to take, to make decisions. I mean some of the controversies are actually among the founding members of the European Union. And then the second point Sylvie made, in her opening statement, I think a very important point about you know, talk about the geopolitics of enlargement and the importance of enlargement from a geopolitical perspective that we should not strive for an alliance of states. This really is an alliance of people. So maybe, Gerald, can I ask you to address also the question of credibility and how non-EU Europeans view the European Union? A European, non-EU colleague said, yeah, but Europe is not just about that, it's also about democracy. Can you perhaps speak to this point as well?
Gerald Knaus
Yes, thank you. Well, on your point of what the European integration process is about, I always. Look, I mean you can't go wrong. Going back to the conversation, the first conversation between Jean Monnet and Conrad Adenauer in Bonn in 1950, just after the Marshall, the Schumann Declaration, where, where Monnet visited Adenauer, five years after the war and said, here is what I propose. And it is not. I'm not a technician, you know, this is about coal and steel, but it's not really about the technical details. They can be worked out. It's a, it's a political vision. And then Adenauer said, yes, in fact, it's a moral vision. And these two men agreed. This was the experience of money. If we have a clear. But this is the problem, it must be clear, a clear and shared moral vision. or, you know, geopolitics is a great word which covers all sorts of things. You know, do we agree on threats? What are the major threats to our societies, to our democratic models, to our prosperity, to our model way of life? Do we agree on the threats and do we agree on what we should do about them? if we do, then we can act together. If we don't, institutions, can only go so far, you know, especially as we've seen in the field of foreign policy. And I mean, Sylvie mentioned the Board of Peace. I mean, you could mention, you know, recognition of Kosovo, you could mention Gaza, you know, go to Spain, go to Austria positions, you can. The Middle east, I mean really any foreign policy issue that is in the remotest, controversial, where Europeans are divided. If we don't have the same vision, we have a problem. Now could we have the same vision on Ukraine or on enlargement here? I think it might be easier because, you know, Ukraine is obviously, the most powerful democratic army in Europe today. We have a massive interest that Ukraine, you know, which is now led by people who really risk enormous amounts and put their emphasis all on European integration and on being close to Europe. We have a very big interest this remains this way, that Ukraine remains stable and pro-European, that it doesn't go to Serbian or Turkish way in a few years time because people are so disappointed by Europe. And of course we have outside efforts to try to destabilize and a lot of the people who are now fighting for reforms give up, which we've seen in many countries that were in the accession process for decades, give up or even leave to Europe. So we have a massive interest that the reformers now leading Ukraine, the civil society, fighting the rule of law, going to demonstrate even in a war, that they see us as credible. Now how can we do that? I think the only realistic way is to say we need Ukraine on defense. We need to find some institutional way and it will not be in the EU. You know, we need Norway in defense, we need the U.S. in defense. We might even need Turkey in defense, because of the Black Sea and its crucial role. And we need Ukraine. Let's think of what format and this is where we need institutional thinking of powers that are interested to establish a joint goal, what is the joint goal? To deter Russia. You know, as Zelensky said, we could help you deter Russia also after the war and you help us deter Russia. This is a big issue and decisions I think will become only seriously discussed when, as I fear, it becomes clearer that the Americans are completely turning away from NATO. You know, as long as there's the illusion, including in Berlin, that the U.S. might reconsider, I don't see that happening. And I think the last few months have shown that. So then we need Ukraine on defense. And there are lots of practical things we can do which we are not doing at the moment. You know, in terms of making defense cooperation really easy. That doesn't have to be EU policy. Second, on the budget, we will have to rebuild Ukraine if we want Ukraine to be stable and also if we don't want millions of Ukrainians who didn't leave during the war conclude after the end of the war that there is no future there. And then they come to the European Union. We have an interest in rebuilding Ukraine. You know, that's not charity. That's a massive interest. That's worth it. We have that whether Ukraine is in the EU or not, whether it's in the single market or not. But the experience of Poland, Romania, the Baltic states in the last 20 years shows us joining the rules of the single market and having no tariff and non-tariff barriers. Ukraine already has non-tariff barriers, but non-tariff barriers is of an enormous benefit. Germany exports more to Poland than to China at the moment. It exports more to Romania than to Japan. We've created a China next to Germany in terms of economic activity and Ukraine has the same potential, but for this, it needs