Rym Momtaz, Thomas de Waal, and Garo Paylan examine why the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations remains stalled and how Europe might help revitalize the process.
Relations between Turkey and Armenia remain frozen, largely because of Azerbaijan’s influence over Ankara and a lack of sustained Western diplomatic engagement.
Rym Momtaz sat down with Thomas de Waal and Garo Paylan to discuss the main obstacles to a rapprochement and why reopening the Turkey-Armenia border matters for both regional and Western interests.
[00:00:00] Intro, [00:01:35] The State of Turkey-Armenia Relations, [00:11:58] Russia's Influence in the Process, [00:20:47] Can the West Play a Role?
Thomas de Waal, March 17, 2025, “Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Major Step Forward,” Emissary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Thomas de Waal, September 19, 2024, “Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Fragile Peace Process,” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe.
Thomas de Waal, July 11, 2024, “Armenia Navigates a Path Away From Russia,” Carnegie Europe.
Thomas de Waal, Dimitar Bechev, and Maksim Samorukov, May 30, 2024, “Between Russia and the EU: Europe’s Arc of Instability,” Carnegie Europe.
Thomas de Waal, September 22, 2023, “A Tragic Endgame in Karabakh,” Carnegie Europe.
Garo Paylan, January 30, 2025, “Leveraging International Pressure to Reform Turkey,” CivilNet.
Garo Paylan, January 13, 2025, “Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Deal: A Golden Opportunity for Trump,” Wall Street Journal.
Garo Paylan, July 3, 2024, “Why Washington Must Push Forward the Fragile Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Plan,” Emissary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Rym Momtaz
Hello and welcome to this episode of Europe Inside Out. I'm your host, Rym Momtaz, editor in chief of Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe's blog, where twice a week we publish punchy, short analysis on all things strategic in Europe.
In today's episode, we're delving into Armenian-Turkish relations, or lack thereof in this case. We're going to look at the current state of relations, more than a year after the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War. The border between the two countries has been shut since 1993, and a reopening seems harder to reach now. We'll explore the dynamics at play on the Armenian side and the Turkish side. And they aren't just domestic and historic, but also geopolitical. And we'll look at what space there can be for Western and, in particular, European diplomatic initiatives to reinvigorate normalization between the two countries.
Rym Momtaz
To discuss this, I'm happy to welcome two colleagues who have extensive in-the-field experience on these issues: Tom De Waal, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, who focuses on the Caucasus and Eastern Europe; and Garo Paylan, a visiting scholar with the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., and he focuses on the South Caucasus in Turkey. He's also a former member of the Turkish Parliament.
Hello to you both.
Garo Paylan
Hello.
Thomas de Waal
Great to be with you.
Rym Momtaz
Garo, let me start with you. You say that after an early momentum in 2022, normalization between the two countries is stalled, but it's not dead. What's happening?
Garo Paylan
During my service in the Turkish Parliament, I always urged the Turkish government to open the border and normalize relations with Armenia. But there was a stumbling block, no? Baku’s objections to this opening. And unfortunately in 2020 there was a terrible war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the second Karabakh War. And Turkey was expecting leverage over the so-called Caucasus with that war. But unfortunately, Turkish government saw that Turkey was one of the losers of that war. Maybe Russia had more leverage and Azerbaijan as well, but Turkey was one of the losers of this war. Then I convinced the government to extend the hand to Armenia and that this normalization process started. But Turkey always saw this as a bargaining chip, because Turkish economy was not bad, and Erdoğan always sent messages to Western capitals that he can get credit out of this opening normalization process. But unfortunately, whatever Baku was offering was always better than Western offerings. So Aliyev knew how to buy Erdoğan’s silence. And unfortunately, this peace process, this normalization process within Armenia and Turkey unfortunately has been stalled, but it's not that yet.
Rym Momtaz
So can I jump in here and ask you, like, what's the deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan? Because I think there's a widely held perception, at least among some people, that it is Turkey that is dominant in the relationship with Azerbaijan. But you seem to suggest otherwise, at least on the Armenia issue.
