Pierre Vimont and Amr Hamzawy take stock of Europe’s response to the Israel-Hamas war and provide insights into how Brussels should navigate evolving geopolitical challenges in the Middle East.
The Israel-Hamas war has exposed Europe’s declining diplomatic clout in the Middle East, where Arab countries and the United States are taking the lead to find durable solutions for the region’s peace and security.
Pierre Vimont, senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, and Amr Hamzawy, senior fellow and director of the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, take stock of Europe’s role in this troubled region and discuss the EU’s potential room for maneuver in the conflict.
[00:00:00] Intro, [00:02:00] The EU and the Israel-Hamas War, [00:09:54] Rebooting the Peace Process [00:16:44] A New Role for the EU?
Amr Hamzawy, December 6, 2023, “The Political Impact of the Israel-Hamas Ceasefire,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Amr Hamzawy, Nathan J. Brown, November 17, 2023, “Arab Peace Initiative II: How Arab Leadership Could Design a Peace Plan in Israel and Palestine,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Amr Hamzawy, November 1, 2023, “Pay Attention to the Arab Public Response to the Israel-Hamas War,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Amr Hamzawy, Rafiah Al Talei, Nathan J. Brown, Yasmine Farouk, Mohanad Hage Ali, Zaha Hassan, Marwan Muasher, Sinan Ülgen, Maha Yahya, Sarah Yerkes, October 13, 2023, “Arab Perspectives on the Middle East Crisis,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Pierre Vimont, October 10, 2023, “Europe’s Moment of Powerlessness in the Middle East,” Carnegie Europe.
Pierre Vimont
Countless innocent lives have been lost in Israel and Palestine since October 7. On that day, Hamas’ horrendous terrorist attacks shocked the world and shattered Israel’s sense of security. The Israeli government’s response has been to besiege and bomb the Gaza Strip, seeking the annihilation of Hamas. Despite the recent truce, the conflict has restarted with its endless toll of civilian casualties.
While the threat of a regional escalation persists, Europe is divided as all too often. Crucially, it finds itself with little diplomatic influence in a region key to its own security.
So, what’s next for the EU in this troubled region? Can it help broker a new humanitarian truce, or use its economic leverage to bring Israel and Palestine to the negotiating table? How should it prepare for a “day after” scenario in Gaza? And finally, how should Brussels navigate the new geopolitical challenges that are emerging in the Middle East?
Pierre Vimont
Hello, and welcome to a new episode of Europe Inside Out, Carnegie's Europe monthly podcast about the continent's greatest foreign policy challenges. My name is Pierre Vimont, and I'm a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe.
Pierre Vimont
This episode of Europe Inside Out is about Europe's role in the Middle East. And I'm joined by Amr Hamzawy, a senior fellow and the director of the Carnegie Middle East program in Washington, DC. Amr, welcome.
Amr Hamzawy
A pleasure joining you, Pierre.
Pierre Vimont
So, Amr, to start our conversation, let me put forward some consideration on what I personally think are the immediate challenges posed by the conflict in Gaza. We are recording this episode on Tuesday, December 5, which is almost two months into this conflict, and we are starting to have a better grasp of Israel’s plans and what the rest of the regional and global players can do about it.
Let me put it that way. Israel looks committed to what it seems to me its priority goal, namely, eliminate Hamas. The release of hostages is also crucial, of course, but it comes only second to the eradication of Hamas and this idea that by eradicating Hamas, Gaza will not be anymore a platform for terrorist attacks. On the other side, as far as I can understand, Hamas tries to keep on playing with both options. Either there is a truce, and truce puts Hamas in the seat of the negotiator, therefore, some kind of credible interlocutor for Israel, which, by the way, keeps some kind of control over Gaza also.
