Rym Momtaz, Dimitar Bechev, and Thomas de Waal examine how Russia is challenging the EU’s enlargement and Black Sea strategies, and what Brussels can do in response.
Russia’s belligerence and political interference in some of the Black Sea littoral states threaten the EU’s influence in the region.
Rym Momtaz sat down with Dimitar Bechev and Thomas de Waal to discuss how the union can respond to Moscow’s destabilizing actions and keep the enlargement process on track.
[00:00:00] Intro, [00:02:13] The Political Situation in Georgia and Moldova, [00:10:04] The EU’s Enlargement Strategy, [00:20:14] Europe’s Role in the Black Sea
Rym Momtaz et al., December 5, 2024, “Taking the Pulse: Are Information Operations Russia’s Most Potent Weapon Against Europe?,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Dimitar Bechev, November 25, 2024, “Illiberal eastern Europeans look to play their Trump card,” Financial Times.
Dimitar Bechev, Richard Giragosian, Gorana Grgić, and Batu Kutelia, December 5, 2024, “In Brief: Russia’s Hybrid War,”War on the Rocks.
Dimitar Bechev, Iliriana Gjoni, October 24, 2024, “All Is Not Well With EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans,” Carnegie Europe.
Dimitar Bechev, June 27, 2024, “Between the EU and Moscow: How Russia Exploits Divisions in Bosnia,” Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
Dimitar Bechev, June 20, 2024, “Can EU Enlargement Work?,” Carnegie Europe.
Thomas de Waal, January 16, 2025, “Moldova’s Gas Crisis Is Europe’s Headache,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Thomas de Waal, October 31, 2024, “Georgia’s Dangerous Moment Is a Challenge for the EU,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Thomas de Waal, October 9, 2024, “Can Georgia Stay on Its European Path?,” Europe Inside Out, Carnegie Europe.
Thomas de Waal, June 5, 2024, “Opportunistic Georgia joins Europe’s illiberal club,” Financial Times.
Thomas de Waal, October 9, 2024, “Between Russia and the EU: Europe’s Arc of Instability,” Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
Rym Momtaz
Hello, and welcome to this month's Europe Inside Out. I'm your host, Rym Montaz, the editor in chief of Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe's blog, where twice a week, we publish punchy short analysis on all things strategic in Europe. Today, we'll be exploring enlargement and the EU's Black Sea strategy, two highly strategic issues for the EU's ability to effectively contain and counter Russia's increasing belligerence. And we'll be doing so by delving into the situations in Georgia and Moldova. We'll start with an overview and assessment of the state of play in both countries.
In Georgia, there's been a pro-Russian tilt or perhaps a move away from the EU, and mass street protests have gripped the country since late November when the ruling Georgian Dream party's increasingly authoritarian government said it would freeze EU accession talks until 2028, even though accession is a goal enshrined in the constitution and supported by 80% of the population. In Moldova, president Maya Sandu was reelected last year despite evidence of a Moscow run massive campaign against her. But Russia's attempts at destabilization haven't ended. They're now trying to trigger an economic and political tension ahead of parliamentary elections later this year. We'll then move on to assessing how the current situation can and might impact the EU's enlargement and Black Sea strategies.
Rym Momtaz
So I'm delighted to do so with two of our best scholars on these issues. Tom De Waal, our senior fellow specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region, and Dimitar Bechev, our senior fellow who focuses on EU enlargement, the Western Balkans, and Eastern Europe. Welcome both.
Rym Momtaz
Tom, let's start with what is happening in Georgia today.
Thomas de Waal
So let's contrast the beginning of 2025 with the beginning of 2024, a year ago. All three countries seemed to be on a positive accession track. Georgia a bit behind, but it had been given candidate status by the EU. There was going to be an election which did take place in Georgia and quite high hopes that the Georgian Dream party was unpopular, that an opposition coalition might, you know, take its place. All of that really crumbled in 2024.
There was evidence of mass fraud in the election. Georgian Dream claimed a victory. The opposition is now boycotting. And we've got this long-running crisis in Georgia accentuated by the fact the Georgian Dream is now suspending EU accession. We've now got two presidents in Georgia.
