Marc Pierini and Sinan Ülgen analyze the lead-up to the Turkish municipal elections in March 2024, the sustainability of Ankara’s balancing act between Russia and the West, and the future of Turkey’s relations with Brussels and Washington.
Turkey’s 2023 was marked by the reelection of President Erdoğan and by a reorientation of the country’s economic policy—while old disagreements with the West over Ankara’s close relationship with Moscow and poor rule-of-law record persisted.
Marc Pierini and Sinan Ülgen, senior fellows at Carnegie Europe, discuss Turkey’s political and economic landscape ahead of the 2024 municipal elections and what the future holds for the country’s relations with Brussels and Washington.
[00:00:00] Intro, [00:01:46] The Upcoming Local Elections in Turkey, [00:08:17] The Headlines From Turkey in 2023, [00:19:21] The Future of Turkey-EU Relations in 2024.
Marc Pierini and Francesco Siccardi, October 24, 2023, “Turkey at 100,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Marc Pierini, September 18, 2023, “Turkey’s European Goals: Prospects and Impediments as Seen From Brussels,” Carnegie Europe.
Marc Pierini et. al, July 24, 2023, “What does Erdoğan’s new term in office mean for EU-Turkey relations?,” Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) Network.
Marc Pierini, 2023, “Turkey’s Geopolitical Role. Between National Ambitions, Western Anchors and Russian Sway,” European Institute of the Mediterranean.
Marc Pierini, Alper Coşkun, Francesco Siccardi, June 14, 2023, “What to Expect From Erdoğan’s New Term,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Marc Pierini, May 19, 2023, “Turkey has to reassess its position between NATO and a disruptive Russia,” Le Monde.
Sinan Ülgen, November 20, 2023, “Europe needs a new framework for Turkey,” Financial Times.
Sinan Ülgen, Alper Coşkun, November 7, 2023, “A Reflection on Türkiye’s Centennial,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Sinan Ülgen et. al, October 13, 2023, “Arab Perspectives on the Middle East Crisis,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Marc Pierini
2023 marked a turning point for Turkey. President Erdogan secured a new presidential term, and also the country marked its centennial celebration as a Republic. But 2024 also has much in store for Turkey. The municipal elections are coming up and the ruling AK Party is gearing up for a heated battle to reclaim both Istanbul and Ankara.
As citizens head to the polls, the Turkish leadership is addressing the nation's economic challenges while pursuing a foreign policy of self-interest. This includes managing an ambivalent relationship with Russia and Ukraine, handling tensions with the West over old and new crises from Gaza to Syria, and recently approving Sweden's NATO membership bid.
As Turkey embarks on its second century, what issues lie on the horizon? What’s the future of Europe’s relationship with Ankara? And can Turkey keep sustaining its delicate balancing act between Russia and the West?
Marc Pierini
Hello, and welcome to a new episode of Europe Inside Out, Carnegie Europe’s monthly podcast about the continent's greatest foreign policy challenges.
My name is Marc Pierini and I am a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe.
This episode of Europe Inside Out is about Turkey and what to expect from the country in 2024.
I’m joined by my colleague Sinan Ülgen, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe. Sinan, welcome.
Sinan Ülgen
Hey, Marc, it's always a pleasure to have this conversation with you.
Marc Pierini
Sinan, let me say first that our conversation is taking place on Monday, January 29, which is approximately ten days before we release this podcast. We are also two months away from the Turkish municipal election, March 31. And they are traditionally very significant events, especially since in 2019, a number of cities went to the opposition parties. So can I ask you to give our listeners an idea of what is going on now in the electoral campaign and how do you expect these elections to unfold?
Sinan Ülgen
Indeed, we are now at the end of January. So as far as the election campaign is concerned, we have exactly two more months to go. The main issue in the local elections that are set for the end of March is essentially who's going to win Istanbul. Because as you recall, in the previous round of local elections, the opposition did surprisingly well. And they have captured Istanbul and Ankara in addition to Izmir, which they've always held onto after almost more than two decades with Istanbul and Ankara. And this time around, therefore, Erdoğan wants to recapture Istanbul because has obviously an emotional connection with the city. This is where his political career began, as the mayor when he won the mayoral race in 1995. And since then, Istanbul was held by parties that are from the same political family as AK Party. Secondly, Istanbul is also obviously the economic center of Turkey, and therefore, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality has a very sizable budget, one that even compares favorably with some of the line ministers in Turkey. So it is, therefore, an entity that is also important, not only politically, but economically.