But if the conflict - as it is the case today - starts again, then it helps Hamasto be pictured as the main adversary of Israel, the one that has managed on October 7 to gain some real credibility in the military ground and therefore steers more popularity, it seems to me, in the Palestinian population, as the main opponent to Israel. So my theory is that the conflict might go on, and it could only be stopped if third parties are able to put enough leverage and bring this to a ceasefire or something of that kind. But there you have, first of all, the United States, which are in a bit of an uncomfortable position, caught in a dilemma. They have to support Israel in its right to self-defense, and yet at the same time, they have to look at the increasing casualties in Gaza and cannot look like they're staying immune from that terrible tragedy that is going on in Gaza. Arab countries are also in a sort of dilemma. Their population supports the Palestinian cause, and they have to show that they are also supportive of the Palestinians. And yet, at the same time, Hamas is the most radicalized phenomenon of the Palestinian cause at the moment.
And therefore, for most of the Arab countries in the region, Hamas is certainly not welcome in this difficult situation. The partners of the Global South, are getting more and more critical of the Western countries playing double standards, criticizing Russia and Ukraine for its attack against civilian population, but saying very little about Israel doing the same in Gaza. And the Europeans, of course, are caught in the same dilemma. So it seems to me that we are in a kind of Catch-22 situation where nobody knows exactly how to get out of that kind of entanglement where we are at the moment. Would you agree with this analysis, Amr, or what is your take about all of this?
Amr Hamzawy
Well, I believe that having signed the truce for a week has impacted some change in the scene which you vividly described and analytically outlined in an excellent fashion. The truce has restored a bit of politics and diplomacy into the conflict which, in fact, since October 7 has been primarily about military actions on both sides. I highly see the impact of the collective shock which Hamas’ horrific attacks on October 7 caused. I also see the impact of the very harsh military response from Israel and the massive number of civilian casualties and destruction in civilian infrastructure all over the Strip, especially in the North and in the middle sections now extending to the South. And under these circumstances, it's very very difficult to talk diplomacy or talk politics or talk peace. In spite of that, signing the truce was a big achievement because it really brought back a sense of these two actors – even via mediators – they could agree on releasing Palestinian prisoners, Israeli hostages, increasing humanitarian aid to Gaza, and ceasefire for a week.
And this is basically where I would place my hope as of now. The US has maneuvered itself into a position of critical support of Israel and its calls on the Israeli government to better protect civilian life, to better outline safe havens within Gaza. It might be listened to, it might be less listened to. The Europeans are truly missing. When you look at the last two months, I am not aware of any single European initiative, be it from a leading European country or at the EU level, pushing forward a diplomatic solution or a ceasefire arrangement.
What happened on the ground has been led by Arabs. I believe the only way forward is to get more Arab mediation, is to get key Arab countries. And there are two countries which proved their capacities and their capabilities to mediate successfully the one-week truce: Egypt and Qatar. Egypt has huge concerns because Gaza is not simply a territory somewhere in the region, this is a neighboring territory. And Egypt has huge national security concerns. And Egypt does not trust Hamas, but has to mediate around Hamas to restore calm into the Strip and to avoid a massive humanitarian crisis and mass displacement or mass transfer to Egypt, which is a no-go zone, a red line for Egypt. Qatar has been hosting Hamas political leadership and it has been co-founder of Hamas since several years, has accumulated diplomatic power in dealing and wheeling with Hamas and can impact change. And these two countries were successful in brokering the deal.
So the way forward is probably for the two countries, plus Jordan, which is impacted by the situation in the West Bank, plus the UAE, which has good relations with Israel, Morocco, which has a symbolic value because Morocco oversees the Jerusalem Commission of the Arab League and has good relations with Israel as well. And maybe Saudi Arabia. You need a group of Arab countries with US backing primarily. Still, I'm not envisaging a role of Europe as of now because Europe has done so, so little in terms of positioning itself. But maybe the US can back Arab regional powers in once again putting forward an Arab Peace Plan 2.0 which would entail solutions for the interim, for stopping the war, implementing ceasefire, the interim situation in Gaza and its governance. And a long term solution based on the two-state solution, with more offering from the region with regard to combating violence against civilians, combating anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim sentiments and so on and so forth.
