Thomas de Waal, Zaur Shiriyev, and Areg Kochinyan examine recent shifts in Armenia–Azerbaijan relations and explore future trajectories in the South Caucasus.
The peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, initialed in August 2025, represents a major turning point for the South Caucasus.
Thomas de Waal, Zaur Shiriyev, and Areg Kochinyan discuss the role Europe can play in supporting normalization and advancing infrastructure development across the region.
[00:00:00] Intro, [00:01:37] The Armenia-Azerbaijan Normalization, [00:11:23] New Connectivity Projects in the South Caucasus, [00:19:31] Europe’s Role in Supporting the Peace Process.
Zaur Shiriyev, February 3, 2026, “Europe Falls Behind in the South Caucasus Connectivity Race,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Thomas de Waal, December 16, 2025, “Trump’s Peace Lessons for Europe,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Zaur Shiriyev and Philip Gamaghelyan, December 4, 2025, “Strategic Directions for Building Sustainable Peace Between Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
Thomas de Waal, November 13, 2025, “Armenia’s Election Is a Foreign Affair,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Thomas de Waal, September 22, 2025, “An Unlikely Road to Peace for Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Foreign Affairs.
Philip Gamaghelyan and Zaur Shiriyev, August 7, 2025, “As They Edge Toward Peace, Armenia and Azerbaijan Must Resist Old Habits,” Emissary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Zaur Shiriyev, May 26, 2025, “The Precarious Power of Azerbaijan,” Foreign Affairs.
Thomas de Waal, March 17, 2025, “Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Major Step Forward,” Emissary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Areg Kochinyan, July 12, 2024, “Why the World Must Support Armenia’s Defeated Democracy Against Russian Hybrid Warfare,” Conflict and Civicness Research Blog, London School of Economics and Political Science.
Areg Kochinyan, May 21, 2024, “Armenia Should Use This Window of Opportunity to Leave Russia’s Orbit,” Politika, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
Thomas de Waal
Hello and welcome to Europe Inside Out, Carnegie Europe’s monthly podcast about the issues in and around Europe. Let’s be honest, there’s been a lot of bad news in the world recently. And in 2025, continuation of war in Ukraine and Gaza. In 2026, we see problems in Venezuela, Greenland and beyond. But one bright spark perhaps is the situation in the South Caucasus. The possibility this year of a historic peace agreement being signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is a peace agreement which is very problematic. We saw in 2023 the recapture of the Armenian populated area of Nagorno Karabakh inside Azerbaijan and the flight of the Armenian population. But that, in turn, I think laid the possibility for historic normalization between these two countries which have been in conflict since the early 1990s. I’m here in Brussels and I’m joined by two colleagues who I’m working with on this region, we’re working on a new paper together. It’s Zaur Shiriyev, who’s non resident scholar with the Russia and Eurasia Carnegie Center in Berlin, and Areg Kochinyan, who’s president of the Armenian Council, which is a think tank in Yerevan. We’ll be discussing what’s going to happen between Armenia and Azerbaijan this year. More peace? We hope. Normalization? Let’s see, Areg, Zaur, welcome.
So Areg, let’s begin with Armenia. This is an absolutely crucial year for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. He’s had a very tricky few years. He’s seen a peaceful revolution, he’s seen two elections, he’s seen two wars. Now he’s trying to get a peace process done with Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, he’s trying to loosen Armenia’s dependence on Russia. So he’s trying to manage many things at the same time. And he faces a very crucial election in June. So how is Pashinyan doing and what are the main threats that he’s facing?
Areg Kochinyan
First of all, Tom, thank you for the invitation. It’s an absolute pleasure to be speaking for this format. Now going to your question, Armenia now faces significant amount of Russian interference and Interference and propaganda into our elections. The situation is pretty similar to what happened in Moldova, where Russians were trying to bring some influence and change the results of elections in their political favor. Similar things are happening in Armenia with the key difference that Armenia is significantly closer to Russia. Thus movement of finances and channels to implement this influence are significantly bigger. We can see that, we can feel that. A Russian oligarch, a billionaire Samvel Karapetyan was sent to Armenia to become basically the champion of pro-Russia orientation. I would say that in this regards the situation reminds what was happening in Georgia a couple of years ago with probably in Kremlin they decided not to invent a bicycle but to use the same technology as they did in Georgia. Simultaneous to this there is a big amount of AI videos, disinformation, misinformation campaigns in social media research engines with amount basically unprecedented for the Armenian media sphere. We have never seen this amount of disinformation campaigns being done on our media sphere. With all of that it’s pretty clear to us what’s the agenda. Russia is permanently against of the Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization and Armenian-Turkish normalization because those two combined would mean a significant decrease of the Russian influence in our region. That influence currently is based on those conflicts and the solution of those conflicts would create conditions in which the Russian military presence, let’s say in Armenia, will no more be needed. And very realistic opportunities for trade, energy, and many others. Diversification would become possible. Now that’s definitely not in the Russian interest and Russians are going to do everything possible not to let that happen. And right now the best opportunity that they have are the upcoming elections in Armenia in June. I would say that this is the biggest challenge that the peace process in South Caucasus, both between Armenia and Azerbaijan and also the normalization Armenia and Turkey currently faces.
