Rym Momtaz, Sophia Besch, and Christopher Shell discuss how Donald Trump’s victory might reshape transatlantic relations.
With Donald Trump returning to the White House, the future of the transatlantic alliance hangs in the balance.
Europe Inside Out's new host Rym Momtaz is joined by Sophia Besch and Christopher Shell to unpack the reasons behind his victory and its implications for EU-U.S. relations.
[00:00:00] Intro, [00:01:52] Interviews with Voters in the United States [00:10:52] The Reasons Behind Trump’s Victory [00:20:59] The Election’s Impact on EU-U.S. Relations [00:27:54] The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship.
Rym Momtaz et al., November 7, 2024, “Taking the Pulse: Can Europeans Significantly Reduce Their Security Reliance on the United States?” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Rym Momtaz, September 17, 2024, “Europe’s Choice: Adapt or Atrophy,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Sophia Besch, Liana Fix, November 7, 2024, “Europe Does Not Have the Luxury to Panic Over Trump’s Election,”, Emissary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Sophia Besch, Christopher S. Chivvis, Stephen Wertheim, October 24, 2024, “Will America’s Next President Bring Real Change in Foreign Policy?” The World Unpacked, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Christopher Shell, October 24, 2024, “Race, Foreign Policy, and the 2024 Presidential Election,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Christopher Shell, October 11, 2024, “How Do Americans Feel About the Election and Foreign Policy?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Rym Momtaz
Welcome to Europe Inside Out. I'm your host, Rym Momtaz. I'm the editor in chief of Carnegie Europe’s Strategic Europe, where we publish twice a week punchy short analyses on all things strategic in Europe. And I'm delighted to be taking over hosting this podcast.
After a landslide victory, Donald Trump will become the next President of the United States, marking a crucial turning point in the transatlantic relationship.
Trump's win, driven by voters wanting lower inflation, tighter immigration controls and less defense spending abroad, promises to upend the alliance with Europe and its decades old core tenets. So with Carnegie scholars Sophia Besch and Chris Shell, we will discuss the impacts of the shifts in the role Americans now want for their own country in the world. More protectionist, less committed to alliances. And we'll discuss whether those in Europe who think they can keep buying more American weapons to keep the American security guarantee are right.
But before we get to that discussion, we're doing things slightly differently.
Rym Momtaz
For this first episode, we'll have two parts. In the first, we travel to the US a week before the presidential election. We're taking you on the ground to meet some voters in Pennsylvania and in Connecticut where there are massive weapons factories that export big ticket items to Europe. We wanted to know if in communities in the US that benefit directly or indirectly from European defense spending, the candidates’ positions on the alliance with Europe is a main consideration when deciding how to vote.
First stop, Pennsylvania.
Rym Momtaz
I’m here a week before the US presidential election, which is presenting the American people with a stark choice when it comes to the relationship with Europe, the transatlantic alliance. On the one hand VP Kamala Harris has expressed her commitment to the alliance, and on the other former president Donal Trump has said that if Europeans don’t pay more and don’t pay their fair share, then the US is going to encourage Russian president Vladimir Putin to attack them.
So I am here here to discuss this stark choice with people from this community to see if when they’re deciding who to vote for they’re also thinking about the candidates’ position when it comes to the alliance or supporting European countries against Russia or against any aggressors.
Citizen
So I don’t like all the money going to them obviously but that wasn’t a factor in me voting, immigrants was a factor in me voting.
Rym Momtaz
Is that the only factor? The most important one?
Citizen
The major one for me. And spending the money on Ukraine. And spending the money on immigrants and not the people in this country.
Citizen
Sending billions and billions to the people over there, how is it going to benefit us? You have homeless people here, you have mentally ill people out here. You have to take care of your home before anything else. We are the ones who need billions of dollars, I need help!
Rym Momtaz
And these two women felt like Europe didn’t protect the US from immigration so they should not be receiving so much American defense protection- they mentioned in particular German Chancellor Angela Merkel taking in, in 2015, a million refugees mostly from Syria.