And that's why all the attention will be on whether the current mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, will be able to hold on to his position, or whether he will be unseated by the AK Party candidate, who's Murat Kurum, former minister of urbanization. And there, ultimately, the way that I see it, it boils down to whether İmamoğlu will receive the backing of the opposition electorate, and here particularly, the pro-Kurdish electorate, because the other members of the opposition have all fielded their own candidates. But their electorate, in all likelihood would still vote for İmamoğlu as the anti-Erdoğan vote. So ultimately will matter whether the pro-Kurdish DEM, formerly known as HDP, will firstly field their own candidate, and secondly, whether it's going to be a strong candidate, in which case the opposition vote would be split, and that would raise the likelihood of AK Party recapturing the city. In the opposite scenario, of having a weak candidate or a no candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu is likely to win, given his popularity.
Marc Pierini
Thank you, Sinan. The expectations of European leaders, in my view, is not very high. They have seen the national leadership of Turkey acting with much unpredictability. Many U-turns on various foreign policy issues. So they are observing the local elections with a prudent distance and with, inevitably, the memory of the spring 2023 electoral campaign, which was heavily favoring the ruling party and the incumbent president. So they're prudent. The key issue here, seen from a European perspective is that maybe local elections, because citizens know their local candidates better than national candidates, perhaps, may end up to be a sort of compensation for the national election. That is, whether this local election will be a protest vote against the sharp degradation in the rule-of-law architecture. That is the way I think European governments are observing the issue. They're fully aware of what you said about Istanbul. Istanbul is more than just one municipality, albeit a very large city. It is the cradle of President Erdoğan's political life, and the loss of Istanbul was most probably very painful to him in 2019. So European governments expect that all means will be used to recapture Istanbul.
Probably a lot less easy in Ankara, but overall, as I said, observing it with a prudent distance is what I can detect.
Sinan Ülgen
So do you think that there can be any impact one way or another, on the Turkey-EU relationship, depending on who we see emerging as the winner of the local elections in Istanbul?
Marc Pierini
I don't think there is a direct relationship between the local election, even if it is Istanbul, and the EU-Turkey relationship. The relationship has seen ups and downs, obviously, for the past 20 years, but has seen a sharp degradation in the past few years, especially in the context of the constitution introduced in 2017 and then the presidential election in 2018 and the implementation of the new constitution, and, of course, the recent events in the context of the Middle East, in the context of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. All these issues have kind of tarnished the relationship between the EU and Turkey, or between the West and Turkey. So local elections in themselves will not directly change these foreign policy and security policy facts, but they will show where there is a further consolidation of President Erdoğan's power if his party wins the election in Istanbul or wins a majority of the nine biggest cities.
Sinan Ülgen
I think another factor that will certainly impact the outcome at the end of March will be the economy. We got a lot of distress signals actually last year, in the weeks and months leading to the May elections, after the elections themselves, we've seen a reshuffle of the cabinet, including some key economic positions. Mehmet Şimşek, the former treasury minister, stepped in. We've also seen a new appointment to the head of the Central Bank. And as a result, actually, we've seen a totally new economic policy that started to be implemented after the elections. So the former policy of trying to lower interest rates in order to lower inflation has vanished, to be replaced by more conventional thinking, as a result of which the central bank started to raise interest rates. The policy rate was about 8.5% before elections. Now it's 45%. So quite a steep hike. We've seen similar measures to also recalibrate policies in the area of the financial industry, with banking and so on, so that ultimately, slowly, gradually but surely, confidence is starting to be rebuilt. Of course, this has to be sustained. Perhaps the more difficult part will come after the elections, given that growth still continues to be strong and positive in Turkey, buoyed by private consumption.
But that needs to be recalibrated and will have impact also politically and socially. But fortunately for the government, this will happen in a period where there will be no election within the four years after this March 2024 elections. But here, Marc, let me ask you, since I already alluded to the change to the new cabinet, how has this cabinet been perceived in the EU and the policies that it has started to implement?
Marc Pierini
I'll say two different things. One is that the appointment of Mehmet Şimşek and the new governor of the central bank has been positively perceived. Obviously, it has been a reversal of the previous policy. It means a more orthodox economic policy, monetary policy. So this is the main real innovation since June last year, and it continues so far. So it is seen as good news from an economic point of view, from a business circle, financial circle point of view. Other than that, the reality is that President Erdoğan won a new term. The opposition was not able to effectively challenge the results as they say they would. The coalition supporting the president in the Grand National Assembly is obviously more conservative, more nationalist. Well, observers can lament what happened, but this is behind us now. It has an impact on the way Europeans and Westerners in general observe the municipal election. As I mentioned before, whether they will be free and fair, and that is sort of background issue. But what matters really now is to see the direction Turkey will take. One is what you just said about the economic policy.