Garo Paylan
Yeah, of course, the Turkish South Caucasus's policy is unfortunately a hostage to Baku because Turkey and Western capitals' relations are terrible, and there is no investment coming from the West. And let's say Aliyev just announced another eight-billion-dollar investment plan to Ankara. It is the only investment plan which is just planned to Ankara. That is how Baku buys Erdoğan's silence. And you are right. In this equation, Ankara was the elder brother, but now Aliyev is playing this elder brother role in this policy.
Rym Momtaz
Tom, I wonder if you could give us a bit also of the sort of historic context, because I think, like just a normal person who doesn't have your expertise, they would think, of course, Turkey and Armenia, they can't actually have normalized relations because there was a genocide. Turkey doesn't recognize that there was an Armenian genocide by the Ottoman Empire. And that's something that the two sides are not going to get over. Is that a simplification, like, what's the background of this relationship today?
Thomas de Waal
Sure. Well, of course there's a lot of very, very bad history between these two nations because of the 1915 genocide against the Armenians by the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of the Turkish Republic and of, you know, Turkey, as we know as a, as a government and mainly as a society, has denied that for generations. And so obviously there's trauma there, there's history. But strangely enough, this is actually not the main issue. It's obviously a cloud that hangs over relations, but it's not the main issue that prevents normalization. Turkey did actually recognize Armenia as an independent state in 1991 with the end of the Soviet Union. It just didn't open diplomatic relations. And then it was the war with Azerbaijan which really froze things. And as you said, the border was cut.
Rym Momtaz
The Armenia-Azerbaijan war.
Thomas de Waal
Yeah, exactly. The Armenia-Azerbaijan war of the 1990s, in which Azerbaijan, as Turkey's closest ally, there's this kind of phrase about one nation, two states, that they're basically two very, very close Turkic states. And out of solidarity with Azerbaijan, Turkey closed that border, and so it's not really history that hangs over this, but it's not actually the main obstruction. It is the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. And let's be clear here, 10, 15 years ago, Turkey had conditions for opening the border, which was that the Armenians would get out of some of the occupied regions of Azerbaijan. Then the condition was that the Armenians would get out or remove its forces from Nagorno-Karabakh. Both those conditions have been met. And so it's the Armenian side which basically says, we're ready to do this, this is good for us. We want to open to the world. We're not setting the genocide as a precondition. It's the Turkish side, which is basically putting the brakes here. And as Garo said, it's because of their relationship with Azerbaijan.
Rym Momtaz
So I want to go back on this issue of the border because it seems to be pretty central. So it's been shut since 1993, which is the longest shut border on the European continent, if I'm not mistaken. These countries don't really have relations, right? Turkey and Armenia. So what's the big deal? Why should they have an open border if they don't actually have normalized relations? What's at stake here? I'll start with you, Tom, and then I'll come to you, Garo.
Thomas de Waal
Well, I mean, for one thing, you know, closed borders, surely we should not be living in an era of closed borders anymore. You know, that should be something for history. Second thing, it's actually open borders are good economically. It's good for Armenia, which can diversify its economy heavily reliant on Russia at the moment, who they regard as an unreliable partner. And they want to diversify their foreign policy, their economy. And the moment the Turkish border opens, that's the moment that Armenia can open its land borders to the West and begin to do that. It's also good for Eastern Turkey. Garo can confirm that many more people live on the Turkish side of the border than the Armenian side. So it's good all round. Obviously, it will be difficult, but it's definitely something which is good for the South Caucasus, very good for Armenia. In the long run, there would be a lot of, I think, short-term pain involved in opening that border after so many years economically to such a big market. It also helps to lift this terrible burden of the past when Armenians and Turks can mix more freely.
It's a bit of a no-brainer. I mean, I think the trouble is that this issue is a kind of second-order issue. You know, when everyone talks to Turkey, they're talking Syria, they're talking Cyprus, they're talking Ukraine and Russia. And this issue always gets pushed down the agenda, unfortunately.
Rym Momtaz
So, Garo, it seems like Turkey has a lot of leverage here, you know, on the border issue specifically, what's the perspective from the Turkish point of view? Why wouldn't they open that border?