Citizens
It's like with Merkel. So they got her out, because they didn't want them. She had already ruined them. It works from within, so you have somebody work from within and then all of a sudden you are suddenly broken. It happens this way, so they felt first. They got broken and this is how it's happening.
Rym Momtaz
So you feel like Europe gave in to immigrants and has facilitated the arrival to the US?
Citizens
Yes, something is going on there. It was within. Somebody might have said "I'm going to give you this, ABC, but this is what needs to be done". Money rules everything. Somebody paid somebody something. And I think there was a plan in effect for years and it's slowly coming our way.
Rym Momtaz
Clearly, all politics is local. And it works for the other side of the argument: a little further away in the same county, the benefits the US derives from its alliance with Europe were front of mind.
I wanted to ask you, when you are thinking about how you’re going to vote on November 4th, is part of your consideration for each candidate's position when it comes to America's relationship and alliance with Europe? Especially the support that America gives Europeans and Ukranians against Russia?
Citizen
The short answer is yes, but it’s not so much acutely Russia, I personally think about it because of, being a student of history and personally my family what it went through I was sort of inculcated that it is critical to have not just good relations but for the purposes of trade and support - even going as far back as to the Marshall Plan on WWII - and that positioned the US to be without any doubt the superpower.
To answer your question does it play a role? It plays a role, is it the sizeable predominant no, but I do sit back and it does have an affect on me. Being a student of history I know that any strong nation is one that has its tentacles in a benevolent way, to be outreach supporting financially through trade, through diplomatic, having really strong relations, because I think it keeps you in the pole position.
Rym Momtaz
I’m in Stratford, Connecticut. This is a “blue town”.It voted for Hilary Clinton in 2016 and it voted for Joe Biden in 2020. It’s also a town where there’s a big military helicopter factory that employs something like 7,000 to 8,000 people and they export a lot of these military helicopters to European countries, especially Eastern European countries and Baltic States. And so I was curious to know if in a “blue town” people are considering the alliance with Europe when they are deciding who to vote for.
On the main street right by the helicopter factory, I find a local on his lunchbbreak and we get talking.
As you’re thinking about who to vote for in this election are you taking into consideration the candidates’ position when it comes to the alliance with Europe and whether the US would come to the rescue of these European countries if Russia attacks them?
Citizen
No that is not something that I’ve thought about during this election.
Rym Momtaz
How come?
Citizen
I don’t know, there are so many things going on that that’s being looked over possibly, I’m not sure.
Rym Momtaz
Are you thinking about whether the US needs to continue supporting the Europeans against Russia, as Russia is attacking them? Is that a consideration for you?
Citizen
Yes, it’s not the top of my thoughts about the whole situation, I’m all about no war and peace, I hate where we’re at.
Rym Momtaz
What do you mean by that? Where are we right now?
Citizen
We are super divided. Everybody is divided. There’s division everywhere. In America, I think it’s all over the place. I just want everything to be peaceful. I want everyone to go along and that’s not what can be but I’m all about no war
Rym Momtaz
Some European countries think that the more they buy things that are like weapons that are produced in the US, the more America is going to support and protect them. Do you think that’s what America should be doing? Continuing to protect the Europeans?
Citizen
I don’t know a lot about that, so I don’t really want to speak about things I don’t know about, I have to be honest with you, I’m not 100% about that, I’m all about the no war, I hate it, I just want everything to be peaceful.
Rym Momtaz
Peace is a word that came up often in my discussions. Even though most hadn’t thought much more about it – they hadn’t thought about the importance of avoiding imposing a so-called peace on Ukraine that would legitimize Russian President Vladimir Putin’s violation of international law.
Regardless, Donald Trump won the presidential election. One of his promises was to avoid WWIII, as he put it, and to end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours”.
Which brings us to our expert discussion.
Rym Momtaz
So, on this first episode of Europe Inside Out that I'm hosting and that happens to be airing shortly after the US presidential election, I'm really happy to be at Carnegie's global headquarters in Washington, DC and to have with me both of you, Sofia Besch, senior fellow at the Europe program here at Carnegie and host of The World Unpacked, and Chris Shell, fellow at the American Statecraft program at Carnegie as well.