Is that going to be sustained? Can Turkey effectively manage to attract more funding from outside, be it short-term funding or foreign direct investment? We know that the economy and finance minister is doing promotional tours in the US, in the Gulf, in Europe, this is all fine. But as I see it here, hearing people in London or Frankfurt, hearing some people in New York, one of the obstacles, or one of the worries is whether rule of law will be restored. Because after all, if you are an investor or a banker, going to put down 500 million, 1 billion euro or dollars in Turkey, you know that at one point, whether you like it or not, you're going to face litigation. Companies have litigations with suppliers, with clients, with the state or local authorities, banks have litigations, and you want a level playing field. And in a country where you see that politicians or philanthropists are jailed without real trials, with sort of theatrical trials, with no proof, well, if you're an investor or a banker, you're worried about that in a different way. You're not civil society, obviously, you're not a politician, but you need a fair justice, a fair judiciary.
So that is the connection that foreign partners, economic partners of Turkey, do not see yet. The other issue is the recent approbation of Swedish accession to NATO. Whether that will result in an appeasement in the US-Turkey relation is one question. Whether this will lead to changes in the Turkish policy vis-à-vis the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. That is a question I'd like to ask you now.
Sinan Ülgen
With regard to relationship with Russia, first of all, I think it's worth underlining that Turkey's position on Sweden has nothing to do with Russia. Unlike Hungary, Turkey had its own expectations from Sweden and Finland and from the United States. And to some extent, those were fulfilled. And ultimately the Turkish parliament and then the Turkish president approved the deal last week, so that within 15 days now, the US side is set to approve the package of F-16s to Turkey. Having said that, of course, especially for President Erdoğan, his relationship with Putin remains important. It's a part of the balancing act of Turkey vis-à-vis the West. And so far, I think it's been a successful balancing act in the sense that Erdoğan remains a political leader that is both welcomed in Kyiv and Moscow at the same time. So he can talk to Putin, he can talk to Zelensky at the same time. Also, there is a deepening collaboration with Russia when we look at the overall portfolio of relations. One dimension is the nuclear power plant in Akkuyu that's being built and will be operated by Russia. There is a tourism dimension.
Russia remains the top country in terms of number of tourists that come to Turkey, and there's an energy dimension as well, given that Turkey has not, as a matter of principle, been party to the EU sanctions policy. The principal stance there is that Turkey will align itself with UN Security Council-mandated sanctions, but not bilateral sanctions of other jurisdictions, whether it's the US or the EU. But in reality, what has happened is that the Turkish government has been quite cautious. Yes, there is a booming element of trade with Russia, given that there are no sanctions. However, in cases that are really critical, Ankara has been cautious and has tried to comply with the requests of its partners in the West. One example is Turkey's withdrawal from the MIR credit card scheme after the summer of 2022. Then, we haven't had any real story of sanctioned oligarch money parking in Turkey. Otherwise that would have been quite an issue and dispute. We haven't seen that. And as far as I know, Turkey tries to answer positively some of the requests that it receives from its partners. Now, lately, the EU and Turkey have reached an understanding about Turkey's domestic regime that needs to be applied for goods that are seen to be part of Russia's war campaign.
I think there's a list that's been exchanged and Turkey will heed that as well. So on sanctions there is a degree of cooperation, but of course, this takes place against the backdrop where Turkey politically does not align itself with the sanctions regime of the West. But that's basically what the relationship with Russia looks like. I don't know, Marc, how do you assess Turkey's relationship with Russia? What are the expectations from the EU side regarding this relationship? And perhaps also now that the Swedish NATO membership has been approved, what will be the implications of the step for the overall Turkey-EU relationship?
