Rym Momtaz, Sophia Besch, and Ulrich Kühn debate whether the update to France's nuclear doctrine adequately addresses Europe's deterrence gaps.
Emmanuel Macron's updated French nuclear doctrine represents an unprecedented effort by Paris to coordinate with European partners as U.S. security commitments decline.
Rym Momtaz, Sophia Besch, and Ulrich Kühn discuss France's evolving role in European nuclear deterrence and the political and material credibility gaps that persist.
[00:00:00] Intro, [00:01:26] Macron’s Update to France’s Nuclear Doctrine, [00:09:13] The Role of the Baltics in Europe’s Defense, [00:22:47] European Alternatives to the U.S. Extended Deterrence.
Rym Momtaz, April 7, 2026, “On NATO, Trump Should Embrace France Instead of Bashing It,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Rym Momtaz (ed.), March 12, 2026, “Taking the Pulse: Is France’s New Nuclear Doctrine Ambitious Enough?,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Ulrich Kühn, February 24, 2026, “The Unintended Consequences of German Deterrence,” Global Policy vol. 17, issue S1: 1-9, https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.70134.
Sophia Besch, Erik Brown, and Rafaela Uzan, December 22, 2025, “Rebalancing the Transatlantic Defense-Industrial Relationship: Regional Pragmatism in Northeastern Europe,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Sophia Besch and Jamie Kwong, December 11, 2025, “Unpacking Europe’s Deterrence Dilemmas,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Ulrich Kühn, May 1, 2025, “Is Europe Moving to an Independent Nuclear Deterrent?,” Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association.
Rym Momtaz
Hello, and welcome to a new episode of Europe Inside Out. I'm your host, Rym Momtaz. I'm the editor in chief of Carnegie Europe’s Strategic Europe, where twice a week we publish punchy short analysis on all things strategic in. In Europe. Our episode today could not be more on brand. At the beginning of March, the French President Emmanuel Macron gave a landmark speech updating France's nuclear doctrine. Everything about that speech was unusual, actually. The fact that Macron has gotten to give two speeches on nuclear doctrine and the fact that he made the changes that he made to the doctrine, which we will get into. And to get into all of that and what it means for Europe in this particular geopolitical moment, we're very fortunate to have Sophia Besch, senior fellow at the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with us from Washington D.C. Hi, Sophia.
Sophia Besch
Hi. It's great to be with you.
Rym Momtaz
And Ulrich Kühn, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the head of the Arms Control and Emerging Technologies Program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, obviously calling in from Hamburg. Hi, Ulrich.
Ulrich Kühn
Hi, Rym. Thanks for having me.
Rym Momtaz
So, I want to delve right in, and I want to start by asking both of you, what is it that struck you the most in Macron's speech? And I'll start with you, Sophia.
Sophia Besch
Sure. I mean, I'm sure we'll get into the depth of the substance, but to me, one of the most striking parts was not just what Macron said, but how carefully the speech was prepared and positioned and how it was conceived and perceived in Europe as a response to that. So, there were extensive pre consultations with the U.S. with NATO. There was early coordination with the UK. There was a very deliberate outreach to Germany, all the DCA nuclear sharing countries, to NATO leadership, the Secretary General Rutte, and a really explicit effort to avoid signaling a break with the U.S. which was one of the big concerns still of many European countries. And the speech is now moving into a, again, carefully prepared implementation phase. The French clearly expect this to be a shared European project in practice. So one of the striking things to me is how unfrench, in a sense, this process was. This was tightly coordinated. It was not unilateral. It was a real difference to previous French attempts to reach out a hand to European partners. And then the other striking thing following on from that, if you look at the reception of the speech, there was criticism. Their friends still didn't go far enough. Which shows you that debates that were considered taboo only a few years ago are now mainstream in Europe, between Russian nuclear signaling in Ukraine, serious concerns over U.S. security guarantees. But Europeans still lack a shared theory, a shared narrative of deterrence. They don't like what they have and they don't like any of the alternatives. So the speech is, is both, I think, the most ambitious French move toward Europe and still not enough to settle the core question on the future of European deterrence. I think Europe wants this conversation, but it hasn't settled. It's not convinced by any of the answers yet.
Rym Momtaz
I think what you touch upon is super important. I just want to follow up quickly and I'll get to you. Ulrich. Do you feel like France is in a position right now where it's damned if it does and damned if it doesn't on this particular issue?