Thomas de Waal
So a lot at stake there in Armenia. But Zaur, returning to you: even if Pashinyan does win the election, that doesn’t mean there’s going to be an automatic signing of peace agreement with Azerbaijan, does it?
Zaur Shiriyev
Thanks Tom. The success of the peace process right now is dependent on the Armenian government for sure. It’s a rare or the public acknowledgment of this. So this is also helping both Baku and Yerevan to build a much more trust and to trust each other. So for Baku also thinking that actually in the long term. So 10 years, 15 years later. So this issue. So there’s a concern also insecurity that this issue can come back. Only the removal of this the indirect reference in Armenian Constitution to the Nagorno Karabakh unification with Armenia. So if you remove this element from the Armenian constitution they will not be in a legal and political barrier. But there’s also one thing has changed a year ago or two years ago otherwise I made a similar demand. But right now we see much better understanding and sometimes not making it public and understand that actually the critical first step is Armenian election and then this can continue. But also about the peace agreement. So there is also on the sun that might be segment can be signed before the Armenian election or after right after. I see also in Baku a concern that Yerevan is focused on peace agreement, but what happens after signing a peace agreement is also important in Baku as far as I see.
Thomas de Waal
So Zaur, just to clarify, what we’re talking about here is a reference inside Armenia’s constitution to unification of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, the issue which for so many years was the conflict between these two nations. And what Azerbaijan is saying is that only when there’s a new constitution which drops that reference can a peace agreement be signed. So we’re looking at a quite a tricky process with several hurdles that need to be surmounted. So, there are still things that can go wrong, aren’t there?
Areg Kochinyan
There is this idea, let’s say in air, that things can go on right now, that the peace agreement can be signed now, with the possible ratification happening after elections. By the way, I must say that in Armenia both the government and the expert community disagree that in the Armenian constitution there is a there is a problem, there is a challenge to signing the peace agreement and the Constitutional Court’s decision made on the act of delimitation demarcation committees proved that the Constitutional Court of Armenia as well doesn’t agree that there is a problem in the Armenian constitution. That said, most probably in the upcoming year we will see an adoption of a new constitution, as an implementation of the promise of the Prime Minister and his team that was there since the revolution in Armenia since 2018. And most probably this new constitution will change a lot. I don’t exclude the possibility that also the parts that Azerbaijani sides is problematic would also not be presented in the text of the new constitution. So to keep it short, there is still a room of possibility in which the peace agreement can be signed this year even prior to June. But that would need definitely some level of trust between the sides that the processes are going to continue. That would need a level of participation and synchronization also of the positions from Turkey. And that would need some benefits for, for both sides actually from our partners in the West.
Thomas de Waal
So, Zaur, you’ve already alluded to the fact that the peace agreement is not the end of a process, it’s the beginning of a new process. There are many steps that need to be taken before this region becomes fully peaceful. So, we are here talking to an audience which doesn’t necessarily know all the ins and outs of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Just kind of sum up for us, what is the big significance all of this peace agreement for the South Caucasus as a whole, and what’s possible that’s not been possible before?
Zaur Shiriyev
The most possible is that actually the Azerbaijan-Armenian irreversible choice about connecting each other and making a more predictable region. So let’s say 30 years, 10 years ago it was impossible. We always talk about this. So we have only one partner, Georgia, that both sides are negotiating talking as a neighbor. But we have a dysfunctional region because all three never come together. Now very interestingly we have right now Azerbaijan and Armenia talking to each other and they are getting much more closer. What wasn’t possible 30 years ago or 20 years ago is possible but also how to reach the Georgia and engage is also critical the point for both Baku and Armenia. But second thing was possible right now. Now we are in the process of identifying there was a peace missing. So because this region actually lived with what war means and they observed this, they lived with the war but now is actually the how to make the meaning to the peace. So in the level of the state, in the level of the communities, in the level of the less ordinary people. This is a big question is actually that the next couple of the years is actually going to have to understand this. But also it’s not only just waiting but also working on this. So the door to making a peace possible is open. But also it also depends on Baku and Yerevan how much and how the fast they can go with the storm.