Garo Paylan
Actually, Turkish-Armenian border has been closed for more than a century now. After Armenia was established in 1991, the border was open for only a year, but there was no real trade. And then, after the first Karabakh war happened in 1993, Turkey closed the border. And for 30 years, there was a fear in the Armenian community that the threat will come from Turkey and Azerbaijan. So we need Russia to save us. So Armenia relied on Russia, but Armenian committee saw that Russia is not coming for their help. When that catastrophe, second catastrophe happened in Artsakh, in Nagorno-Karabakh or when Azerbaijan occupied some Armenian territory as well. So, the Pashinyan government started to put its bets on normalization with Turkey. Pashinyan’s government knew that they need to diversify this relationship and they need to mitigate the dependency on Russia. So Turkish border opening would be a lifeline for Armenia. And that lifeline means again just a lifeline for the European Union as well. That is how Armenia can diversify its relations. But unfortunately, as Tom said, the Turkish Eastern part is so much underdeveloped.
It is going to be very significant for Turkey's eastern cities as well. Even the nationalist Turks want this border opening. But as I said, the Turkish economy is so much vulnerable. Turkey's economy needs some billion dollars of investment. And Aliyev, Azerbaijan, Baku invested so much in Turkey. They have media outlets, they have so many economic cooperation. And there is also a payroll in Ankara. And that is how unfortunately, despite Turkish brokerage, all of them know that this is a window of opportunity for Turkey, let's say having more leverage in the South Caucasus with normalizing relationship with Armenia and just helping Armenia and Azerbaijan just have this peace deal. And with that, Turkey can have more leverage. And this is a window of opportunity. Anytime Russia can be back in the region, and have more leverage. This is the reality in Ankara. But unfortunately, who decides the policy? Erdoğan. And Aliyev buys his silence with some billions of dollars. To change this equation, we need some big power to incentivize, to change this reality with Erdoğan. But unfortunately, there is no conversation between the Western capitals, let's say between Trump and Erdoğan. We saw that they had a telephone conversation last week, but this was not on the agenda.
And European capitals only criticize Turkey, of course, for Erdoğan's wrong things about jailing his biggest rival, İmamoğlu, let's say this is why this conversation couldn't start. So there is an unfortunately vicious cycle there. And the only way to change this now, I guess there is only one man in this world to change the equation. It is Mr. Trump. But Trump is not interested in this peace agenda because Armenia doesn't have the cards.
Rym Momtaz
So we're going to get into what the Europeans could do, what they're not doing, and what the United States and the Trump administration could do, and they're not doing. Before I get there, both of you mentioned another external actor: Russia. And Russia actually had deployed its troops and was manning basically the Armenian border for a long time, and they only withdrew, if I'm not mistaken, in 2024. So, Tom, I just wonder if you could give us a sense of how the Armenian-Russian relationship has developed and is evolving. You're also an expert on Russia and used to cover it.
Thomas de Waal
Sure. Well, let me slightly correct you on one thing, Rym, the Russian border guards have actually withdrawn from bits of the Azerbaijan border and Yerevan airport, but they're still there on the Turkey border. I think Russia still regards Armenia as an outpost in its contestation with Turkey. And you know, Turkey and Russia, let's not forget, have fought, you know, countless wars in the last two or three hundred years in the Black Sea and the Caucasus, you know, including, of course, the famous Crimean War. So that contestation is still there. And Russia tries to play on this Armenian fear of Turkey to stay in Armenia. But this Pashinyan government is different. They see Russia now as an unreliable partner. And I think the population is basically behind them. They see that Russia has not defended them in the last few years against Azerbaijan. And so the population has shifted. I think if only five or six years ago in opinion polls, 90% of Armenians regarded Russia as a good ally. That figure is now below 30%. It's been a massive public shift. Pashinyan wants to diversify foreign policy. He thinks that relying on Russia has been a mistake.