Sophia Besch
Well, I think that I would want to get out of a framing that puts all the responsibility on France? In my mind, France has sort of done all it could do, keeping the many audiences that it is speaking to in mind, both its domestic audience. We have an election coming up, the U.S. audience where, they were under clear instructions, I think, from Washington on what to say, what not to say, and then also the mix of expectation and skepticism in Europe. You can, I think, and we might get into this, blame them for not starting this whole process of confidence building much earlier. We would be in a different place had they done that. But we are where we are and we sort of have to work with what we've got, which is a bunch of bad options.
Rym Momtaz
A bunch of bad options. Ulrich, what did you find very striking about what Macron said?
Ulrich Kühn
I'll st art with something similar like Sophia said at the beginning. What I found very striking was the whole setup and actually the beginning of the speech. I had to look it up. And it starts with a quote where Macron says “I stand before you today at the heart of the Île Longue base, a cathedral of our sovereignty and a symbol of our country's constant commitment to nuclear deterrence for more than 65 years now.” Now I would add to that, if the base is the cathedral, then clearly nuclear deterrence is religion. And Macron is not alone. As we know, J. Robert Oppenheimer said it when he observed the first ever man-made nuclear explosion. He said: “Now that I have become God, the destroyer of worlds,” which in the end means to me that nuclear deterrence is mainly a belief system. And if we talk about belief, I don't believe the French effort here, to be honest.
Rym Momtaz
You don't believe it? What is it that you didn't believe? Where do you feel like credibility is lacking?
Ulrich Kühn
I feel credibility is lacking in the two most important dimensions: in the political dimension, as well as in the material dimension. And we should talk about these separately.
The material dimension is basically about how much do the French have, what kinds of nuclear weapons and what sort of nuclear arsenal do they have. And the political dimension is basically about the core question: Is France ready to extend any kinds of guarantees to its nuclear to its European partner nations? And here Macron is very much in the tradition of all French presidents before him, and he's clear on that issue. He says no, we're not even thinking about guarantees. And we do not believe. Again, that's the belief system. We do not believe in the system of extended nuclear deterrence, like the U.S. does. And I'm not sure whether all European nations have really, really understood that.
Rym Momtaz
But isn't that a doctrinal difference between France and the U.S. i mean, France has always said that in its nuclear doctrine, it does not believe in a, in an extended nuclear umbrella and that it is not its doctrine. So you still take issue with that? You would like them to change that doctrine?
Ulrich Kühn
I think that, to shorten things, I think the French have missed a huge chance. Look, don't get me wrong. I'm very much in favor of Macron reaching out to the Europeans at this point in time. The U.S. credibility has very much gone out of the window in the last, well not just in the last couple of months, but effectively there. It's that we still have the material dimension. The U.S. nuclear weapons are still deployed in Europe. Most U.S. soldiers are still in Europe. But the President and his vice president basically tell the Europeans to, well that they don't care about them anymore. So this is the time where Europeans have to think about how they can set up their own basically defense pact as well as European nuclear arrangement. And of course, then everyone looks at those two nations that are, that, that do have nuclear weapons in Europe. It's France and the UK. The UK is not part of the European Union anymore. So, the first view certainly goes to France, and the French understand that and they know that they need to give an answer to all these questions. But I think that France has missed a chance to come out of its own little chamber that mostly defines its interest in a national sense. And I know that Macron has used a lot of very nice words to tell all the Europeans that the French think about their interests in a European sense. But honestly speaking, when I see the changes that are now happening on the French side, I'm not convinced. But we can get into the details of those a bit later.
Rym Momtaz
So, Sophia, I actually want you to react to that. Do you think, first of all, that's a fair assessment of what Macron has said. I just want to remind listeners who perhaps maybe are not necessarily following this in great detail. Macron, like Mitterrand before him and like many other French presidents before them, has said and has repeatedly said that there is a European dimension to French vital interests. The French doctrine is ambiguity. And so it is not to draw bright red lines for the adversary. And in this speech in particular, you know, there were three, I think, fundamental changes that Macron, expanded on and announced. He said that France would expand the number of nuclear warheads that it would keep and it would stop revealing, disclosing how many warheads it had. That it would lean into a new concept called “forward deterrence” and that it would associate a few European countries in bilateral nuclear steering groups. Obviously, it has a very important series of treaties or agreements with the UK on this. The UK is the only other European nuclear power. But that has now been expanded in terms of nuclear steering groups to Germany, Poland, Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark if I'm not mistaken. And that also means that in these countries there will be discussions about pre-positioning conventional capabilities that are used to shoulder the nuclear deterrent writ large. So I want to go to you Sophia, first of all to react to what Ulrich said. Do you think that is fair? Do you agree? And then we'll take it from there.