There's the new Georgian Dream nominated president, a guy called Mikheil Kavelashvili, a former footballer, not a respected man in Georgia or the West, we have to say, but elected president on the 29th December. And there's the outgoing president, Salome Zurabashvili, also a French citizen in the past, who says that she's still the legitimate president because the new president lacks that legitimacy. So we've got this long-running crisis, and no one seems to have come out on top. Still protests, but Georgian Dream is kind of riding out the protests as best it can.
Threat of sanctions from the US, which may be followed by EU countries. So a real mess, and I guess the EU not doing so much maybe because it's got its hands full elsewhere. But basically, this crisis continues to unfold.
Rym Momtaz
And interestingly, I mean, we've seen that the state department has already imposed sanctions on the head of the founder of Georgia Dream, where obviously, as you said, the EU hasn't really moved yet. But what we did see is that Viktor Orbán, who had the rotating presidency of the EU Council when this election happened, actually broke ranks with the EU and congratulated Georgian Dream and went to Georgia.
How is that playing out right now, in terms of the standoff that we're seeing, this big crisis that you describe?
Thomas de Waal
Absolutely. I mean, what we're seeing I think, you know, some people describe this as a pro-Russia strategy. I think what's happening is obviously that Georgia is de facto moving closer to Russia because it's moving away from the EU and the rest of the West. But it's more like a Serbia strategy. What we're seeing is a government that wants to play all sides.
It wants better relations with Russia. It wants Chinese money and it wants friends in Europe. And its chief friend in Europe is, of course, Viktor Orbán, with whom they've cultivated ties over many years. They're, of course, also watching Washington because they see a possible excess of illiberal values that will connect them to Washington as well.
So they're kind of down with many Western actors, but they still see potential. And this is why this hedging strategy that we see, this kind of Serbia-style strategy, maybe they're also looking to countries like Azerbaijan and Turkey, looks attractive to them. They see a geopolitical environment which is more favorable to them than it would have been a year or two ago.
Rym Momtaz
So I wanna just drill down on one thing because I think, Tom, you are a bit outside of the, sort of grain on this or the bubble think on this. A lot of people say, actually, what's happening in Georgia is a Russian-led strategy, that this is all Russia maneuvering, and you don't necessarily agree with that. You think that what's happening in Georgia is a little more complex than that, so let's just go back on that a bit.
Thomas de Waal
For sure, it's more complicated than that. I mean, you know, let's look at the last 30 years in which Georgia and Russia have basically been in a state of conflict in one way or another. They broke diplomatic relations in 2008 with the five-day war between Georgia and Russia. And so Georgian Dream is a party that doesn't really mention the word Russia or Putin. They say there's a global party of war that wants to drag us into war in Ukraine.
They talk about traditional values, but they're also drawing on something quite Georgian there, support from the Georgian Orthodox Church, this kind of Orbánesque talk about values. And so the hints about Russia are hints thatif Georgia was to restore diplomatic relations with Russia, seek to join Russian-led institutions, there would be a big backlash. We've seen a lot of the institutions in Georgia, whether the foreign ministry, the military, they don't like what's happening, but they're not gonna rock the boat. But there are red lines that they don't want to see crossed. I think I see these Georgian Dream leaders as being actually pretty afraid of Russia.
It's an impediment strategy to Russia. They don't want the Russians to take them over, but they want to deal with the Russians. And, of course, they wanna make money with the Russians as a lot of people do. I see it as more of an anti-Western strategy than a pro-Russian strategy.
Rym Momtaz
Alright. So let's shift maybe to Moldova, where I think we can all agree that there, there was clearly sort of a Russian-run attempt at influence and at defeating the pro-EU presidential candidate Maia Sandu. Let's do the same. What's the overview there, Tom? What's happening in Moldova right now?
What's the state of play given that Maia Sandu was able to, perhaps miraculously in a certain way, win despite this Russian attack?
Thomas de Waal
I think 2025 is gonna be an absolutely critical year for Moldova. I urge people to pay a lot of attention to it. A lot is gonna happen. We're gonna see a parliamentary election there, before July. I think the date is not fixed.
And let's not forget that that's more important actually than the presidential election. Maia Sandu party, PAS, has a big majority in parliament. If it loses that, then we're gonna see a different government. We're gonna see, for sure, a slowing down of the EU trajectory. We're gonna see, you know, political deadlock in Moldova.