Thomas de Waal
So when we look at the South Caucasus, we see small countries with big neighbors which have continuously dominated them, which have exerted their bullying, you might say, influence over them: Russia and Iran. Particularly Russia, which has traditionally used the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a lever of control between the two countries. That seems to be changing in Azerbaijan and in Armenia. So talk us through that Zaur. What do you think is changing in the relationship between these two countries and Russia? And how is the peace agreement going to help to solve that?
Zaur Shiriyev
The region is not actually the dominance of any power anymore. It’s as you somehow once you put it that it’s like a marketplace of the influencers. So there are different actors. The process that Iran cannot block it. So whether it’s about the connectivity, whether it’s about the normalization and Russia cannot monopolize. This is something new but also one thing is new that more Azerbaijan and Armenia is talking to each other also reduce the polar impact of Russia because Russia used to leveraging between Azerbaijan and Armenia, first. Second, actually how to not to keep them as spoiler power, both Azerbaijan and Armenia, on their capacity which is going to important and it’s important to shape the next months and the years.
Thomas de Waal
Let’s talk economics, because there’s been a significant problem for many years which is that Azerbaijan is a country of two parts. There’s the main part of Azerbaijan, but there’s also the exclave of Nakhchivan which borders Turkey and borders Armenia, but is not connected to the rest of Azerbaijan. It’s kind of in geographic terms, it’s the Alaska of Azerbaijan. And because of conflict for decades, there’s been no connection between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan because the railroad across Armenia was closed. It last operated back in Soviet times. And this has been a significant problem. It’s a local route which has closed down. It’s also potentially an international East-West route between Turkey and Central Asia, between, Azerbaijan and Armenia, all the way across. So this problem, it seems, was solved by American intervention last August, the signing of an agreement in the White House last August, and the renaming of this trip with the immodest name the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP, which involves the U.S. and the Armenia and Armenia now jointly controlling a new, railway to be built across Armenia which gives Azerbaijan “unimpeded access” to and from Nakhchivan across this route. So, this is all about what we call connectivity. It’s all about reconnecting the region by opening closed roads and railways, reconnecting electricity and gas links. You better start Areg, has this American agreement solved this or are we still in for some unpleasant surprises? Is this issue now fixed?
Areg Kochinyan
I might say it is being fixed, because unfortunately not all of the details are yet published about the connectivity project. Definitely it’s significantly better and significantly a significant step forward compared to the Russian suggestions which were creating big issues for Armenian sovereignty and jurisdiction, which are well respected in this new agreement. For example, in the explanatory part of the agreement which was just published in January, the term, sovereignty of Armenia is repeated 16 times. The term jurisdiction is repeated, if I’m not mistaken, 14 times. Almost in every sentence, wherever someone is writing anything about that infrastructural project, it is stressed out that everything is under Armenian sovereignty and jurisdiction, which was basically the problem that Armenia felt that the previous rounds of negotiations were one way or another violating the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Armenia. The term, and the term “unimpeded” at least in 2021, 2022, 2023, the way Russia and Azerbaijan were using the term was incomparable with the full sovereignty and jurisdiction of Armenia amongst its own territory, amongst this infrastructure. I want also to stress out to the people who would hear us that the Nakhchivan enclave is not a perfect enclave. So it’s not encircled by Armenia. It has two other borders, it has Iranian border and it has a Turkish border. And throughout these years Azerbaijan was connected with Nakhchivan through Iran and through Turkey. So it was not in a total blockade, let’s say. And currently the connection that is going to be built between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through the territory of Armenia is just the shortest connection that can that can be there between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. The word “unimpeded” would mean that Armenia would not create any impediments of political nature, of artificial nature. But then there is a border, there is a custom, there is a passport control, with the easiest possible procedures with electronic procedures. And this is something Armenia is going to implement not only here but alongside its borders. Because Armenia is very interested to become this transit hub, and to do that one definitely needs upgrade of its procedure schemes that it’s using for custom passport control. But the principal question is that there is a passport control, there is a custom control and there is a border.
Thomas de Waal
Thanks so much. I mean Zaur, how important is this deal for Azerbaijan? And I guess a follow up question would be is the fact that President Trump personally got involved is that seen in Azerbaijan as a guarantee that this deal will now work?