He doesn't completely want to exclude a relationship with Russia, that would be crazy. You know, Pashinyan went to the victory parade in Moscow on Red Square. So he's not completely throwing out Russia, but he definitely wants to open up to the West. There is an opening here. But as Garo says, you know, the more that Russia achieves some kind of stability or ceasefire in Ukraine, the more capacity it has to look elsewhere. And I think getting rid of the Pashinyan government in Armenia, either through interfering in the elections or even some kind of dirty tricks or active subversion, would definitely be on their agenda.
Rym Momtaz
So, would you compare their actions and their role on the Armenian side to the Azerbaijan role on the Turkish side?
Thomas de Waal
Not really, because I think the Azerbaijan-Turkey relationship is real. I think they do have different strategic perspectives on issues like the Middle East. And I think a lot of people in Turkey are frustrated with Azerbaijan on this issue and would like to open the border. The Russia-Armenia relationship is a very dysfunctional one. It's like, you know, an abusive parent, I would say, in which that child is trying to grow up and break its dependency.
Rym Momtaz
And Garo, how is Russia's role in Armenia perceived in Ankara?
Garo Paylan
Ankara knows that Russia is occupied in the Ukrainian front, and Russia will be back and might be back, and this is a window for Ankara to step in. And all the clever bureaucrats and diplomats understand this. And there is a huge frustration about Aliyev and Baku in Ankara. But as I said, just like in the US system nowadays, Trump decides. In Ankara, it is maybe 100% more, Erdoğan decides. And if you buy Erdoğan's silence with some billions of dollars, the rest is only a nuance, unfortunately. So Aliyev prefers a weak Armenia, an isolated Armenia. I'm an economist and I did this projection about it. If this border opens, of course, the risks about Armenia, of course, the biggest risk was the security risk. And people don't see their future in Armenia. Let's say from 1993 to today, Armenia lost half of its population. Now, in Armenia, there are 2.5 million people living. In 1993, it was 3 million and it could have been 6 million today, half of its population. And with an isolated Armenia, even Armenians don't see their future there. So Aliyev's policy is very clear, keeping Armenia isolated, even seeking some prospects to attack.
If Iran-Israel escalation happens today, you might not see it as a big risk, but it might anytime happen. He plays for time and he believes now Moscow is on his side, Ankara is on his side. Even Israel, they created a huge alliance with Israel lately. Trump's special envoy, Witkoff, landed in Baku. And two days after that, Israel and Azerbaijan signed a big, big energy deal. And then Trump wrote a letter praising Aliyev. This is what emboldens Aliyev to keep maximum pressure on Armenia, to keep Armenia isolated and weak. And Aliyev knows very well that if this border opens, the Armenian economy will boost and it's going to create a strong army and Armenia will have the capacity to deter Azerbaijan. This is Aliyev's, I guess, nightmare. That is why he doesn't want Ankara to normalize the relations with Yerevan.
Rym Momtaz
So, Garo, you brought up the, I mean, I think we can say massive population, you know, movement away from Armenia. And so it's an opportunity for me to ask you, what about relations between, you know, average Turkish and Armenian citizens? I understand that on the geopolitical and the political level, you know, we've laid out all of the obstacles that are there, but is there enough constituency or enough of a strong constituency on both sides, the Turkish and the Armenian sides, that would advocate for a real normalization and warming up of relations?
Garo Paylan
Turkish nationalists had three traditional enemies, so-called enemies, Greeks, Kurds and Armenians, let's say. But when this normalization process started with Greece, people started to go as tourists to each other's countries and they saw that they have a common culture. And of course there are bad Greeks or bad Turks or. But good Turks and good Greeks as well. With the Kurds nowadays we see another peace process. Of course they have a common culture, but with Armenians and Turks, there is no people-to-people attraction unfortunately. Even when I first became a member of the Turkish Parliament, everybody was looking at me because the perception about Armenians were all about, they are traitors. In the textbooks, they only teach Turks as Armenians were traitors, this and that. And then they start to say, Garo, how can you be an Armenian? You are a good guy. Because their perception was all about Armenians are bad, bad, bad. Maybe the same perception was.
Rym Momtaz
So, how would you answer that, though? How would you answer when they said, you're a good guy?