Marc Pierini
Well, Sinan, you alluded to the balancing act or balance policy implemented by Ankara between Russia and Ukraine or actually between Russia and NATO. This is a sort of unusual mix of actions and decisions. Unusual is perhaps a kind word. We understand the new Turkish narrative in Europe. Ankara cannot anymore accept to be tied to only one side, the Western bloc, and wants to be a power in the middle, wants to make policy choices that suits best its interest. Given the constraints in the economic and the security sphere, that in principle is fine. The difficulty from Western standpoint, in my view, is that some of the specific actions taken by Turkey or not taken by Turkey in the past two years or in the past five years, if we go back to July 2019, have benefited Russia and have handicapped NATO. I'm referring here to the purchase and delivery of Russian-made S-400 missile. Of course, you mentioned the absence of sanctions against Russia. But I can also add to that Russian investment in Turkish refineries, ending up facilitating Russian export of crude oil, becoming Turkish finished products. Or in 2023, Russia handing over to Turkey massive financial benefits, like the advanced payment on the nuclear-powered electricity plant in Akkuyu, or deferred payments of gas imports and payments in rubles instead of dollars. So along the way, Russia, for its own sake, has acquired a strong presence in the Turkish economy and even, one could argue, a kind of dominance in the energy sector.
Marc Pierini
But what matters now, in my view, is two different things. After the agreement on Swedish accession and if the US side of the agreement to sell new F-16 fighters and improve some 80 F-16 aircraft currently in service in Turkish Air Force, if all that is implemented, we have two questions emerging. One is will Turkey manage to freeze the S-400 missile system in its possession in a way that doesn't impair NATO's operations in and around Turkey? That's one big issue. And two, whether these agreements will influence Ankara's participation in the reassurance operation of NATO on its eastern front and in the containment of Russia's action in and around Ukraine. How big a force, land or air, for example, could be committed by Ankara in comparison to the current very limited efforts in the NATO coalition on the eastern front?
Sinan Ülgen
I think this has to be put in a context that's fast evolving in the sense that Turkey has given its support to some of these reassurance operations. But ultimately, the argument that I hear in Ankara is, look, if the US is unwilling to give us the modernized F-16s, why should we allocate our overused F-16 operation? So now that argument is at least sidelined. Having said that, Turkey has also been supporting the Baltic air policing in the past, so it has its own F-16s participating in that mission as well. The relationship with Russia, therefore, will continue to be complex and complicated. Turkey will in any case want to retain this political engagement with Russia, but without tarnishing its status in the West and as a NATO ally. One other, of course, interesting dynamic lately has really been the consequences of the Gaza conflict on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy. President Erdoğan, after a balanced statement in the initial few days, then switched to quite a strong rhetoric against the actions of Israel.
There has been very regular rallies domestically, sometimes orchestrated by the government itself, in support of the Palestinians in Gaza and also internationally. Turkey has been quite active, with the foreign minister Hakan Fidan, being part of a number of initiatives in order to accelerate the path to a ceasefire, which to this day proved to be futile. But turning to you, Marc, perhaps on this, where do you think Turkey fits in the broader theater of the Middle East, especially now that we see signs of possible regional escalation? Is there any scope for a Turkey-EU collaboration or cooperation to bring peace to the region?
Marc Pierini
My answer will be against the background of our previous segment of this conversation. That is the long saga of the S-400 missile since July 2019, the long deadlock on Swedish succession, the exclusion of Turkey from the F-35 programs. These events have left a bad impression and have, in a way, weakened the Western trust in Turkey.
Sinan Ülgen
As true as that may be, I think in order to get the full picture, we must also relate that the exact symmetry of an erosion of trust vis-à-vis Turkey's partners in the West exists in Turkey. And this is very much driven by the US relationship with the Syrian PYD/YPG, which is at the core of this animosity.
Marc Pierini
Coming back to the Middle East theater, I think Turkey has voiced in the summer of last year its ambition to become a significant actor on the Middle East scene and to have a bigger say on foreign policy in general, worldwide and in the Middle East in particular. However, I was recently in the Gulf, and one of the things I heard was the regrets of some diplomats there about the unpredictability, or the U-turns if we prefer, or abrupt changes in Turkish policy with Egypt, with Israel, with Saudi Arabia, and also with Syria. Enemies one day, friends the next day, and enemies again. So we understand that there are domestic political and economic contingencies that may pull the policy in different directions. But there is a certain amount of puzzlement in the Gulf, not to speak of Europe. I think peace in the Middle East has long been a long and arduous endeavor. It has now become much more difficult to chart and indeed to achieve after the October 7 attacks by Hamas on Israel and the follow-up counterattack by Israel. So it will require an enormous amount of political trust between all the actors in the region, but in that particular case, between Turkey and the European leadership to create a new momentum.