Not necessarily, again, a tilt towards Russia, but, again, more of this kind of hedging strategy from a new government. And, for sure, Russia is gonna try and influence that election as they did with the presidential election. But the other thing that's going on, which is absolutely critical, is from the 1st January, Russian gas stopped transiting Ukraine. Ukraine wound up that agreement. That affects Moldova, and it particularly affects the breakaway territory of Transnistria, which was relying basically on free Russian gas to survive.
Transnistria factories are beginning to shut down. There's no heating in parts of Transnistria. That whole project, thirty-year-old project to become a Russia-leaning breakaway bit of Moldova in Transnistria is beginning to fail. That in some ways could be good news. It could lead to kind of reintegration of Transnistria into Moldova, but a lot of dangers there.
In particular, a short-term danger is that Moldova has been getting cheap electricity thanks to that free gas agreement. There's a plant on the other side of the river in Moldova that supplies the rest of Moldova with cheap electricity. Suddenly, we might be seeing, thanks to this gas crisis in Transnistria, electricity prices shooting up across Moldova at the absolute worst moment for Maia Sandu and her government. And voters, you know, even without the Russian interference turning away from them because of a big energy crisis in Moldova itself.
Rym Momtaz
Dimitar, I'm turning to you here because in our overview of what's happening in Georgia and in Moldova, the word enlargement or new enlargement and the EU path came up a lot. So I wanna drill down on that bit, because it strikes me as there are similarities, but also differences between both situations in Moldova and in Georgia. In Georgia, it seems to me that there is a deliberate choice now by Georgian Dream to kind of turn away from the enlargement path, from the EU path, and maybe try to hedge, as Tom was saying, try to get the benefits from being adjacent to the EU, but without going through this very long process of enlargement. Whereas in Moldova, they're very much sticking to the enlargement path, and they're actually paying the price with as we're seeing more and more Russian subversive attacks against. So I'm very interested.
What's your assessment, first of all, of what's gonna happen with enlargement in Georgia and how the Georgian Dream party is gonna manage that?
Dimitar Bechev
Well, it seems to me they've given up at least rhetorically on the EU, but it doesn't mean it's over with the day because they're insisting they're still interested. By they I mean Georgian Dream. It just has to happen on their own terms as if it's EU joining Georgia and not the other way around. But the truth - as Tom put it - is that they feel vulnerable, and their room for maneuver is much more limited.
If we look at Moldova, you have the government and political elites who have cast their vote with the EU. But even if they are replaced, which is not unlikely, following the parliamentary election, their likely successors from the now opposition, won't do a Georgian Dream and won't write them off altogether. Rather, to my mind, they'll fall back to the multi-vectoring posture that the previous model of administration had. In other words, have a friendly or constructive tone vis-a-vis Moscow, but then proceed with the EU nonetheless and try to consolidate power. It won't be this radical scenario we've seen in Tbilisi.
Rym Momtaz
And I just wanted to sort of remind our readers because you say, just like Tom just said, that, you know, they feel vulnerable in Georgia. And I think we need to remind people that Russia continues to occupy about 20 percent of Georgia. So there's a real threat, actually. Georgian Dream, you know, is talking about. It's not just something that they're using as an excuse.
But it makes me think, what does that mean about the continued attractiveness of EU enlargement for countries that are on the border of Russia, and who today are perhaps now wanting to make a different choice walking away from EU enlargement because of the Russian threat?
Dimitar Bechev
Well, geography matters is the succinct answer. If you look at where Moldova is on the map and look where Georgia is on the map, you understand the different responses to their predicament. I mean, Russia is virtually next door, and it's overlooking Tbilisi in terms of military deployment, whereas Moldova is far removed from the current battle line. If, God forbid, Russians end up in Odesa, it will be a different calculus for Chișinău, but that's not the case in fact. Russia, thanks to what Ukraine did in containing Russia and it's still been doing it, is hundreds of miles and thousands of miles away from there.
Whereas the EU is a daily reality, across the border with Romania and the fact that so many more Moldovans, including Maia Sandu, hold EU citizenship, makes a profound difference. It also reflected in the turnover in trade and also investment and remittances and what have you. So that explains to a large degree the traction because for Moldova it's a fact of daily life, and it's as much true about the right bank of the Dniester River as it is for the left bank in Transnistria where businesses export heavily to the EU and the co-opted into the Eurosphere. So, long story short, even if we don't play EU’s political agency as a security troubleshooter, it's a huge market and a huge magnet for society and business and to remain so, for, going forward.