Sophia Besch
Look, so I sympathize with the nuclear deterrence as religion framing. I think the nuclear priesthood has done a great job of communicating the religion of U.S. extended deterrence for the past few decades to Europeans. And that's what we all bought into. I think we're at a point where we no longer believe in that God and we haven't come up with another one that we believe in. And there's a lot of, I mean you can cry over spilled milk here, right? What should we have done for the past few decades, prepare for that moment? What should France have done? Should there have been France participation in the NATO nuclear planning group? It took a long time for the United States to decades to create the kind of buy in into the U.S. extended deterrence model that we reached pre-Trump, where Europeans were felt very comfortable with leaving their nuclear deterrence to a country that was an ocean away and had no real stakes in or fewer stakes than the countries in Europe themselves. And we can needle that system for as much as we want, but we bought into that. We no longer buy into that. I think the French have always had a different, they've always followed a different religion, they've always had a slightly different belief. I think Macron said in his speech there are no guarantees. I think we are coming to that point broadly in Europe now where we have a complete change in our idea of what alliances are. There are no guarantees, you cannot actually fully rely and trust another country to provide your security and another country will never fully outsource or share its nuclear decision making. The U.S doesn't do that either. France has refused to do that here.
Rym Momtaz
Just a point on this. Is it even reasonable to expect people to have that belief, to have that article of faith in others. I mean, countries are rational actors that act in their national interests at the end of the day.
Sophia Besch
Okay. So, then I think we get to the actual questions that Europeans are struggling to answer right now because we can have, and we are having, it's very fun, a philosophical and religious debate about nuclear deterrence. But really, I mean, Europeans are asking what do we actually need to deter Russia? What do we actually need to defend ourselves against Russia? What threats are best dealt with nuclear deterrence and what threats are better dealt by conventional capabilities?. And how do we prevent Russian nuclear use and effective gains from Russian nuclear threats? And that is, I think, a more reasonable starting point for us to look into broadly than to look at all these different theoretical models that we might replace U.S. extended deterrence with, which again, none of them are good, but we're going to have to find a way forward.
Rym Momtaz
But is it theoretical? I mean, again, I think, you know, what Macron was talking about seemed pretty concrete to me. He is talking about building up with these select countries, first of all a kind of connective tissue that is concrete. Talk about reinforcing, sharing intelligence. Talk about identifying lines of communication when it comes to deterrence. Talk about increasing conventional capabilities that can shoulder a nuclear deterrent. And that also includes deep strike capabilities, which we've seen are vital for a conflict like Ukraine and Russia. So, I want to kind of drill down Ulrich on your criticism. What do you think the Europeans would have accepted from France? And which Europeans are you talking about when you say there is a problem of credibility here in the French proposal?
Sophia Besch
The Baltics, but Ulrich, go ahead.
Ulrich Kühn
That's my answer. The Baltics, first and foremost. Let's unpack that. So, first of all, I think that Sofia is totally right. Let’s focus on how we can make that better. And let's also, I mean, my critique aside, but let's also be clear about the fact that we have a French president who is a true believer in the idea of Europe. And that's a great thing. And we don't know for how long we have such a president in France. We should talk about that option.
Rym Momtaz
In 2027 there's a presidential election in France. The polls give the far right as the clear winner, but of course, we're far away from that presidential election.
Ulrich Kühn
Let's talk about how can we turn that into something better? So the first thing I think is that those eight countries that have been invited by the French, to bilateral dialogue., that was the word. They want to make sure at some point that the French don't play divide and rule here, but that we get one forum for all of those. I know NATO will balk at that and will say oh my God, that's replicating the NPG, the Nuclear Planning Group, but since France is not getting into the Nuclear Planning Group, the Europeans need to have a forum to talk with each other and the French about these issues. So that's the first thing.