the same rules. And the cost of not being in a single market is shown every day now in the, in the United Kingdom, you know, they, they have no tariffs with the EU, but they're not in the single market. So we, we offer them this, we rename it. We don't, we don't have to call it European Economic Area. European Economic Area too. We can name it European Community because that's what the European Union was at first, you know, before Maastricht. And then, and then on the budget, we show in the next EU budget that we are serious about this. And if we get the European Council, and I just want to quote that I end with this quote, the European Parliament, in December, 2023, in a resolution calling on the EU, on the Commission and on the member states, and I quote, to ensure that the EU will prepare itself to welcome any EU candidate country in the accession process into the EU single market as soon as that country has demonstrated its ability to assume the required obligations and establish a robust rule of law. Now, there is no discount. This is not gradual integration. I never quite know what this means because we've never really, you know, we never, we don't have one model for this. This is what we did under the law. It’s very clear you need to have the rule of law, you need to have good relations with your democratic neighbors. And you need to meet the conditions of the hierarchy. But if you do that, we are ready to welcome you in three or four years. And we add to this defense, and we add to this the next EU budget. And Europe is credible at the geopolitical role everyone talks about. We can play it in the countries that matter most to us, which is our immediate European neighbors.
Rosa Balfour
Thank you. Gerald. Can I counter a question asking you to elaborate a little bit more What are you saying create this. But what about membership rights? Okay, because some of the discussion that has been developing over the past few days is, you know, countries that really want to join and that be knocking on the door for many years. They're saying, okay, we have a transitional period in which we suspend our rights, we suspend our veto rights, and then gradually we will acquire that as we move along in meeting all the EU requirements. How sustainable is this? And at what point do you think, the critics or the skeptics of enlargement talk about veto rights for members, talk about how challenging it is to reach common decisions at 27, let alone at 30 or 35. So what about this, you know, is it sustainable to have second order members, do you think, from a political perspective, both in terms of the countries that would join who might not enjoy full rights as members, but also in terms of the other countries that actually will have to make their, you know, if they do grant those rights, they'll have to share them with a growing number of countries. Can you elaborate a little bit on this.
Gerald Knaus
Well, Sylvie reminded us that Jean Monnet talked about bringing people together, not just governments. It's not an intergovernmental organization. It's an organization where people, businesses, you know, everyone, because of the promise of the four freedoms, can consider this huge space of democratic freedom, open to them? I mean I think we're pretty close to the Norwegians. They're in Schengen, they're in the single market. Of course they're also in NATO and that has worked. Now if, if we look at visions for Ukraine that are realistic, I don't see what is not in the EU interest to offer this. Now the Ukrainians of course will rightly say yes, but our goal is full membership. I mean it's the Norwegians decided themselves they didn't want to be a full member. But in the first stage, the Swiss, sorry, the Austrians, Finns, Swedes and Norwegians, we are told you cannot be now a full member. Politically there is no consensus. But we offer you in return for all the reforms, access to the single market. So it is not a detour if we market it like this. It is credible. And if we think that the goal is creating links, including as Jomoni, so powerfully realized, if businesses start integrating chains of production, not trade. Trade doesn't as we've seen with Russia buying oil or having commercial relations doesn't actually create more trust. But having the deep integration that the single market has created, also builds trust over time. We, we would have a different discussion about Ukrainian accession, if Ukraine would I think and we don't know what the world looks like in five years. so, so I really, I struggle to find an argument why the recommendation by the European Parliament at that time very strongly pushed by somebody who's not a European Commission, Andreas Kubilius, but with a broad support which has been in the past invented by a, great French European, Jacques Delors. Why we don't offer this, why we don't, why we don't discuss this. Now, would the Ukrainians, the Moldovans, you know, any of the Balkan countries that meets the condition prefer to be a full member immediately? Perhaps, but they definitely prefer being offered something that is credible and packed and honest to what we are currently doing. We are telling them it's merit based. And then around the corner here in Berlin, most of the key policymakers in Parliament say, but whatever you do in the next five years, we are not ready. You know, that's not honest. That's demotivating. And in the case of Ukraine or even Moldova, it could be devastating.