Zaur Shiriyev
Starting with the second part of your question. Yes. I mean the American involvement also President Trump’s involvement is not only about the TRIPP route is important for Baku but also recently the bilateral relationship between Washington and Baku. This is something where they actually see a benefit. And Baku never wants to see that actually this region is recognized as a part of the Russian sphere of influence. So this American involvement is a kind of the guarantee of that this is actually, as we put it before, that this is marketplace of the different actors’ influence. Over 30 years it’s not about the fiscal connection with Nakhchivan but also it’s about this reducing dependency of the Nakhchivan to the external powers. So starting with the Iran so the gas is coming from Iran also Nakhchivan is much more closer to Turkey than Azerbaijan because of this loss of physical connection. So it’s time for Baku to better connect with its exclave, also to creating economic opportunities. So this is also important. It’s not only about the railway. It’s also about the more interdependency with Armenia but also much more the direct control of the Azerbaijan Nakhchivan exclave. So because of that the TRIPP route or the American involvement is important. Another element is that what make an important is important because in Russian discussion in the since 2021 until the lesser 2023, all was about the talks. So this is something actually the American involvement is bringing the results.
Thomas de Waal
We’re sitting in Brussels. All three of us in fact are in Brussels, today. And we’ve been talking to the EU. And you’re publishing a piece with us with Strategic Europe, Zaur, in which you’re making the case that the EU has a much more direct interest in the South Caucasus. It has more expertise, it’s spending more money, and yet it’s less visible on the strategic level, it’s making less of an impact than the United States. So what’s gone wrong here in your view? And what’s your recommendation to Ursula von der Leyen and Kaya Kallas about what they should be doing in the South Caucuses that they’re not?
Zaur Shiriyev
Thanks, Tom, actually, we all know that the EU has the deepest interest in the Caucasus. Also, when it comes to the Azerbaijan-Armenia, the EU always say that they are ready to support the peace process, the normalization, unblocking the region. So, this is all true, it all looks good. But when it comes to the action or prioritization, it actually lacks capacity or interest. So this is for Baku and Yerevan, the things are actually moving very fast. So acting fast is the rule of the game in the Caucasus. So this is how we see the American involvement, they acted fast and they made a deal very quickly. And they see the opportunity they interest here. So this is something actually that Baku and Yerevan probably expected from the EU to do because they had enough time for the last, let’s say the last two years. So that’s why still the EU has a stake. TRIPP is one part of this connectivity. It’s a longer connectivity project between Azerbaijan-Armenia and connecting to Turkey and also to Europe. So what the EU can do you is also to take a part of this. And the support, tt’s not all about the railway. It’s about the fiber of optics. It’s about this might be electricity. So EU customs also can benefit from this. So this is one priority also the second is that probably EU should have a much more longer vision for the Caucasus so how to deal with actors and how EU can actually help the Baku and Yerevan to benefit of the peace, and also identifying or making them meaningful of the peace for the local citizens. EU has the capacity, so that’s why, I mean, still there’s a big expectation from the EU to act. And so the key, term might be. Is a prioritization of, these issues in the Caucasus.
Thomas de Waal
Areg, what’s your assessment? What scorecard are you giving the EU for what it’s doing in Armenia? What could it be doing better?
Areg Kochinyan
Well, to be fair to the European Union, Americans were not always as quick in their decisions and actions as they are now. This is more of a situation with this administration because I remember very well with previous administration, it was basically a couple of years of discussions about the discussion to happen later. No actions followed. So, it was very much the nature of the action from collective West rather than just the EU. Now with regards to European Union, European, at least for Armenia, I must say the European Union is doing, a lot both, in building up the resilience of the country, in supporting our democratic path, in supporting our institutionalization of the democratic choice of Armenia, the rule of law, visa liberalization. Conversation started between Armenia and the European Union. We just refreshed our strategic partnership agenda. So a lot is happening between Armenia and the European Union. Very specific actions that the European Union could take to be more active and visible in the region, that is the communication, the infrastructure processes that are happening in the region. Americans clearly already have their share. My idea is that Europe doesn’t need really to follow Americans in their actions but rather be more creative and suggest its own projects. Let’s say one of those projects could be the northern route that could connect the Turkish city of Kars with the Azerbaijani city of Azat, through the north of Armenia through Gyumri-Vanadzor- Ichevan, which is by the way, shorter than trip and which is shorter than the current Georgian route. And in my opinion, this is where the future economy will work whenever it is created. So this can be a very sort of specific project the European Union can take charge of. You know, bring investments, share the interest, etc. Etc. So, my suggestion would be to do specific projects like Americans are doing, but not to follow them in their projects, but to generate their own projects.
Thomas de Waal
That’s great. Some very specific recommendations to finish with. And let’s hope that this year goes smoothly and that we don’t see major disruptions. Thank you so much Areg Kochinyan, Zaur Shiriyev, great to talk to you, as always.
Outro
Thank you for joining us on this episode of Europe Inside Out. We do a lot of work on the South Caucasus here at Carnegie Europe, including with Zaur and Areg. So please follow us on Carnegie Europe and across all Carnegie platforms and of course, on social media, on X, on, BlueSky and LinkedIn.