If we only want to restrict the discussion on foreign policy issues, we have two background elements that are important in EU-Turkey relations. One is that for years now, the Turkish leadership has refused to discuss rule of law. Essentially, the attitude is, let's talk about trade, let's talk about Customs Union, let's talk about European investment. Everything else is terrorism. No, it is not. Now we have to clarify between Turkey and the EU the fact that as much as there is resentment over past actions around the table, we need to come to the real issues. One is rule of law and the other is this perceived insistence of the Turkish leadership about accession to the EU, which, of course is not in the cards. Beyond saying that Turkey wants to accede to the EU, everything which is done in terms of constitution, in terms of rule of law, in terms of the conduct of judiciary or media or civil society, all this is going in the opposite direction of what would need to be done to operate a rapprochement with Europe.
Sinan Ülgen
Let's hope we can even get there. We're not even there yet. I think the framework of the Turkey-EU relationship has certainly not moved beyond the refugee package since March 2016. Whether it's customs union, visas, a foreign policy corporation, we haven't had any progress. So I wouldn't minimize those areas, really, even though I also think that the central framework of the relationship should remain accession. The erosion of the democratic standards at home makes this certainly not an imminent objective. But having said that, there is also a perception in Turkey that the EU is not acting in good faith against Turkey. If the EU wants to have a discussion with Turkey on democracy, rule-of-law issues, it should not have basically suspended the two chapters 23 and 24 where it is supposed to have a discussion with Turkey on this issue. So how can you claim that you want to discuss these things and then on yourself, unilaterally suspend the exact chapters where you need to have this discussion with Turkey?
As a Turkish citizen living in Turkey, I very much wish that the government would reform and upgrade its standards on democracy and the rule of law, but the question is whether having this discussion with the EU is now possible. If the EU is not going to give Turkey a green light on the accession track, the value of having enormous, heavy discussion with the EU is difficult to uphold. And therefore we fall into a framework which is less rule-based, and more transactional, which is today's situation. And I think the challenge for the leadership on both sides will be to take stock of this and realize that the accession track is not a realistic perspective for the foreseeable future and create what I would call a complementary framework.
Because in the absence of which, I'm afraid, we are facing a scenario of even further alienation. It's difficult for the Turkish population to comprehend that the EU would basically greenlight the accession track to a set of new countries. And still Turkey cannot talk accession, or any other cooperative venture. The challenge will be to basically weigh all these obstacles and try to reaffirm a politically feasible framework to advance this relationship with the understanding that the reform agenda in Turkey will not gather pace in the next few years.
Marc Pierini
Sinan, let's go back to the two chapters blocked, which is more than ten years ago now, and accession track or no accession track. I think what you have now in the EU following the 2017 constitutional referendum, and its implementation all over these years since, is a one-man rule system in Turkey, period. There is no prospect for accession. And I do not see the prospect of the European Council changing its position on this particular aspect of the relationship. Now, what we hear when this position is expressed by the Europeans is two things. One, a number of Turkish diplomats still claiming that accession is the ultimate objective of Turkey. Nobody believes that because we have a one-man rule system and biased elections and so on and so forth. So how can you pretend one thing and do the exact opposite as a matter of political principles?
And secondly, if you want to continue the strong economic and trade and finance relationship between Turkey and the EU, the strong technology innovation links between the two economies, you also need a return to a decent degree of rule of law, because businesses and bankers need rule of law for their own sake. And as long as you have politicians and philanthropists in jail for no reason at all, the perception is that Turkey is not interested. So we indeed are at a deadlock.
And I very much hope that after a reversal of the economic and monetary policy, after putting an end to the very long discussion on Swedish accession, after probably receiving new aircraft from the US for the Turkish Air Force, there can be a real discussion on rule of law. That's really the expectation I perceive from European political circles.
Sinan Ülgen
I'm not going to argue against the need to have a discussion on the rule of law, but perhaps the EU should be more entrepreneurial with the customs union, had the discussions on the customs union been started, a crucial component of that was going to be dispute settlement. And it's that dispute settlement that would have forced Ankara's hand in upgrading its standards on the rule of law. But when all these conditions are put to the table as ex-ante conditions, the track record is that they don't help to advance the state of play. So maybe we need a degree of entrepreneurship here and goodwill in order to move the state of play.
Marc Pierini
Thank you, Sinan. Thank you for your participation.
Sinan Ülgen
Yes, it was nice to have this talk with you, Marc, as always. À bientôt. Thank you.
OUTRO
Marc Pierini
For those who are interested in learning more about Europe’s relations with Turkey, I encourage you to follow Carnegie Europe’s work.
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