Dimitar Bechev and Oana Popescu-Zamfir discuss the social and political dynamics in the Western Balkans, why EU enlargement to the region has stalled, and how remaining obstacles can be overcome.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has given EU enlargement new impetus, but obstacles to the Western Balkan countries’ integration persist.
Dimitar Bechev, senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, and Oana Popescu-Zamfir, director of the Bucharest-based think tank GlobalFocus Center, discuss the domestic dynamics in the region and how Brussels can encourage democratic reform.
[00:00:00] Intro, [00:01:41] Where the Western Balkans Stand on the Road to the EU, [00:11:20] Obstacles to EU Enlargement, [00:18:35] Prospects for Western Balkan Countries’ EU Accession.
Dimitar Bechev, January 11, 2024, “Serbia’s Authoritarian (Re)turn,” Carnegie Europe.
Dimitar Bechev, December 5, 2023, “There Are No Quick Fixes for EU Enlargement,” Carnegie Europe.
Dimitar Bechev, September 28, 2023, “The EU Cannot Give Up on Serbia and Kosovo,” Carnegie Europe.
Dimitar Bechev, June 20, 2022, “What Has Stopped EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans?,” Carnegie Europe.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir, Nikola Dimitrov, et al., June 2, 2023, “It’s a Package Deal! Reforming and Enlarging the European Union in a Contested World,” Institute for Human Sciences.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir, Rosa Balfour, et al., June 22, 2022, “What is to be done? The war, the Western Balkans and the EU,” Institute for Human Sciences.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir and Zoran Nechev, May 3, 2022, “Time to Recognize Ukraine as European and Shake Up the EU Enlargement Process,” DGAP.
Dimitar Bechev
The Western Balkan countries have been stuck in the EU waiting room for over a decade. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a renewed momentum in the union’s enlargement agenda may have broken the impasse. But several obstacles remain in the Balkan states’ road to joining the EU.
The stalling accession process has left the candidate countries’ populations disenchanted, lowering public support for EU membership in many of them. Meanwhile, leaders in the region have been resisting democratic reforms that could reduce their powers and have been looking for partners beyond the West.
So, what are the major social and political trends in the Western Balkans? Why has EU enlargement to the region stalled and when, if ever, can we expect these countries to join the union?
Dimitar Bechev
Hello, and welcome to a new episode of Europe Inside Out, Carnegie Europe’s monthly podcast about the continent’s greatest foreign policy challenges. My name is Dimitar Bechev and I am a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe.
Dimitar Bechev
This episode of Europe Inside Out is about the social and political dynamics in the six Western Balkan countries and their EU membership prospects.
I’m joined by Oana Popescu-Zamfir, director of the independent foreign policy think tank GlobalFocus Center in Bucharest and a long-time commentator on Balkan affairs.
Oana, welcome.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
It’s good to be here.
Dimitar Bechev
This episode is on the six Western Balkan countries, that is Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. But perhaps there is no better place to start the conversation than Brussels. And as you know, past December there was a momentous decision to open accession talks with Ukraine, Moldova, but also to promise Bosnia & Herzegovina a start of negotiations once all the conditions put forward by the EU have been met and there’s a necessary degree of compliance. It’s a historic decision, no doubt, but perhaps we can just have a look at the big picture and discuss the repercussions. What is your take on those?
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
WIt was the right decision primarily because the opposite would have been a historic mistake. We have this mantra about the fact that we as the EU support accession countries, but it’s ultimately up to them to take the right steps. And I’ve always asked, what if they don’t? Are we okay with that? Because after all, we don't do charity, we do enlargement for our own sake. It is in our own interest that our neighbors join into a common area of shared values and prosperity. And I think we’re seeing this today more than ever following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
So this is very much about who we are as the EU in the new global circumstances and about how and if we are closing ranks in front of new challenges. So from that perspective, this was clearly the right decision, but we have only done half the job. And let’s make this clear, as recent studies have shown, there’s never been more support for enlargement among the member states. But there is also never been less willingness to actually take the right steps to implement what is necessary.
So I very much fear that we are past peak geopolitical momentum, which is what we have been discussing for the past year or so, ever since we’ve extended the invitation to Ukraine and Moldova. But we have essentially offered everything that we had to offer at this point. And what’s likely to follow from now on is the long-drawn, likely to be painful technical process. And let’s not forget that on the other hand, 2024 is elections year in the EU, in the US, worldwide. So things are going to get much more political. And from that standpoint, what we have offered the Western Balkans, that the Growth Plan is essentially a step forward, but it is more of the same. It doesn’t revolutionize the process, it doesn’t incentivize reform, it doesn’t support pro-democratic forces and it doesn't help oust the stabilocrats that we’ve been having across the region, which is more and more a nice term to call autocrats and corrupt leaders.