Rosa Balfour
Sylvie, I'd like to ask you this question about public opinion. And what, what would it take, in your view? I've always had the suspicion that actually public opinion against enlargement has been very much manufactured from the top rather than a real sentiment. I think a lot of Europeans, until recently, were not really aware of what was going on. So, can I ask you what do you think it would take to convince, for instance, French public opinion that, actually is in European interest to enlarge? And I say this, and I ask about France because, of course, should, there not be a majority of three fifths of the French, of both houses of the French parliament, the issue would be put to referendum. So public opinion is very important in this whole process, and I think the institutions are way behind in thinking through how to make enlargement be something that is understandable to ordinary citizens who might not be well versed in the nitty gritty of this process. What would it take, in your view?
Sylvie Goulard
So, first of all, thank you for asking about the public opinion. Gerald was very eloquent. And of course it is manufactured from the top. But who has the most to lose? People who are conflicted. The governments, the highest public administrations, the supervisors in the financial field, or whomever, the ordinary people, they are far away. They don't know. for me, it's a matter of power. As I said before, it is about sharing sovereignty. So giving up, if you have one representative, you don't have eight people in the White House office, etcetera. So the resistance is coming from the national level, where we have very nationalistic parties now more than in the past, and we should be careful for that. So I'm not saying that the people, the ordinary people are not in favor. But keep in mind one thing is that, and I have no nostalgia of the leader of Europe, I used to work with Romano Prodi when we did the Big Bang enlargement. I'm just saying, as a matter of fact, for the countries at the West, in the Western side of Europe, these countries are very far away. Very, very far away. I remember if you live in Berlin, you can take your car, you go to Poland, you have an opportunity to meet people. Does not happen. if you live in France, if you're in Toulouse or in, in Brittany, you don't meet people from this part of Europe. So it would mean that we, we would need a structured plan, by the European Commission and the member states to encourage. I proposed that for Poland, years ago, for example, to encourage some of our students to learn the language, to meet the people, to participate in exchanges, etc. Etc. So we need to make sure that the people know each other and I'm sure that they will enjoy, there is no reason that it does not work. But if we don't do it, we are very, very far away from the efforts that were made after the Second World War, let's say between France and Germany, for example. So first of all we are facing, how can I say, a nationalistic caterpillar in Europe right now, financed by the U.S. and Russia or helped by the U.S. and Russia. Look at the links between the AfD and Meloni's parties and the CPAC, etc. So we should not be naive. It's not going to happen just like this, in a world where many people are spending a lot of money and energy to divide us and Gerald used the word honesty. We are not honest because Rosa, I see no chance to have a 3/5 majority in the French Parliament. It will end with a referendum. And at least we should take this scenario in consideration. I'm not saying it is the only one, but what if it goes to referendum? If it goes to referendum, you take the risk to have first of all, people voting against other people, which is not the best way of handling this kind of issue. But it is our constitution. And the risk that the people say no to the person asking the question more than answering the question is very high. And when you said it was manufactured from the top, and remember the Polish plumber discussion, it was ugly. I'm not proud of that. But in 2005 it contributed to the destruction of the constitutional treaty. It was a mix of very strange things. And maybe it was the first example of disinformation because I remember it was the beginning of the social networks, etc. Etc. Anyway, to put it short, I really believe, as Gerald proposed, that if you use something that is existing, people know what it is about. We have countries in very serious. This is something people can identify for the rest of the. The gradual integration is only if I may, diplomatic, blah, blah, blah. They are in a room in Brussels, they invent concepts but they don't think in terms of what people are going to understand. You cannot be half pregnant. Okay? You cannot or you are or you're not, or you are in or you are out. and this is something many people don't realize. And the most important thing in my opinion, if we want to keep this democratic element in Europe is really to look at the participation of these countries on a sound ground. No second class members with representatives in the European Parliament, that is the co-legislator with a certain representation within the commission. Even if I don't believe we can continue to increase the number of commissioners, but we could have clusters, geographical or whatever. and a kind of rotation solutions do exist as long as we are constructive and honest. And there is a question I see in the chat on the French and the cap of course, first of all, I'm not a representative of France in this discussion. I'm not in favor of keeping the cap as it is because it is poisoning our people and it is not a future oriented way of producing agrifood. But remember, it was not only in France that we have problem with the grain. It was also the case in Poland for example, where, which is a country doing a lot for Ukraine. So I think we should not oversimplify or put the blame to one country or another one. There is hypocrisy everywhere and we need to find solutions.