Pierre Vimont
I'm very much interested, Amr, about what you were saying about the European Union. I find it all the most surprising that at their last meeting, about two weeks into this crisis, the 27 leaders of the European Union after a very long discussion, were able to agree among themselves and call for humanitarian pauses. We didn't had the first truce at the time, but they agreed among themselves. And what I find quite interesting is that the next day in the UN General Assembly, where there was a vote on a Resolution, they split three ways, without having even taken into account what they had decided on the evening before. So it tells a lot about how the EU is powerless to some extent for the time being. They are naturally divided, as they have been on this issue for many years. And if I come to the point you were making about the two-state solution and the need to get the Arab countries involved, it seems to me that the Europeans could play a useful role there.
If we look where we are at the moment, with Israel shifting more and more towards a very radical, ultra-right line of action, I wonder to some extent what is going on in Gaza. The Israeli forces slowly moving into the center and the south of the Gaza Strip, as if they were looking to displace the population there and slowly move them out altogether of the Gaza Strip, which would be something akin to complete destruction of the two-state option, I would say. Everybody has been discussing about a lack of a true Palestinian leadership, a credible leadership that could be a useful interlocutor for renewal of a peace process, and yet, having said that, the peace process seems to me to be the only way out of this situation because October 7, we all know, has been a kind of existential trauma for Israel and the Israeli population.
But how do we go from where we are today with a conflict that has started again in Gaza to the relaunch of the peace process and even more maybe to a broader picture of how to bring regional security in the whole area?
Amr Hamzawy
Where we are now, Pierre, is structurally related to where the peace process has been throughout the last years. So I dare say that October 7 would have not been possible – or let me say less possible, less likely – had the peace process been brought to its expected end, which was back in the 1990s when the Oslo Agreements were signed in 1993, a Palestinian State and the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people and an Israeli withdrawal based on the borderlines of June 4, 1967 before the June 5, 1967 war. The two-state solution, for many different reasons has not been implemented.
And so it's only if we restore the credibility of the peace process, if we kickstart the peace process once again, that we can avoid more confrontation, more bloodshed and more destruction. Because as you've rightly mentioned, the Israeli and Palestinian people are losing. This is not a scene where you would expect a victorious side to emerge. It comes at a very high cost from a humanitarian perspective, it comes at a very high cost for peace prospects in the region as well. I mean, look at the massive mobilization happening everywhere. Israel is shifting more towards the right, yes, but even probably in different Arab societies I'm afraid of a new wave of radical terrorism which will not stay confined in the region, will unfortunately reach Europe. And we saw a bloody event which took place, a bloody attack in Paris a couple of days ago and fears are everywhere. And we've experienced similar episodes before following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and different events which shocked the Middle East and Europe.
So we should really try to invest in restoring and reviving the peace process. The point I'm trying to make, and this is a paper which my colleague Nathan Brown and myself wrote for Carnegie and came out as under the title of “The Arab Peace Initiative 2.0”, what we are trying to say is last time, when the peace process was pushed forward early 1990s, it was primarily the United States aided with a significant European role. And you're very right, Pierre. Europe stood in a different place when it came to the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Middle East conflict maybe a decade ago or two decades ago. And I remember the declaration of Venice and many basically EU-led milestones which were introduced into the conflict in which the two-state solution was becoming more viable with a proactive European role. But right now I believe the US for definite domestic reasons is consumed with its own stuff and there is not much to expect in terms of the grand design. The US has been moving away from supporting Israel unequivocally, so it's now on the region, on regional powers to push forward a grand design for a new peace process. Why would they do so? For two reasons, Pierre. Number one, this is a region which has been lacking security for a very long time and every single actor is suffering. They have concerns as well because regional instability impacts our polities and societies. And no one of us, no one of our societies can really endure a new wave of radical terrorism or radicalization. So we have stakes, we have regional security issues and we've been seeing the Saudi-Iranian proxy wars emerging everywhere, now containment with Chinese mediation and that can be built on.
So if you come forward with a grand design in which peace is one of the gains you're getting, and the other gain is security, normalization, delegalizing, outlawing and proactively combating violence against civilians everywhere, this might change the picture, the overall make of the region. And Arab countries should have a stake. A war like this will not go unnoticed in terms of its impact on the radicalization of collective psyche and maybe peace becomes less attractive. So we are at a brink and unless we move fast, I'm afraid we will be stuck in the ugly reality of war for a very long time to come.