For this discussion, which we're going to have about basically European buying American to keep America, so to speak, keep America engaged in the transatlantic alliance that has dominated the security architecture since the end of World War II.
Rym Momtaz
I really wanted to start with a question about how do you think the average American voter thinks about Europeans and the alliance with Europe when they're voting, and do they think about that?
Christopher Shell
I think it's important to start that there's layers to the conversation. There's the DC, wonky, complex, abstract conversations about the European alliance. Then there's, I guess, the more quotidian base-level conversation. And from what I found in my own research and just from casual conversation, my own level of street journalism, I think there is a respect and understanding for American alliances at the top-line level. I would say that we saw from the election that countries really split in half. There's a substantial amount of Americans, regardless of class or race, who do understand that, hey, the US has a role in the world. It's a role of ensuring peace at adhering to alliances, trying to at least contain what we would consider adversaries. But then, I hope this helps, but there's another half who, one can say, have bought into President Trump's rhetoric around alliances being a form of usury, transactional. And I think what we saw in the election in particular, was that half who believe that or somewhat believe it, turned out and voted in mass. And I just say this one more thing, I do think that, in particular, I guess we'll get to it in terms of the war on Ukraine, that there is a sentiment of some of the polling that I've had that Americans are largely in favor of, hey, let's give aid to Ukraine, to ensure that Ukraine is able to stay on their own two feet.
But then, unfortunately, there is also an aspect of feeling, like I said earlier about usury and money that's going overseas cannot be used here
And the trade-off. Why are we doing this? For what people would say, guns and butters. I guess, in other words, for your audience, money overseas that can be used domestically. There's also the material concern about racial minorities overrepresented in the US-services, military service. So there's also what if we go into a great power war with Russia would then mean that we're now dying over this conflict? So I think there's those concerns that doesn't necessarily mean that these groups don't care, which is more so of, I think, a better explanation of why this is happening and why it's important.
Rym Momtaz
Sophia?
Sophia Besh
I might add that on your very interesting point about how to make the case for alliances. I think often the way that policymakers here make the case for alliances is implicitly a way of making the case for US primacy and holding up the international world order through alliances and with allies and with partners. And if you fundamentally don't believe that that should be what America is doing, then it's harder to make the case for alliances. I think that is something that we have to take very seriously after this election, where I think after the first time Donald Trump was elected, there was maybe a response in Europe and among Democrats saying, people don't understand the benefit of alliances. They bought into this metric about protection records and the Europeans aren't paying up in NATO, and that's why we're just getting a bad deal. Then there was a lot of explaining that happened about how actually NATO doesn't work like that. Actually, we're all benefiting, and actually the US benefits. But I think this is the element that voters are questioning.
Does the US benefit? What is the purpose for the US of these alliances? And if it is upholding European security, if it is upholding the international economic order, if it is upholding US primacy, and they don't actually believe that that's what they want to do, then I think we have to take seriously that they're voting down on those issues today.
Rym Momtaz
So we're recording two days after election day. The data it's still coming in. But I think one thing we can all agree, or maybe you disagree with me, is that inflation was the single most dominant force in determining voting. It seemed like, it's what carried Trump over the line with such a clear victory, while Kamala Harris had a hard time coming up with a message that resonated on how she would improve the situation on inflation. The reason why I think about inflation is because it's tied in a certain way, maybe sublimately, with this idea that former President and now President-elect Donald Trump has driven about how European countries that are rich, quote-unquote, Germany, France, take advantage, quote-unquote, of America and how that needs to be rebalanced. I wonder how much that seeps in with that voter that is hurting economically, even though obviously GDP growth and GDP numbers in the US are much better than Europe. At the grocery store, things are very expensive, and that's driving people.
Sophia Besh
I think we have to be very careful in one-factor explanations for what happened. In terms of the topics that influenced the vote, obviously, inflation, the economy was the big one. The other big ones were immigration and democracy. Then a little bit below that, abortion. But then foreign policy did actually, in some of the posts that we're seeing, play into, I think, the pitch that Donald Trump was making.