Rosa Balfour
I would also like to add one final issue in this discussion. The additional point I'd like to bring in is democracy. Enlargement has always gone hand in hand with democratization processes in countries that you know some, some of which had come from non-democratic situations. And I'm thinking in particular of Hungary, which is going to the elections in April. And you know, it's positively described as a hybrid democracy. But, you know, many of the features of democracy are no longer in place. So if the enlargement process cannot ensure the democratization of these countries, and if the EU cannot serve as an anchor to democracy, these are countries that we cannot have in our fold. So I'd like Gerald, I'd like you to address this question as well. I know you know the answer to it.
Gerald Knaus
I really very, very much hope, Rosa, that the answer will be given by Hungarian voters in April. I think what we are seeing in Budapest, and I was just there for a week, is a Victor Orban who's increasingly desperate. I mean, you know, sex tapes of his major competitor, videos that show, basically German-looking soldiers shooting Hungarians, as we've seen on the internet. You know, these measures suggest to me that Viktor Orban realizes his old trickster don't work. And that has a lot to do with the fact that Hungary is in the EU and that the EU is withholding huge amounts of money that Hungarians could benefit from, for reasons to do with corruption and the rule of law. And that the opposition, Peter Magyar, is promising to address the concerns of the EU, which would dramatically benefit Hungarians, not just in terms of their democracy, of course, and rule of law, of course, but also because all this EU money would be made available and Hungarians don't want to leave the EU, otherwise Viktor Orban would have promised it. You know, he does his polling. So even Hungary actually shows us the power inside the EU. We never had a Belarus outside the EU. We had a lot and I would just like make, to make two really big points at the end. One is, you know, we've been hearing in the last four months from the top military leaders in Europe, you know, the head of the Swedish, army, the head of the French army, the leading military in Germany, in the Baltic states, in the United Kingdom, recently a joint letter by German and, and UK military about the threats we face in the very near future from Russia. And with the uncertainty about the U.S. we need policies that make Europe strong not in 10 years, not even in five years, but in the next two years. A credible policy that ties accession candidates to Europe, that inspires them, that promotes reforms, that gives us the leverage to help the reformers there is crucial also in the short term. So that's the first thing. it's not charity to encourage reformers in Ukraine now and give them a sense of hope. The second point is the big European story. I just wrote a book with my daughter, from a different generation born in 2000, and we dedicated to that generation. About which Europe do we need? It's in German, the European Union and its enemies. And we start with this big story. And the big story is that since 1990, the 50 countries in Europe, of which 46 are in the Council of Europe, the 50 countries of Europe, we've had 33 that have democratic peace for the whole period since the end of the Cold War. Seventeen had war or civil war or dictatorship. Now, those 33 which had democratic peace for the last more than three decades, they are either, in the European Union or in Schengen, or they are microstates like the Vatican, San Marino or Andorra. That's it. Every country not in the European Union or in Schengen, and also in those cases in NATO, although NATO alone is no guarantee, as we see in Turkey. Every country that is not in the European Union and in Schengen has had dictatorship or war or civil war of violence. That is why countries want to join. That's the big story of Europe. The promise of the founders of the Monnet and Spaak and Adenauers of the 50s was renewed with the second great foundation with enlargement, the Havels and elves. And this Europe works. And it works so well that a lot of young, small democracies, like Moldova or all democracies like Iceland want to join. That's the big story. And for that reason, we need to think creatively now about the next few years. And we can't continue to play a game of deception, where we are not honest and where we mislead reformers. And then they discover that we didn't offer them anything real because we were lazy or not imaginative enough. We didn't fight for it, and in the end, we are harming ourselves.