Pierre Vimont
Let me throw again one more idea. After all, this is a podcast about Carnegie Europe where we're trying to see how Europe could play a new role. Europe is the one who regularly came up with new concept being rather innovative: self-determination for the Palestinians, the PLO as the natural representative of the Palestinian population, and so on and so forth. The Quartet, the roadmap where the Europeans played also some part in setting all this up. It happens that at some stage the French government asked me to lead a French initiative on the Middle East. It was around 2016, which was not the best moment for a French initiative, the last year of the Obama administration, the Trump success in the 2016 elections. But still, what surprised me the most when I was doing this work for the French government was that I tried several times to convince many of the Arab partners who were interested in our initiative Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and others, Jordan, of course, to take a larger stake in this initiative and to some extent, take over from the French, because we had to stop. We had our own presidential election coming in 2017. And what struck me at the time, is how reluctant my Arab interlocutors were in having anything to say into this. I remember at some stage just putting forward the idea of having a Friends of Quartet Group with most of the Arab players and they just told me bluntly, we're not interested in that. Of course, things have changed since then. And I hear and I read your very interesting paper about rekindling the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 and I very much agree with that. But do you have the impression that there is a real appetite from the Arab countries for a role and more responsibility there? And let me put it in another way: How could Europe maybe help in creating that kind of appetite? And what part could it take in pushing the Arab countries forward? Because it seems to me, as you rightly said, that maybe any possible success for a new peace process has to start the other way around.
From what we were doing in the past, namely the US. And to some extent the EU in the forefront and the Arab countries staying behind and supporting what was going on. It seems to me that this time it should be the other way around. The Arab States in the forefront and the United States and Europe supporting them. How can we push such an idea? And do you think there is a real appetite there from the Arab states?
Amr Hamzawy
Well, let me start by sort of differentiating between the now and the interim and the long term. So with regard to what's happening right now, I believe Europe can do a lot in terms of sending and putting out the right signals that a renewal of the truce is existentially important. Of course, conditions of the new truce can be discussed and negotiated and mediated.
And I understand that there are significant issues and disagreements between Israel and Hamas on the release of male hostages, on the release of military hostages. But at any rate Europe will restore some of its credibility, credibility lost due to its silence and the double standards which have been noticed and taken note of everywhere in the region. And this should not be denied, because it's been seen in the Arab public space, clearly. So restore some of the credibility by saying it's time to agree on a long-term truce. Europe can as well sort of moving forward, resume what it has been doing in a very effective way throughout the last decades, even in bad times, which is to put forward pledges for economic and financial support. And we're looking at a Strip, Pierre, which is greatly destroyed. I mean, you will not need only humanitarian aid.
You really have to figure out modalities for reconstruction. And Europe does not have - and the same goes for the US - to collaborate with Hamas or Hamas affiliates. There are definitely local leaders on the ground. And here the role of Egypt, Jordan, Qatar can be helpful in assigning leading roles to local leaders on the ground who can administer financial and economic help coming from Europe. Europe, as well, has to signal that it's politically ready to back, just like the US, an all-Arab effort or a multilateral Arab effort led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, UAE, all of them countries which have relation with both parties engaged and have good relation with the PA as well, which remains as of now, sort of the legitimate actor on the ground, even if missing from Gaza. We had so many timelines for declaring the existence and announcing the Palestinian State.
They were never implemented and we were drifting away due to settlement activity. So now when Europe announces that it is backing an Arab effort for a peace process, it has to put forward two clear conditions. One, that the timelines will have to be defined quite well, that we really need to have a clear prospect, and then you start reverse engineering. So Palestinian State is to exist along the borders of June 4, 1967, in four years from now, in five years from now. But the timeline has to be announced. And secondly, the settlement activity has to stop. The settlement activity is poison to the two-state solution. Europe contributed, as you rightly mentioned, to designing the Roadmap in 2002 and 2003. And all of this can be restored and adapted to the current situation so that a swap is possible. So you have an integral Palestinian territory on which a Palestinian State can be declared.