Rym Momtaz
Can you define how? How did that? What were the terms?
Sophia Besh
I think the terms were his main pitch on foreign policy is deterrence and influence through strength rather than alliances.
Rym Momtaz
Bilateral relationships, not alliances.
Sophia Besh
I think under foreign policy, you would probably also include things like tariffs, trade imbalances that he's obsessed with. But what I meant to say was that it was once again an incumbent versus change vote. And that the four years that Donald Trump was out of office helped him make the case that he was still the candidate of change and that Kamala Harris was seen as a continuation of Biden's policies and then “Bidenomics” and his economic policies, but also everything else that he stood for, which was a very nostalgic view of US primacy in the world and of US positions in the world.
Rym Momtaz
A lot of people are actually noting that most incumbents in liberal democracies have paid the price after COVID and inflation. I have to say my other specialty is obviously Emmanuel Macron. I think it's really interesting that he was the only one who got reelected. He then suffered in other polls, but it's not the same situation. But I think you put it better than me, the whole idea of the trade dimension that is actually connected very, very deeply in the Trump world and Trump messaging to tariffs and inflation. And that is a way to think about how foreign policy played that I think maybe perhaps in Europe, we don't think about it in these terms. I wonder, Chris, what you think about that.
Christopher Shell
Yeah, you did an excellent job of summarizing it. I'll just add one thing on the foreign policy aspect. I believe that Trump was, quote-unquote, successful in able to characterize himself as an anti-war candidate. I'm not saying that's necessarily true, but I think we talk about how the American, the average American voter who's not deep in the weeds of international affairs, foreign policy, thinks about the US's role in the world. There is this aspect of US involvement in overseas conflicts, interventionism, especially if we put in the broader context of a global war on terror that you go back to thinking about the incumbent, there was the pull out of Afghanistan, which I think many can agree needed to happen. I think it was the way in which it happened. And we even saw Trump play on that in the second debate, about the bosh withdrawal from Afghanistan, so on and so forth. And I think we even saw Trump is very reductive way of doing it, but saying that, I'm going to end the war in Ukraine. People were asking, Well, how are you going to do that? But I think Trump, he didn't specify. He just said, I'm going to end the war in Ukraine.
Rym Momtaz
Did he need to specify?
Christopher Shell
No. Unfortunately, I don't think he did, especially when we're talking about people who are not in the weeds of these types of issues. All they need to hear is he's going to end the war in Ukraine. I do think there was a way in which, and this is all hindsight 2020, in which Harris could have one up Trump in saying that, okay, I'm going to end the war, but I'm going to end it in this way that's going to benefit Ukraine. I think that could have been done. And she only had 100 days of separating herself from Biden. I think that's also a very tall order. Having 100 days, which is really hard, where Trump pretty much had a whole year relatively to make his case plain for American people. But so I say that all to say that we're thinking foreign policy or international affairs, definitely this concept of US involvement in world affairs, US involvement in global conflicts. And American people, unfortunately, I don't think, are really trying to hear this idea of, okay, we just into Afghanistan, but we're going to get entangled in something else.
Sophia Besh
There's a really important point that you make there, Chris, that I think is worth restating. I often hear Democrats who worry about the next Trump presidency say that “Oh, it's going to be so much worse because the world is so much worse now.” For some reason during his first term and global politics, there were no wars, there were no big crises that the US was involved in. Then, of course, the mirror image of that if you're a Trump supporter, is “how did the world get so much worse?”
It helps him to say, “now suddenly there's this war in Ukraine, and there's the war in the Middle East.” Trump supported the Afghanistan withdrawal, of course, but the argument that he makes is to say, I would have done it better. I would have shown more strength. Who knows if that's true? But it's a very seductive theory to say deterrence through strength and then deal making to avoid more wars. I think that's a really, really important point, Chris.