Rosa Balfour
A couple of things have been addressed in the context of the discussion, but there's one question in particular that, I'd like to raise because we talked about whether a smaller EU would be stronger than a larger one and Sylvie mentioned you cannot be half pregnant. Either you're in or you're out. But let's assume that actually these ideas about multi-speed Europe or gradual integration or membership light or reverse enlargement and all these other technical ways of thinking about you know, half membership for the countries that want to join. What would this kind of multi-speed Europe look like? Would it be, would it strengthen Europe because of size or would it weaken Europe because of how complicated it would be?
Sylvie Goulard
Yes. No, it's an excellent question. It's a very old one and for me if I in German they would say it's a spannungsverhältnis. There is a tension between two things. I repeat, if a group of governments and member states believe they have an idea together and they want to begin not waiting for the ones who don't share their views, it's fair enough. And it's what we did for Schengen, it's what we did for the Euro, it is a good way to move ahead. and once again there is nothing new in that. The key element, I see two key questions. The first one is that of course the idea, the way it is done, should be inclusive and accept some members that maybe were not ready but would like to join. And here I have some troubles because if you look at the treaties we negotiated at the beginning of this century with countries like Poland etc or Sweden, they have accepted to join the Euro. So the question is also because the blame is always put on the front runners. But there are some countries that were involved, it was open, it was inclusive and they don't join. So this is typically the kind of thing, you know, it can create gaps but it is not always because some countries are moving ahead. It is also because some countries want to benefit from being inside but not being everywhere, etc. Etc. And then it makes things complicated. So once again if some countries move ahead it is inclusive and the other ones join and at the end it becomes something really common. The whole field of home affairs, migration etc. was outside at the beginning in Maastricht and then it was included. So if we are inclusive, if it is about deepening with more members, step by step, but deepening, it's fair enough. Question. Who is the avantgarde today? I don't know. I don't see to be what is happening in France and Germany right now where our governments are completely forgetting what their responsibility is for the future of the European Union. Okay, we have some divergences. It is always the case between the French and the Germans. That's the reason why we had wars with each other. So they should come down, sit down in a place, close the door, use all the bad words they want among ourselves, but go outside with a new blueprint, inclusive and forward looking. if we lose this part of the differentiated cooperation, we lose everything. Remember that Monet was not someone close to Germany. Nevertheless, when he convinced Robert Schumann to begin with coal and steel, it was with Germany. And why? Because you can only defeat nationalism if the big ones accept to share sovereignty. and I say it with a lot of respect for the sovereignty of smaller member states, but it is the way it worked after the Second World War and it is still what we have to put in common. France must share its nuclear protection with the others. The Germans should share their huge means with the others because it is in everybody's interest. It is difficult, yes, but it is our responsibility. When it works well, it is not against other members. It is really to, you know, to try to clean up a little bit the bilateral mess. And it is a perspective. I don't know. Gerald, if you, if you agree, as we are both from these two countries, and what happened in Italy, where it is obvious that the current government is trying to divide France and Germany. If it is a discussion between Rome and Berlin, fair enough, I accept it's great that they talk with each other, but not this power game where we exclude someone. And I remember Mario Monti who came in charge, in the midst of one of the worst crisis in the euro area. The first thing he did at that time, December 2011 was to try to put together France, Germany and Italy. And this is the way we should work and with Poland and with others.