If we start compartmentalizing the Palestinian issue by saying, well, here is Gaza and we have to figure out Gaza and ignore the West Bank, which has been seeing a lot of violence in the last weeks, or East Jerusalem, this will not do. We have to restore the integrity of the Palestinian issue and then start sort of looking collectively in a multilateral way led by Arabs. So it's a homegrown and home-owned initiative aided and assisted by the US and the Europeans, and even in terms of figuring out who will represent the Palestinians, and how to in fact get beyond the high militarization radicalization which Hamas, under the conditions of no peace and no prospect for peace, has impacted on the ground.
A successful peace process cannot happen between fireheads, between radical groups on both sides. So we need to figure out how to impact change within Israel, maybe drifting less toward the right, restoring the credibility of center-right forces and center-right politicians like Benny Gantz, for example, and on the Palestinian side, restoring credibility to the PA and getting the PA with local leaders to come back. And then questions can be addressed in the negotiation framework. This is how I would see Europe becoming relevant at all these levels. But it takes a political commitment and it takes, in spite of the differences between the 27 countries, an agreement on what is accepted for all 27 actors and what can be pushed forward with a clear conditionality.
Pierre Vimont
I would like to introduce one last consideration before we end that conversation and it's about the, I would say the elephant in the room, namely Iran, the spoiler. Can we hope for a genuine peace process that could come at the end to an endgame that would be a good result for all in the region if we don't also look at the broad regional security. And therefore shouldn't this issue about Iran also part of the whole conversation? Maybe not at the same level or at the same stage, but to keep it in mind maybe for later on. Because if we don't do that, there is a risk that whatever we want to build in terms of a Palestinian State could be undermined by the presence of Iran and the feeling from Tehran that they are going to be sidelined in this whole process.
What is your take about this?
Amr Hamzawy
Thank you so much, Pierre, for raising this very important point and I couldn't agree more. Yes, they will have to be part of discussions in the Middle East about the regional situation, about regional security, about arrangements to achieve regional security.
However, it's difficult to include Iran in the first stages because you will have a spoiler basically sort of making you appear quite unsure, uncertain about how to go forward, and making anti-peace propaganda in the region which Iran has been doing as well. So you need to avoid that in the beginning and to figure out a gradual modality by means of which, when we have reached solutions for the interim phase, for a clearly defined long term, with a clear timeline on the Palestinian State and the enacting of the two-state solution, we can start branching out into wider regional security issues and including Iran. Meanwhile, what needs to be done is improving relations, bilateral relations between Iran and some of its Arab counterparts and regional counterparts. So as long as you include Iran from an Arab perspective in a community of peace-oriented Arab countries, you will contain Iran's risks for the peace process.
But if you get Iran to be part of it in the beginning, this will be a recipe for explosion and a recipe for no success. As you move forward, as we have some quick gains from the peace process, Iran can be included to address its major issues, which are of different political nature. I mean, you have the nuclear issue here at stake. You have Iran's role and its expansion, the expansion of its influence in the region. You have Shi'ism and the role of Iran in terms of disseminating Shi'ism across the region, concerns for Arab countries, legitimate concerns for Sunni-dominated Arab countries in the Gulf and elsewhere. These issues will have to be tackled. But the time issue is of crucial nature, not for the first phase and not until we have some clear gains and a clear timeline for implementing a solution for the Palestinian issue.
Pierre Vimont
Thank you, Amr. I totally agree with you. I think we have to keep that in mind for later on and maybe once again this is a place where Europe, because of its own experience in its negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue, could maybe also there play a useful role. But I'll stop there. Amr, it was a pleasure having you on this month's episode of Europe Inside Out. I very much enjoyed our conversation, and thank you very much for taking the time to speak with me.
Amr Hamzawy
My pleasure. Pierre, it's been a pleasure to join you, and I look forward to staying in touch. Thank you so much.
Pierre Vimont
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