Rym Momtaz
So is it fair to say that today, American foreign policy, in the view of the average person, we've gone from a doctrine, an ethos, a DNA that was an America that was very confident, that was very dominant on the foreign stage, that felt like it could project its power and project its values, democracy, capitalism. And now we're at a place in the beginning, maybe, of an era where average Americans want to avoid forever wars, as they put it, and want to just make sure that they're getting the benefit of capitalism, and it's not happening at their expense because they felt over the past 20 years, the middle class or blue collar workers, that capitalism and globalization has happened at their expense. Has this shift happened in your view, and is it here to stay? Because that would have real consequences on the relationship between the US and Europe to start with.
Christopher Shell
This is happening at a time of the rise of China. So I think China's rise, you mentioned this earlier about this concept or this thinking amongst many Americans about rich Europe, capable Europe. This is not Europe of the post-Second World War period. They can handle their own issues in their own backyard. I think that amongst, and I don't think it's amongst all Americans, but especially we see it with Trump's base, this, okay, China is eroding America's strength, which is our industrial strength, especially when you put in the context of the financial collapse and all the mode of collapse of the early 2000s, I think there is this base that China is to blame for. I think obviously that stems from the deal that was struck with Nixon and all the other stuff. I don't think Americans necessarily see it that way.
But I think it's definitely China is becoming stronger. China is taking away from our economic base. And there's this sentiment that, okay, Europeans can handle this. They have expensive railway system, free college, all these things that I just think-
Rym Momtaz
Health care, vacation.
Christopher Shell
Health care, yeah, all this. And I think this is stuff that I see, that can be a bit reductive, but I think these are things that are shared. It's this sentiment that in order to restore American strength, let Europe handle their stuff, and then we're going to shift and look and take on China because China is the real threat. There's a bunch of polling that says that the way Americans view the relationship with China has definitely degraded, where it goes from competitor to now enemy. And I think there is a sense that, okay, well, we can't do it all at once. Europe, just handle it. And I think that's definitely appreciated amongst the Trump base. And I think what we even saw, there are people who might not characterize themselves as MAGA, but people who may, going back to the economy and inflation, may feel that, Okay, the economy is not right. Maybe we should blame China for it. So that's how maybe Trump's message becomes more alluring. You start seeing these subtle demographic shifts that we haven't really seen in recent decades happen.
Rym Momtaz
It's interesting you should say that because it reminds me of something that Trump said on the campaign trail where he was basically saying in Pennsylvania in particular, which ended up obviously being a very important key state, at least three times, he said he wouldn't spend taxpayers money on wars in, quote, countries that you've never heard of and don't want to hear of. I wonder how that applies to Europe. Does the average American know where Estonia is?
Sophia Besh
I think the Europe case is a little bit different because what Trump has also said about Europe and about the EU is, you think it's just these nice little rich countries, but actually, they're out to get us, I'm paraphrasing. I think he's playing into that image that Americans have of Europe, which, I mean, they're not wrong.
Rym Momtaz
They're not wrong on what?
Sophia Besh
They're not wrong on these. They are wealthy, democratic, stable, relatively, ethnically homogenous democracies. There is a very real question that Americans are asking that European should ask, which is why is the US paying for their security? We're dancing around that question. I think a lot of President-elect Trump's views on foreign policy have become mainstream over the past few years. This is one that I think lots of Americans of all political colors would probably subscribe to. Another point that I just wanted to quickly raise, you both outlined, I think, two variants of where the Republican foreign policy is going. And it's one of the questions that we wonder when we wonder where Trump's foreign policy would actually go, is would it go more in a restrainer withdrawing from the world's direction, or more into a, we have to withdraw from Europe in order to focus on China and in the Pacific direction. Then for me, if it's the second, then I foresee... I can't really see voters supporting Donald Trump now, supporting, for instance, a war over Taiwan. If you're not supporting a war over Ukraine, it's hard to make the case why you should support a war over Taiwan.
Rym Momtaz
But in talking with people in the Trump foreign policy world, when they want to confront China, they don't necessarily agree, all of them, that they need to go to war over Taiwan.
Sophia Besh
Absolutely.