Rosa Balfour
Gerald, I also would like to ask you a direct question, which is whether there is a political will inside the EU to allow Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans to join the single market. Because this is something you have been advocating from the European Stability initiative for some time.
Gerald Knaus
Well, I think if nothing will work without a serious Campaign without trying to reach out to interests. But I think this is the sort of thing where you know, start. I think in France one could convince people that, that this is a way to make Europe more stable. It could be part of that new blueprint between France and Germany. And indeed Italy has an interest in stabilizing the Balkans. So this would be an attractive offer. and I think it's at it's at the heart of what the challenges that Europe faces now. So I think if the core countries, that have been motors of the EU in the past, France, Germany, Italy can reach an agreement on something along those lines, I see a lot of support in some of the countries most concerned about Ukraine, that worry about a fraudulent non serious accession process and its consequences in the north of Europe. I think you can get broad support for this. I'm convinced nothing is easy. but I think it is realistic. What is not realistic, and I'm not even sure this wasn't planted by the Russians or by Maga, the Americans, is this idea that Ukraine can join by 2027. You know, and unfortunately by putting it on paper it creates pressure on Ukrainian politicians who now talk about it. You know, and Chancellor Merz said it last week, he said no, it's excluded. The Dutch parliament had a resolution where it said of course there will be no relaxation from the accession conditions. I mean this is not a new position, that's an old position. And we saw how serious the EU was about this, the integrity of its single market in the, in the Brexit talks, you know, which is a former member and still have all these negotiations on ensuring that the EU can defend the standard. So this is not realistic, but we don't need it. What we need is now a serious commitment that comes from the Council. But the commission needs to work on the proposal. It has the power of initiative. and I think the European Parliament's conclusion from December 2023 points the way, now two more points. Ukraine, we missed two opportunities. In 2004, Ukraine already had the Orange Revolution and then we basically pushed them back and in 2013 and 2014 they had the Maidan revolution and we basically pushed them back and there were many reasons for this. Europe was diverted. We had other problems. The end result was what Havel had always warned. Without enlargement, we have war. We have the biggest war in Europe since 1945, the biggest refugee movement we could have 10 million more refugees in the next two years. What will this do to our democracies if Ukraine does not hold up? So this third chance, we can't waste it. And the big advantage of the single market proposal to go back to something Sylvie pointed out, is it doesn't require a referendum in France because it's not full accession. So it gives us something to do for the next five years. The big issue that would have been at the center of this debate ten years ago, freedom of movement. It's resolved. Ukrainians have full freedom of movement. Every Ukrainian, and we have four and a half million in the EU. Every Ukrainian for the last four years could come anywhere in the EU, live, work, you know, have residents that Moldovans, because so many of them have Romanian passports, already have almost full freedom of movement and visa free travel. So some issues that were big problems in the past would not now be a problem for the four freedoms to be implemented. And so I think we need that vision. And the only way we get there is if we have debates like this one. And I'm really thankful that you put enlargement in such a serious and, and going beyond the cliches and the words, that you put it on the agenda in Brussels. And we need to remind people that this is the most dangerous moment for the European project, since 1948, since, the blockade of Berlin before we had NATO, because we not only have Russia as a threat with the biggest war since the Second World War, we have the most hostile America we've ever had since the Second World War. And we have parties inside our democracies that try to destroy it from within. So this is a moment for really seriousness and we need a serious enlargement policy that fits that challenge.
Rosa Balfour
Well, thank you very much, we could continue for another hour, but I'm afraid we've run out of time. So I'd like to close with just two points. The EU was founded as a peace project. And I think that that chimes so well with Gerald's points about how dangerous the world is and how war was prevented thanks to European integration. Sylvie you talked about enlargement and forcing a mirror on what the European Union is today. And you know, how the need seen through the eyes of others, perhaps this can also be a stimulus to improve our own democracies and our own governance systems. So, I'd like to end on these two big points, but I think they speak to how big these challenges are.
And, I'd like to thank you both very much. Stay tuned. And next month, we will come up with another event looking at the radical right in Europe. Thank you very much.