Dimitar Bechev
Just to unpack a little bit what you said, Oana, you started with this notion of a political momentum towards enlargement, but pretty much ended up on a more skeptical note. And I suppose it’s a bit of both. There’s continuity and there’s change post-24 February 2022. So I was just wondering where you stand on this discussion. How much has changed in EU’s thinking? If we can talk about the EU as a whole, as a single actor, on expansion, enlargement and how much is business as usual, vis-à- vis candidate countries and membership.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
There is this acknowledgment that there is more to enlargement than just convergence of not just values and interests, but also policies and alignment with the EU. I think at least several countries have moved past that and are seeing the value of enlargement as being primarily security-related, geopolitical in the sense of building a more united continent in the face of global shifts. That has not necessarily materialized yet.
It has, in the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, it was obvious in the fact that we have not left Georgia out, despite the fact that its government has not made progress. But we have responded to the general mindset of the Georgian population, which is clearly pro-European. So I think that shows an understanding from the EU that we cannot just abandon Georgia, and with it the South Caucasus, to the Russian sphere of influence. We have included Bosnia in this new approach to enlargement - again, not on Bosnia’s merits, but on considerations related to our own interest as the EU, to keep like-minded neighbors close, even if they’re just partially like-minded.
However, when it comes to actually walking the walk, I think that’s where we start seeing more and more divisions, especially because increasingly it’s becoming clear that this time around there cannot be any sort of revolutionizing the enlargement process without revolutionizing EU institutional decisionmaking processes. And that’s something that nobody is particularly willing to touch on, especially ahead of elections. So basically what I see is not necessarily revolutionary change, but I do see some evolutionary change because the ball has started rolling. We have the Franco-German report…
Dimitar Bechev
Perhaps you can just say a few words about this report for the listeners who are not necessarily following day in, day out, the goings on in national capitals and Brussels.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
So the Franco-German report is essentially the product of twelve high-level experts from both France and Germany, whose initial mandate was to pick the minds of the two governments as to the strategic direction in which they were thinking of taking EU institutional reform to accommodate the new global realities and specifically the needs that EU enlargement brings. And well, since France and Germany don’t necessarily see eye to eye these days, their product is more that of their own minds. But it still presents a few proposals which essentially cover the whole ground from the possibility of continuing with deepening integration, while at the same time enlarging the European Union all the way, to actually creating four kinds of concentric circles that resemble the European political community, in which essentially the member states that sign up to all the rules and values of the union get all the benefits, and then gradually those that don’t will also see the benefits diminished.
So, this would be separate tiers of integration. What this report does, I think, most valuably is it actually presents concrete proposals as to how we could move forward, changing the decisionmaking processes, our outlook as the European Union on how we work together in a way that would reduce the possibility for blockages, of individual vetoes.
Dimitar Bechev
So when you look at the EU in the Western Balkans in particular, what do you think are the priorities? What is it that the EU wants to achieve beyond the overarching goal to bring those countries closer to itself? What are the political agenda items, if you will?
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
I’m afraid that we still see the Balkans as a pretty safe region where we are not going to see any sort of conflict of the kind that we see in Ukraine, and that could potentially expand to Moldova as well. So I believe the EU essentially looks at the Western Balkans and says if we manage to push for closer regional integration with the common market, then that’s going to drive reforms, it’s going to drive rule of law and political integration without us having to go all the way.
Dimitar Bechev
I think it’s the opposite, actually. I mean, there’s a bit of what you’re saying, but also if you look at what Brussels has done since 2022, it has been to turbocharge the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia. In other words, become much more mindful about security and political issues. It’s not only about trade and economic reform, institutional adjustments.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
No, absolutely. But I’m afraid we still think this is relatively easy to solve. I mean, what has been the success of the normalization process between Serbia and Kosovo? If anything, things have started deteriorating markedly over the past few months. So essentially with a process that is genuinely very important to the EU, I do believe that we tend to see stability in the Balkans as hinging on peace and enduring peace.
So I do honestly think that we look at the Western Balkans and we see a moderate level of instability and moderate risks, and then we do want to reduce the space for third countries, whether we’re talking Russia or China or even Turkey and the Gulf countries, to operate in the Western Balkans. But we don’t necessarily see this as something that requires our whole involvement and commitment.