Rym Momtaz
That conversation is happening among themselves. I want to go back to Europe because both of you outlined a view, an American view, that I think is actually consensual, whether you're a Democrat or a Republican, that Americans think that Europe is a wealthy place because they also mostly interact with Europe when it comes to vacation or to luxury goods.
That's what they see in their mind. I'm struck by the gap between this perception and how Europeans feel about their wealth, their economic situation, and their power. When you're in Europe, there's a real sense of panic over the economic decline and over weakness in terms of geopolitical defense power, even if you have actors like European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, or French President, Emmanuel Macron, or even Poland as a whole who actually believe that Europe can do more for itself. But this gap in perception, I think, has become a real big challenge for the continuation of the transatlantic relationship, the way we've known it.
Rym Momtaz
I'd love to get your thoughts on how do you see new terms of this transatlantic relationship if it is to continue being as strong and as foundational as it has been since World War II? Maybe, Sophia, you can start.
Sophia Besh
That's a big question. That's a question that we'll be working on, I think, for the next four years, at least. Well, first on your, I think, very, very important point, Rym, about the perceptions on Europe's economy, because I think it's important to put a fine point to it. When Americans say Europe is wealthy and wealthy enough to pay for its insecurity, 100%. I think that can’t stand next to “Europe is economically declining.” And that doesn't help the European case in the US either. Because one thing that I am really struck by in every conversation I have with US foreign policy thinkers is how much the potential for economic innovation and investment of a region plays into whether US thinks of that region as strategically important.
Rym Momtaz
So it's not how much weapons they buy from the US?
Sophia Besh
Unfortunately, it's not just that. No. It plays into it more, I think less with voters and more with the defense industrial lobby that then has an impact on Congress. But I think that actually the Draghi report, we underestimate perhaps in Europe, you'll tell me if I'm wrong, how much that damages also the transatlantic relationship if the US feels that Europe is essentially not catching up and not going where the US is going, whereas other countries in the world have much more economic potential and much more innovation and investment potential, and how also the US looks at different European countries and looks at who has the strong economy, who is investing. I think that is an important aspect that we sometimes-
Rym Momtaz
That's why Poland feels good about itself.
Sophia Besh
That's why Poland feels good about itself. If it doesn't get smacked down by the EU Commission over its fiscal policy. That just as an aside on how we have to put the transatlantic relationship on a new footing. I guess I'll focus on one aspect, which is one that I'm working on a lot on European security and on NATO. I think we have to put meat on the bone of the conversation on the European pillar in NATO.
We've had a lot of talk about that, and we haven't really, I think, in Europe, confronted the reality that a European pillar in NATO is not just a more palatable transatlanticist version of European strategic autonomy. It has to basically mean what we were talking about when we were talking about European strategic autonomy inside NATO, because that pillar has to be able to carry the alliance, if necessary, by itself.
Rym Momtaz
But does an alliance actually exist with that in America that is really deeply involved? I think that's an open question.
Sophia Besh
Of course, it's an open question, but we have no choice but to tackle it now. Otherwise, we'll throw our hands up and say, All right, we're done. I don't think that's where we're going to go. I think we can and should make a pitch to the Donald Trump White House about how we move on from a conversation about burden sharing to a conversation about burden shifting. The US wants to shift the burden of European security. And in order to avoid them doing it overnight by pulling out troops, for instance, or important capabilities, let's try to make with them together a plan how they can slowly withdraw some of their capabilities or their troops or their personnel in NATO's command and control structures and how we can slowly replace those with Europeans.
Rym Momtaz
Capacity building.
Sophia Besh
Capacity building. There are some things that we won't be able to replace, even in the medium term, like the US nuclear umbrella. But actually, most people in the MAGA universe who are advocating for a much reduced US presence in Europe don't actually advocate for a withdrawal of the US nuclear umbrella.
Rym Momtaz
It's the one thing they keep actually completely to the side.