Rym Momtaz
And so you think that that huge market and the big economic opportunity that is represented by the EU and getting into the EU space, is that enough to make up for the escalating, you know, threat that Russia is now, more and more explicitly, forming against these countries? Is that enough?
Dimitar Bechev
If it was enough, we wouldn’t have February 24, 2022. In fact, the EU has to now reinvent itself as a geopolitical player in the cruelest form of that, as a military or quasi-military power. So just offering an open door and trade is not enough. We've seen it time and again with Ukraine.
In the Moldovan case, you signed up security partnership with Chișinău. Let's see how much of a difference it makes in terms of upgrading a security position. But also, it's been providing energy and money, of course, to offset this current predicament Moldovans find themselves in. So that's not enough as well, but, at least, I think there is this realization in Brussels and key capitals that having EU as just a passive magnet for countries on its periphery is far than enough because you have other guys like the Russians, but not only, who play the old school game of geopolitics and can send the bombers and missiles and, and little green men and establish facts on the ground and those territories and countries.
Rym Momtaz
So before I jump off of this point, there is one actor that will loom large that's about to be inaugurated and that, you know, is about to start his second administration: Donald Trump in the US and we haven't really talked about him. Right now, I really wonder, Dimitar, because you're also an expert obviously on the Western Balkans, and there's one personality, one character in the Trump galaxy who's called Rick Grenell, who was during the first administration the person who built a lot of these business connections and networks in this part of Europe. And I just wonder, do you expect someone like Rick Grenell to delve into Georgia, Moldova? Is he gonna try to create an opportunity there? Could he be a spoiler for EU plans and maybe come up with some third way or something like that?
Dimitar Bechev
Well, that's one scenario for sure because governments in that part of the world have a transactional mindset as well. Some of those people never bought into the rule-of-law agenda, to put it mildly. And when they see a like-minded actor coming to power in Washington that makes them click, that they could do business, at the personal and group level mixed with foreign policy and get mileage in Washington. That's a welcome realization, so I won't be surprised if I see some outreach in Tbilisi. Potentially if Moldova swings to the dark side court and courts you'll see a similar type of wooing behavior.
But you never know because as you could expect other governments, other leaders around the world will be playing the same game. So, there'll be a huge demand for this personal transactional engagement with the Trump administration. And you wouldn't be surprised to see the default standard issue for American foreign policy kicking in, with American diplomats, state department, taking the lead. Maybe not on Georgia, because geopolitics stakes are high and, you have, probably some scope for the top brass side from Trump getting involved, but certainly in Moldova.
Now there's a third-world card there, somebody called Viktor Orbán, who has long played the intermediary with such governments and partisan leaders in the Western Balkans, but also in Georgia. He was the one who went first to congratulate the Georgian Dream or “Georgian Nightmare” as their detractors call them, for their victory.
Viktor Orbán is close to American conservatives, also to Trump. He was name-checked in the debate with Kamala Harris, and he's, likewise, close to the Vučićs and the Dodiks. He will be playing the intermediary, so if you want to knock on Trump's stall, you might find out that the shortest way to the White House goes via Budapest. So he'll be the one steering those contacts and trying to hold the wheels of commerce and foreign policy, and propose all kinds of initiatives and deals and investment opportunities, and try to help illiberal characters on the EU periphery have a better understanding with Washington as it morphs now.
Rym Momtaz
Tom, I wanted to turn to you because in addition to enlargement, obviously, these two countries and what happens in them will have an impact on the Black Sea. And we're at a point right now with the Ukraine war where there's a lot of talk about, you know, incoming president Trump talking, figuring out some sort of resolution, ceasefire in Ukraine with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. If, and it's a big if, there is a ceasefire in Ukraine, there might be an impact on the Black Sea. Just to remind our listeners, since the beginning of the war in Ukraine in 2022, Turkey was able to close, basically, the Black Sea by using the Montreux Convention that allows them as a littoral state to close the Black Sea to military ships because of a conflict. If the war in Ukraine is stopped or is frozen and Turkey decides to reopen the Black Sea again, what is the scenario that you see first of all, and then we'll talk about what is the EU strategy, and is there one to start with?