The second thing is we need to have a discussion about who is included and who is not included. At the moment, this is basically drawing a line between Poland and the Baltics. And I heard some people at a conference last week say this is an invitation to the Russians to basically test French resolve. So, Macron said basically in his speech, we're going to talk to others, and we seek to increase the circle of participants. Hopefully soon the Balts have to be in there and others as well. I know, like, geographically seen it's a great breakdown of these eight countries. But we need more and ideally, we need all the countries in Europe that want to join that. And then we need to have a discussion about this point that the French don't want to deploy nuclear weapons abroad. Look, this is something where I think really something needs to change in the strategic calculus of the French. And perhaps they feel more secure about this point once they have more nuclear weapons and there was promise, you know, to build up the arsenal. Fine, that's good. But at the moment, just dispersing French Rafale fighter jets is great from a French perspective in terms of deterrence for France, because they are not just deployed at this one base. I think it's Saint Dizier, but now they're dispersed across other countries. But it's not so great for the other countries where the French fighter Jets are being deployed. They basically get a target on their back. So, we need to talk about also deploying French nuclear weapons there. I'm not going to get into the nuclear sharing model here, we're not going to see that. That's, that's, that's an uber taboo on the French side. Let's use that. Let's use what we have. Let's talk to the French. Let’s also see what we can do with the Brits.
Rym Momtaz
But Ulrich, I'm gonna get to you, Sophia. But Ulrich, I want to sort of go back to a couple of things you said. You say that if the French, you know, post their Rafale in other countries, they're putting a target on the back of these countries. Do you feel like the NATO forward-operating groups also put a target on these countries when they have brigades that are, that are based there? Is that what you're saying? Because the Baltics are very happy to have these NATO groups on their territory. They feel like it's a defensive tripwire and a security blanket, as opposed to what you're saying, which is a target on their back.
Ulrich Kühn
No, it's not, it's not opposed. It's exactly that. It's basically this is how extended deterrence in the U.S. mindset works. You put a tripwire there, you force yourself into reacting. But what force is there if we're only talking about 3, 4, 5 Rafale fighter jets and no nuclear weapons there? So there's a clear difference here in the quality of the tripwire. I wouldn't call the French idea a tripwire. And I think the French would also say, no, it's not.
Rym Momtaz
No, I'm not saying that the Rafale being posted there is a tripwire. I just wondered if you were saying posting Rafales in another country puts a target on their back, whereas posting, you know, conventional troops, of which France by the way contributes to, is not putting a target on their back. I wanted you to explain the difference between the two. Sophia, go ahead.
Sophia Besch
Well, I just. This is sort of a follow on from where this conversation is going. But I think we risk separating the nuclear discussion from the conventional discussion. I mean, Macron made an effort in his speech, which again we sort of fall back into this great step for France, a small step for humanity. Right? Like, this is huge. It's huge for France to include conventional into, not officially, but into deterrence thinking, even mentioning this in the speech, this is all. It's big and it's important. I think you talked about, you mentioned that he pointed to early warning, air and missile defense, deep precision strikes, all of that. Sort of a little bit implying maybe a division of labor in Europe. But France, of course, needs to be a part of. Of these conventional projects as well, he's committed to these projects. I think, you know, one, these enablers are weak and they're underdeveloped. We're not at all at the point where we can say that we have built up these kinds of conventional capabilities. And two, I do think that, if I as friends wanted to fix my credibility issue, I would think about permanently stationing troops in the Baltics. I think that this. If right now we have a situation where Donald Trump at a rally is asked would you risk New York for Tallin? And he says absolutely not. Which I am sure he believes. But they've managed to get him to not say that so far, but he says, absolutely not. There's a big crisis in Europe. What do I want France to do? I don't think the first thing I want France to do is join NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, station Rafales, you know, change their doctrine of the European interest. I think the first thing I want them to do is permanently station their troops in the Baltics to make absolutely clear that when they talk about the European dimension and the European interests, who is Europe? Who's included? Are the Baltics in or are the Baltics out? The question is much clearer on Poland and Germany than it is on the Baltics. And I think that's where the most credible criticism for me of France comes from.
Rym Momtaz
That's very interesting, because you are basically saying it's not enough for them to be rotating through, you know, their soldiers through the Baltics, which is what they do right now. They need to go that step above. What I have to say I am struck by in this discussion is that there is no disagreement over the need for France to pick up this leadership role when it comes to filling that security and defense gap, which I have to say was not something that people had consensus over in Europe until very recently. So am I misunderstanding what you're saying? I don't feel like either of you is saying this is not France's job. It should not be talking about this right now. What we should be doing is just continuing with what we have, which is America's nuclear umbrella. Because so far the Trump administration has not actually questioned that. Ulrich?