Sophia Besh
Which is a start. That's a start. Then working with them to say, Give us X amount of years. Here's our plan. And how we can relieve some of the burden from you. I think the entry way into even having that conversation has to be defense spending. It has to be an announcement by European allies, a new defense pledge, if you will. 3% Exactly. 4%, but probably 3%, let's start with 3% by the end of Trump's tenure, 2028. I'm just throwing out things here, but that is your entry way into then hopefully having a more constructive conversation with Washington. We all know there's no guarantees here. It could go horribly wrong, but we have no chance but to try it now.
Rym Momtaz
You have to throw things at the wall and see what sticks, Chris?
Christopher Shell
Yeah. I'm happy that you mentioned the defense spending aspect because there's a thread there when it comes to US domestic conversations. I'm thinking about, I know we've so far talked a lot about Trump and the MAGA base, but I'm thinking about even on the American left, there is this sentiment around potentially NATO being a vassal of US power. You mentioned US primacy I see earlier. I think there's a serious conversation needs to be had in the US. There's a conversation being had, but I don't think being taken seriously, around defense spending. I think RFK talked about cutting the defense budget in half, which is probably extreme, but these are things that Americans are throwing out there. Bernie Sanders has talked about it. He's on the American left. I think there needs to be a serious conversation about how can we address this strategically, but also realistically. I think there's a concern about Americans. You hear a lot of talk about 800 military bases, essentially the US Empire, so on and so forth. And I think that lends to this perception, wherever all you're on about the US-Europe relationship and whether it's one that's transactional, whether it's one where the US is footing a majority of the bill and usury.
And I feel like to get to a point where we can make a solid case for the US-Europe relationship and for NATO is one that takes Americans' concerns about defense spending seriously. When we think about, we just mentioned a lot of social welfare programs that the US does not have. So I think tackling the conversations around defense spending, tackling conversations about 800 military bases around the world, tackling conversations around US presence in Europe, which I wish I could give a really concrete answer, but I think that can start to really address, I think, real concerns about American defense posturing here domestically that could then translate into, I think, a healthier view of US NATO, US-Europe relations.
Rym Momtaz
I think we really went to the heart of how to talk to the American population, which, by the way, on a basis that it's bipartisan.
I do also recognize, if for our policymakers who are listening to us, that it's a probably more complex conversation that they need to have with what you were talking about, the military-industrial complex in the US and also Congress people. They have to find a way to reconcile these two messages that are not necessarily always the same, because obviously, Congress people want to keep those European euros coming in, buying the stuff that the factories produce in their own districts. But as Chris was saying, the American population wants its government to spend maybe a little less on defense and a little more on social stuff and on infrastructure and on reducing inflation.
Sophia Besh
I think what is important for Europeans is we're going to spend much more money on defense. We're going to invest in capabilities. We're going to invest in European defense firms. Some of that money is obviously going to go to the United States, not just to curry favor, but because this is where some capabilities are available quicker and better. Not all of that money needs to go here. I think what's important is that we present this as a win-win deal, which it is. If the overall pie is getting bigger, everybody's getting more money, the US defense production capacity is not currently able to fill all the gaps on both sides of the Atlantic. I think it's actually possible, and there's more of an opening there than we sometimes think. The harder questions for Europeans, I think, is what we talked about earlier, which is the guns versus butter framing that I think we have counter when we're talking about more defense spending. We're far from where we are in the US. I don't think that we actually should go where the US is with the disproportionality of its defense budget.
But it also doesn't mean that if we invest more money into defense, this is going to come out of schools and pensions. If we allow for a little bit more fiscal flexibility, if countries like Germany get around their obsession with the debt brake, if we allow for, for instance, joint borrowing at EU level to give a bit more flexibility to spend more money on defense while not at the same time stirring a populist sentiment over why that money isn't going to the home front.
Rym Momtaz
You know what? Come to Carnegie for a bit of actually positivity and optimism. Win-win. That's what alliances should be about. Now, it's tough, but that's what we're going to leave it at. Chris, Sophia, thank you so much for having this conversation with me.
Christopher Shell
Thank you.
Sophia Besh
Thank you, Rym. Thanks.
Rym Momtaz
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