Garo Paylan
Yeah, yeah. But the same perception was on the other side of the border. We are lucky Armenians because we were living in Turkey, but we are a small minority. Most of my friends were Turks, of course, they were democratic Turks. But the diaspora doesn't have this chance. Or the Armenians living in the other side of the border doesn't have this chance. Most of them, but especially diaspora is the problem now. Let's say Armenians living in Armenia came to the terms that “oh, we need to open this border, start relations, whatever, because Russia is the biggest threat to Armenia.” But diasporans, no, unfortunately, they didn't come to the terms because they believe Turkey is the biggest threat to Armenia. But no, I proposed so many bills to the Turkish Parliament about Armenian genocide, but no, for this. If you don't have a future, let's say, if you don't have people attraction, you will never find justice in the past. That is my point. We need to, of course, have a future together, open the borders, start diplomatic relations, cultural relations, people-to-people attraction and trade or whatever, then we can talk about the past. But unfortunately, this border opening is the stumbling block before this.
Rym Momtaz
So I want to turn now to the two other big outside actors, the Europeans on the one hand, and then the Americans. And Tom, I want to hear you on the Europeans. What can they do? Can they still do something now in terms of effective diplomacy to warm up this process? Because it seems like the normalization between Turkey and Armenia is frozen, but Europeans would actually stand to benefit from a warming up and a reopening of that border. You know, I'm based in France, and I see how often the French government, you know, makes a public show of support for Armenia, but I sometimes wonder if they're able to be a good mediator because of the state of their relations with Turkey, where there's a lot of tension. So if it's not France, which has, you know, a lot of ability, diplomatic, who can be that in Europe?
Thomas de Waal
I think this speaks to the kind of philosophical debate within Europe about Turkey. Do you engage with Turkey or do you isolate? And, you know, Turkey obviously does itself no favors when the president arrests, as Garo said, his biggest political rival. Hundreds, thousands of people are in jail, including, you know, many, many friends and colleagues of Garo’s. So it's not easy to work with Turkey. But I think selective engagement with Turkey, in my view, has to be a good thing. It's an indispensable power in the Middle East. It's absolutely crucial in the war on Ukraine and the Black Sea. And here again, you know, I think there's an underused economic cooperation potential with Turkey. You know, lots of EU projects on transport, energy, global gateway are basically frozen with Turkey, which I think does no one any favors.
And let's be blunt here, that there's one player in the EU who blocks this all, and that's Cyprus. And Cyprus is a, you know, a one-issue country. We understand what that issue is, but I don't think it actually, in the end is good for Cyprus either to have this complete freezing of relations with Turkey. And, you know, if you talk to Mr. Pashinyan's people, they want economic cooperation with Turkey. So I think, and this is obviously a question for Paris, you know, if you want to help Armenia, can you swallow your pride, swallow all those difficulties with Turkey and try and build an economic cooperation relationship with Turkey, which is obviously difficult given what they're doing on the political front.
But I think my view is that engaging with Turkey is necessary. It doesn't mean that you can't criticize them for the other things they're doing. And I think economic engagement is absolutely essential and probably maybe the bridge where you can build to Armenia as well.
Rym Momtaz
So listening to you, it would have to be some sort of combination of EU, because that's where the economic immediate benefits to Turkey would come from, and perhaps with another layer of maybe Franco-German diplomacy. Germany, because they have such good, strong relations with Turkey in a way that France doesn't, and then just both of them together. You know, it makes me think of what Garo said at the beginning of the podcast, which is that there has to be an immediate benefit for Turkey in order for them to engage constructively on this. Otherwise, you know, an actor like the Turkish president, why would he give in on this instead of keeping it as a bargaining chip, I guess, or a pressure point? Garo, you're in Washington right now because you're a visiting fellow at Carnegie's HQ there. So I wonder if you could share with us, you know, your discussions with U.S. officials, including in the Trump administration. At the beginning of the podcast, you said that it doesn't seem to you like this is really on the agenda, even when President Trump is talking to President Erdoğan. So do you think anyone in the administration is ready to expand political capital?