Ulrich Kühn
I would agree with that assessment. I mean you, you heard me. And I'm, I'm, I'm more or less disappointed. I wanted the French to do more. So yes, in that regard and in that specific realm, I want to see French leadership for a very simple reason. They have the stuff, they have the nukes. I mean the Brits are out, the French are there, they have the nukes. What are the alternatives that the Germans start building nukes? Sure, we could do that. It would take a long time. It would be very costly, not just financially, but also politically. Two thirds of the Germans hate that idea. So yeah, I want French leadership.
Rym Momtaz
And do you think that actually in Germany in particular there is enough consensus on the political side to accept that role for France? Or are the criticisms about, you know, France will do this, but it wants Germany to pay for it, or it wants to do it at the expense of other Europeans? Do you think that that is still something that is going to come up in discussions?
Ulrich Kühn
Look, I think two points matter. The one is that the term of the nuclear IQ, meaning like how well-developed is a nation's or a specific elite's ability to think in strategic in nuclear terms is still in official Berlin comparably low. I would argue it has gotten better in the last couple of years, but it's still comparably low. So, I'm not certain that all people really understand sometimes what those nitty gritty details, that actually do matter, what they mean. However, when we talk about what the elites in Germany and as well as the population want. I just did a survey together with another colleague of mine where we did ask that the German public and we also asked that members of the Bundestag and the preferred option in the scenario where the U.S. withdraws is the European option, meaning stronger reliance on French and British nuclear deterrence. That is the preferred option. Almost the same figures for the elite as well as for the public. We haven't published our results yet, but that was interesting for me and I think it shows just, you know, where the Germans want this to go.
Rym Momtaz
That is, I mean definitely interesting when you know that the behind-the-scenes tensions that are happening right now. Sophia, you get the last word.
Sophia Besch
So, well, a couple of last words then. one, I would say that one of the issues that we're having with the intra-European debate on nuclear deterrence, you can sort of use the term nuclear IQ as symbol of that challenge, which is that there is a perceived and real hierarchy between the nuclear powers and the non-nuclear powers, which is there, is founded in a tradition of nuclear strategic thinking versus not having to do that, but is certainly not helpful in the tone of the conversations. And going back to the comment that Ulrich made about divide and conquer, I think this is something for the French strategic establishment to think about. Obviously, they prefer a situation where they have a bunch of dialogues with countries where they get to set the tone and teach them about French nuclear strategic thinking. We're going to have to get to a more European perception of that that might challenge some of the French doctrinal assumptions of the past few decades. Second, I think, so is this better than what we have? I would say that right now the system that we have is incredibly fraught, but we don't yet have an alternative. That's a problem. I think we don't really have nuclear deterrence in Europe right now that I fully trust in. The Munich security reports on nuclear models, that they published called it a deterrence gap. I think that that's right. I don't trust in the U.S. Nuclear extended deterrence. Publicly, most European leaders will still say that the U.S. nuclear umbrella remains central. No one's trying to replace it. France at the same thing. European options are supplementary. This is sort of an insurance policy. But even if the concern is not formal withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons, there's certainly declining enthusiasm in the U.S. over their role in Europe. They are very conflicted over to what extent Russia is a threat. They are pondering, withdrawing on the conventional side. And if you have a real disintegration of U.S. nuclear and conventional posture in Europe, that weakens your deterrent as well. And also, you know, they have a really extortionate approach to alliance management, and they can use their nuclear deterrence as a leverage in the future. And as a European I want to hedge against that. At the same time, I don't think we have an alternative yet. We have to build it up right now. I think the way that Macron framed it in his speech as not an alternative but a supplement is actually the smartest way to frame it from where we are right now.
Rym Momtaz
Well, this is obviously an issue we are going to have to get over and talk and talk over for many months and I think years to come. It was truly a pleasure to have both of you on. I'm sure what you've said will actually make people in France react and keep thinking this idea that it is true what Sophia says, that the French still feel like they need to explain their nuclear doctrine more to their European partners because of how dominant the American doctrine has been. Because as you said, Sophia, it has had decades to be absorbed by the European systems. And unfortunately, the French don't have that time right now to go up, to build that out with their European partners. So certainly something we will have to come back to. Thank you so much to both of you for making the time to join us today.
Sophia Besch
Thanks for having me.
Ulrich Kühn
Thank you.
Rym Momtaz
Thank you for joining this month’s episode of Europe Inside Out. For those who are interested in learning more about nuclear policy, I encourage you to follow the work of Carnegie Europe and the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program on X and LinkedIn.
Our producer is Mattia Bagherini.