Thomas de Waal
Yeah. For sure. The EU has identified the Black Sea as a critical region both in security terms and economic terms. Obviously, two littoral states, Bulgaria and Romania, potentially Ukraine and also Moldova and even Georgia joining in in the future. And the reason that Ukraine has survived this war is the fact that Ukraine has managed to kind of damage or semi-destroy the Russian Black Sea fleet. Odesa has survived as Ukraine's main port and as a place from which to export its grain, previously under this UN deal and now without that UN deal.
So Odesa, the Black Sea – absolutely critical to Ukraine, and that's really possible because Russia cannot rearm its Black Sea fleet because Turkey has closed the so-called Straits of the Bosphorus, that narrow channel that links the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.
Now if there's a ceasefire and there is some kind of peace, Turkey will be under a lot of pressure and will do bargaining with Russia about reopening the straits. And that could be a very, very critical, and dangerous moment for Ukraine. Because, you know, let's imagine the worst-case scenario, which is that Russia then reequips, rearms its Black Sea Fleet, this ceasefire only lasts six months or a year, Russia goes back to war, and this time has more military capacity to attack Odesa. Many other elements there, I'm not saying that's gonna happen, but that's definitely something that should be on policymakers' radars.
Rym Momtaz
And I guess this is where enlargement is also a geostrategic thing. I think Tom explained it very well. The idea behind the EU saying, you know, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia are on a fast track to EU enlargement is also about securing that maneuvering space in the Black Sea and trying to prevent Russia from rebuilding that fleet and using it as an asset to attack the European space again.
So I wonder, Dimitar, how do you assess today the ability of the EU to counter what Russia has done in Moldova or what, let's say, the Georgian Dream’s hedging position might do to the EU's enlargement approach, which is a precursor to its ability to be a strategic player in the Black Sea? How do you see that?
Dimitar Bechev
Well, we shouldn't exaggerate the capacity of the EU to counteract this behavior. Because look, if you live in this growingly uncertain world, you might be a liberal government, you might be liberal or anything in between the gray zone, you want to hedge your bets. Things can go in the wrong direction. How do you do that? By keeping doors open. You have the Russians, you have the Chinese. What's new now is that the US and the EU might not be playing on the same team. So as I wrote in an op-ed in the Financial Times, just to plug it here, the US could become also part of this multipolar scenario, which is something new. We are not used to live in this world, but we experienced it in the Western Balkans with the first Trump administration and you could play off ones against the other if you're skilful enough. And this could go wrong as well, as people in Belarus found and Lukashenko failed to be the intermediary. He had to attach his ship to Putin's after 2020.
The EU is not a unitary actor. And Europeanization also means that candidate countries and their leaders learn the EU ways, and they could build connections to individual governments and split the EU from within. That's why the sanction instrument is not applied consistently, that Georgians feel safe, that even though the US sanctions, Ivanishvili and Kobakhidze and the rest of the group, they EU won't be following up with its own sanctions as long as Orbán is there, but also Fico and others.
So, yeah, I mean, multi-polar hedging and balancing happens both in terms of other powers but also vis-a-vis the various stakeholders in the EU as well. And I'm pretty sure you'll see some of that going forward.
Rym Momtaz
I think this is, like, where I wanna actually end this episode, Tom, because, you know, what Dimitar just said is that no matter how critical and strategic this space is and is becoming more and more for the EU, the EU's ability to shape local actions is extremely limited. So if you were advising the EU, what would you tell them to do moving forward in that space?
Thomas de Waal
I don't think there's one silver bullet. I think you've gotta continue to support these societies, which I think are, you know, basically pro-European in both places like Georgia and Moldova. I think you've gotta, you know, keep up economic links. I think you've gotta engage with a government like Georgian Dream. You don't wanna drive them into the arms of the Russians. You don't want that to become a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, so… But clearly, these are difficult times and a lot of it is gonna be about strategic patience. It's not gonna be about getting good outcomes. It's on the phone, it's about getting less bad outcomes.
Rym Momtaz
Tom, Dimitar, thank you very much.
Rym Momtaz
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Our producer is Mattia Bagherini. Our editor is Futura D’Aprile of Europod. Sound engineering and original music by Jeremy Bocquet.