Dimitar Bechev
So this is a nice way to segue into the second part of the conversation. And our mandate is to explore the difficulties and the hurdles. There is political will. Definitely, countries want to join the EU and the EU wants to enlarge in general, but surely there are a lot of obstacles along the way, both in the EU, but also in the region. So, to your mind, what would be the main hurdles?
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
In the Western Balkans, there are countries that still see their future as exclusively within the EU. And I think in recent times, for instance Albania has been taking steps in that direction. North Macedonia, despite domestic developments, has taken historic steps in the past, and frankly speaking, has no better choice than to become as closely integrated with the EU as possible. Montenegro also is a small country that very much depends on the European Union and the common market. But then there are countries like Serbia that I think are very good examples of how many other countries could see their evolution in the coming future unless the EU pushes more strongly in the direction of enlargement. But they don’t necessarily trust the fact that the EU is serious about it, and so why should they?
Why should they abandon the benefits that they can get from closely cooperating with Russia, China and with others? Why shouldn’t they just play everyone until a choice absolutely needs to be made? And we have not put the countries in this region in front of that choice. I’m afraid we’re going to start seeing this with Ukraine and Moldova as they start making the necessary reforms to advance down the path of accession. So I think this is the main tension for the coming years and it has geopolitical repercussions, and that is, how closely integrated are these countries going to be with the EU?
Dimitar Bechev
I think in Ukraine that you brought in… the issue is very different because without the EU, Ukraine will find it difficult to survive. It needs the EU not just for military assistance, which is provided by the US, but also for fiscal sustainability, just to run the state. And that’s not the case in the Western Balkans. But also, to my mind, the problem in places like Serbia is not China, it’s not Russia, it’s Serbia itself. On the 24th of December, you had a major protest in Serbia that was dispersed with batons and tear gas. You had opposition politicians going on a hunger strike. Now we have a war of words between Belgrade and the European Commission, where the spokesperson of the commission, Peter Stano, has blamed Serbia for using Russian narrative tactics to argue that the EU is meddling in Serbian affairs. But also Serbia has gone in the other direction: It’s not becoming more democratic, if anything it’s becoming more authoritarian. And also other countries are also following down that path. So, there’s a problem in the EU, but I don’t see a bright future for democracy in the Western Balkans, sadly.
And that might, to my mind, emerge as the main obstacle. It’s almost as if we are back to the mid-90s where you had semi-authoritarian regime in Belgrade and then you have opposition that is trying to claim bit of power fighting against the odds. So I'm just wondering if you look back, how much of encouraging signs do you see and how much there is ground to be less abate about this whole democratization/Europeanization process in the region?
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
We keep saying it is up to these countries to demonstrate the political will and the capacity to fulfill the conditions. But the farther we go from the EU core, geographically even, there’s less capacity and there’s less political will, very often because the development gap and the gap in values and in norms widens as you go farther away. And so I think this is partly the failure of the European Union because we have not found the right incentives that would make the elites in these countries renounce their privileges for the sake of EU accession.
Let’s differentiate between the societies and the populations of these countries that are very much European, despite all the differences, and their successive governments, which are not always representative of these societies. If the population does want to move in one direction, that doesn’t necessarily guarantee that the government of the country will demonstrate the same commitment.
Dimitar Bechev
Yeah, I’m with you here, but I’m not convinced that societies are pro-European in substantive way. They want all the benefits of being in the EU. But does it mean commitment to, quote-unquote, liberal values and democratic values? I’m a bit more skeptical, even in places where so very often elites are projection of their own societies. And it’s not accidental that people who we don’t like win power and they win huge amount of support in elections. Of course, it happens because they control public sector, they control the media, importantly, but also there’s resonance with their voters and their substantive numbers of voters who might have a very positive attitude to being able to go to Germany or work in Austria, but at the same time, don’t mind being ruled by autocratic leaders.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
Absolutely. But these are split societies. This is not an automatic organic process. This is a cost-benefit calculation on the part of the electorate. Look at Moldova. Moldova was ruled by pro-Russian socialist politicians that were cultivating vast networks of corruption and state capture. So essentially, it seemed like a lost cause. And then everything changed overnight. We have a government that is at least representative of a major trend within Moldovan society. It is very highly committed, it is working very hard to effect the necessary reforms. And so when we look at Moldova, we need to ask, which one is the real one? Is it the one we have today or is it the one we had five years ago? Countries don’t change in such a short span of time.