It doesn't have to be the president himself. I mean, the US is a big country, but is there like, you know, a special envoy for the president or someone in his cabinet who could take this on?
Garo Paylan
President Trump doesn't like the vulnerable people and vulnerable countries, unfortunately. He likes power and he likes the cards. You saw, of course, how he behaved to President Zelensky, he said, you don't have the cards. He cares about the cards.
Rym Momtaz
From his perspective, he's going to look at the situation and think actually Turkey has cards and Armenia doesn't.
Garo Paylan
Yeah, exactly. The conversation with Erdoğan and Trump was the Syrian issue. And because no, Trump praised Erdoğan for overthrowing the Assad regime, let's say, and he wants to work with Erdoğan and no, Erdoğan is very clever. He extended a hand to Kurds. Now he's creating some leverage to sell this to Washington, D.C. “Look, I am getting along with the Kurds and you shouldn't let Jolani’s regime fall.”
Rym Momtaz
The new Syrian president, which the Turkish government supported a lot in its fight against the Assad regime.
Garo Paylan
Yeah, let's do some sanction relief. And there are a lot of construction, hundreds of billions of construction, which Trump's narrative is like that there. And we can do it together, even work about Gaza, there is a narrative there. So what is the narrative in the South Caucasus? Unfortunately, it is only peanuts for Trump. And when we hear the narrative between Baku, Israel, and Ankara. No, let's say it's all about energy deals, SOCAR's deals and President Trump's special envoy, Witkoff, was in Baku, that is what we heard is mostly about these energy deals. So, unfortunately, Yerevan doesn't have the cards, but there are cards that we need to explain. That's what I'm trying to do with the high-ranking officials. China is in the region. China is creating so much leverage and Russia will be in the region as well. And Armenia is at the crossroads. And Iran of course has also leverage in the region and Russia as well. And Turkey will be one of the losers of this game. If not, we cannot save Armenia and the border will be sealed forever. If we see a pro-Russian government, let's say next year, this vicious cycle, a revanchist government in Armenia, next year elections, we will see another vicious cycle in the region.
So this is the risk for United States. Unfortunately I couldn't see that much sophisticated diplomats, unfortunately who are in charge or politicians in the region in the USA. So that's why I'm trying to just sell them that there is something for the USA, for U.S. interests. And there is a conversation that you can start with President Erdoğan, let's say, because this is something that Erdoğan and Trump can work on. Actually last year there was a window of opportunity, but President Biden unfortunately just turned a blind eye on it. And Erdoğan sent messages in these four years at least three times to Washington, that I am ready to open the border. Of course, things are transactional. This is a bargaining chip. Erdoğan had some demands, but Mr. Biden was not ready to just say yes to these demands. And unfortunately, some Armenian diaspora organizations were only saying “sanction Turkey, sanction Erdoğan.” That was another reason Mr. Biden didn't want to give anything to Erdoğan to open this border.
Rym Momtaz
You know, listening to both of you, what's striking to me is just how reminiscent of a Cold War situation all of this is. At the end of the day, it's going to boil down to what the United States does, what Russia can do as a spoiler. And it's just striking that all these years later, and despite, you know, a strengthening of the geopolitics of the EU and Europeans, they're still not able to be the central actor on a long-term historic conflict on their own continent. And that, I think, should be food for thought and hopefully can push the EU and its member states to be more pragmatic without, again, setting aside the Cyprus situation. But it can't take hostage an entire, in a way, big situation also on the continent.
I really want to thank both of you. This was very interesting and I think it will be enlightening to a lot of our listeners. Thank you so much.
Thomas de Waal
Thanks so much.
Garo Paylan
Thank you.
Rym Momtaz
For those who are interested in learning more about Armenia-Turkey relations and related issues in the Caucasus, I encourage you to follow the work of Carnegie Europe on X and LinkedIn.
Our producer is Mattia Bagherini. Our editor is Futura D’Aprile of Europod. Sound editing by Daniel Gutierrez. Sound engineering and original music by Jeremy Bocquet.