It is very much up to domestic developments, but also the push and pull of external forces. And that’s where the EU plays, or can play a major role to turn things one way or another. And I think it’s the same for the Western Balkans. They’re split between nationalism and internationalism, between integration with the EU and just taking everything they can from every actor that has something to offer, from Russia and China to the US and Europe. And I think it is very much up to what we do to influence domestic developments.
Dimitar Bechev
Well, that might be a good opportunity now to gaze at our crystal ball, moving to the last part of the conversation, and think about what’s coming next. I mean, if you are to make this forecast, looking forward three years, five years, seven years, what is your expectation? Where is this affair going forward? Just to put my cards on the table, I think it’s highly unlikely there’ll be another member state joining the EU in the next five to six years until the end of this decade. Am I right to be a bit more downbeat about the prospects? What’s your thinking?
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
Yeah, I’m afraid you might be right, but I think it’s really hard to make predictions right now because it all depends on what the strategic decision-making will be when we have a new Commission and a new European Parliament and the new balance of power between pro-democratic liberal forces in Europe and more nationalist forces in Europe.
Dimitar Bechev
But do we have to care about the Commission and Parliament, given that it will be the decision of the Council? Member states have to open negotiations with Bosnia. It won’t be down to the Commission.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
The Commission is important because so far it has been the boldest EU actor in advancing enlargement, at times bolder than the Council, and it will continue to have significant influence. At the same time, obviously, the decision ultimately lies with the member states. So I think it's really a function of which one of two directions we go. And this is going to be influenced in a major way by Ukraine. Ukraine has an active war on its territory - unless we manage to provide geopolitical incentives, intermediate deliverables that can convince the Ukrainian people that their fight is worthwhile and that there’s genuine support from Europe then…
Dimitar Bechev
But I’m afraid, I think, Ukraine probably needs much more our ammunition and our weapons and our money, not membership. Many of the benefits are there already with free movement and trade.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
I think it needs both because it needs ammunition and money in the short run, but it also needs a strategic idea to work towards because it’s going to be very important to Ukraine to feel if there is genuine support from the EU and the EU sees Ukraine as being part of a common space of security and stability, or we still see them as the periphery, and that is absolutely an option.
Dimitar Bechev
I think Ukraine won’t be at the center because it will be associate member. As long as the war goes on, it will be very difficult to conceive of Ukraine, not Moldova, even the Western Balkans, as full-fledged members. So I think you’ll be experimenting with all kinds of forms of loose association.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
The key question is, do we imagine Ukraine after the war as being a full-fledged member or not? Because if the answer is no, and we have offered Ukraine the perspective of becoming an EU member state, then the whole enlargement process will be adjusted and it will probably be adjusted in the direction of the Franco-German report and the European Political Community with these loose intermediate forms of association that will allow Ukraine to be part of the club, but not really at the core of the club. And it’s going to mean that we cultivate security and a shared economic space. But we don’t necessarily invest as much into the consolidation of what would be a political club. If the answer is yes, it will have to change the EU, because there is no way that Ukraine, a country of its size and its challenges, is going to become a member of the European Union ever in the future without that fundamentally changing the European Union.
Are we just going to try to continue to patch things up, support Ukraine so that it can continue the fight, but not really feel like it’s our war and it’s not really our business that’s directly threatened by Russia? Or are we going to be forced? The result of US elections could force us to face a new geopolitical reality. But I think that’s really something that remains to be seen. And I’m not very optimistic because at this point I think we are still in denial phase and we’re seeing the global shifts that are taking place. But we are trying to see if there is no way that we can actually avoid fundamentally changing to adjust to these.
Dimitar Bechev
On this semi-optimistic note, maybe it’s time to wrap up. Oana, it’s been a great pleasure having you on this month’s episode of Europe Inside Out. Thank you very much for taking the time.
Oana Popescu-Zamfir
Thank you for having me.
Dimitar Bechev
For those who are interested in learning more about the Western Balkans and EU enlargement, I encourage you to follow Carnegie Europe’s work. Our X (formerly Twitter) account is @Carnegie_Europe. You can find me @DimitarBechev. That is @D-I-M-I-T-A-R-B-E-C-H-E-V. You can find Oana @OanaPope. That is @O-A-N-A-P-O-P-E.
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Our producers are Francesco Siccardi and Indre Krivaite. Our editor is Futura D’Aprile of Bulle Media. Sound engineering and original music by Jeremy Bocquet.